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19 November 1985

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

STATUS OF GULF ECONOMIES DURING OIL SLUMP REVIEWED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Sep 85 pp 48-51

[Article by Henri 'Azzam: "The Gulf Economies Are Adjusting to the Recession"]

[Text] It appears that the Gulf Cooperation Council countries -- the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar -- will continue to adjust their conditions to conform to the sluggish economic growth of the next few years. The recession the council countries are experiencing is different from that in the industrial countries, since it is regarded not as a periodic phenomenon but a result of foreign and structural changes which began 3 years ago. The drop in the levels of oil revenues from their oil exports, the continuation of the Iraqi-Iranian war and the increase in the severity of the problems which arose from the al-Manakh market crisis in Kuwait constitute the main causes of the economic sluggishness existing at present. Therefore, the region's economies will not be able to start realizing stable growth until the foreign variables threatening their stability are eliminated and the performance of the structural modifications the economy requires are completed.

Although the region has suffered from recession for a period of almost 3 years, the private sector is still not optimistic as to economic conditions improving in the near future, it is expected that economic activities will experience further contraction, it is observed that many of the small organizations which are poor in expertise have stopped functioning and that some other organizations have faced problems of cash liquidity, and the main problem which causes banks in the region extreme anxiety is creditors' lack of promptness in paying and the difficulty of guaranteeing loan repayments.

In addition to the foregoing, the drop in the prices of real property and stocks has had a strong influence on the decline in value of the collateral the banks are holding in exchange for the loans in their possession.

The problem of unpaid loans may be attributed to a number of causes, among them the drop in the levels of government spending, the delay in payments due, the al-Manakh market crisis in Kuwait, the drop in the value of shares and real properties, the inadequacy of management and the failure of many

people to realize the true nature of the new situation with the end of the period of prosperity. The main share of the debts belonged to the construction sector, since small contractors borrowed massive amounts in the hope that the government would continue to give profitable new awards, but this did not happen. The problems the contractors faced extended and included importers of construction materials, equipment, and consumer goods; they also had an indirect effect on all other economic sectors.

The main areas for expansion in the remaining years of this decade include unfinished goods, investment, maintenance services connected primarily to the public sector, computers, communications equipment and the manufacture of intermediary chemical products.

It is worth pointing out that the volume of government spending dropped this year in comparison with last year. The 1985-86 Saudi budget calls for revenues and expenditures to be in balance at the figure of approximately 200 billion Saudi riyals (\$55.4 billion), now that the government has been compelled to draw on its foreign assets to cover the budget deficit which has occurred in the past 2 years. This year's budget is considered to have experienced a contraction, since the volume of government spending dropped 6.5 percent in comparison with last year's real expenditures. If the anticipated increase in oil revenues is not realized, this will lead to aggravation of the current economic recession.

In the other council countries, the governments at the present time are seeking ways and means to guarantee a reduction in budget expenditures. Thus Kuwait's budget for the year 1985-86 includes the first planned reduction in the modern history of the country; the volume of these expenditures has dropped by 4.4 percent in comparison with last year, coming to \$12.5 billion (3.7 billion Kuwaiti dinars).

Qatar's budget for this year is considered the second austerity budget in succession, and it is expected that the emirates will announce an austerity budget this year as well.

In addition, the Cooperation Council countries will continue to adjust to the new period in the history of their development, characterized by a drop in oil revenues, a slowdown in the development process, a decline in inflation rates and increased cooperation among themselves. The economic decline in the area occurred as a period of major development was ending and the main portion of the projects needed for the infrastructure were completed. Thus, attention has now been diverted to the industry and services sector and also to the more competent operation of existing economic facilities.

It is clear that the region's prosperity is firmly connected to future eventualities in the international oil market. Therefore, the council countries have started to prepare to face a drop in oil revenues the next few years. Pressure is also mounting on the OPEC organization's member countries to reduce their production or take the risk of subjecting oil prices to a new decline as the weakness in the international oil market continues, although there is no great hope of increased demand for the organization's oil. Adding to the complexity of the situation, the increased production of

countries outside OPEC will in our opinion lead to a drop in demand for Middle Eastern oil in the foreseeable future. It was noted that the area's oil production dropped by 17.3 percent in the first quarter of this year compared with the same period last year. In the spot oil market, a barrel of Arabian Light oil is selling at at least a dollar below the official price.

Thus, while the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had been producing about 9 million barrels a day in 1979, the volume of its production has dropped, coming to 2.5 million barrels a day in the last 2 months. This figure is far below the 4 million barrels a day on whose basis the estimate of the kingdom's oil income for the new 5-year plan years, 1985-90, was set out. If prices remain between \$25 and \$27 a barrel (the official OPEC price is \$28 a barrel), the organization will have to reduce its output further, and this the Gulf countries might reject for technical and financial reasons.

The possibilities of an increase in the quantities of oil offered on international markets and the modest increase in demand, which is estimated at less than 2 million barrels a day between now and 1987, have increased the possibility that prices will drop in the foreseeable future. Therefore it is expected that the region's revenues from its oil exports will remain below the desired level for the next 3 years.

The Gulf Cooperation Council countries are trying at the present time to diversify their economic base, so that oil revenues will constitute an income source of declining importance while the contribution of their petrochemical, fertilizer and refined product exports rises.

The region's economies in the past 2 years have experienced an obvious shift from a balance of payments and general budget surplus to a growing deficit in both. The total deficit recorded by the Cooperation Council countries' current account is estimated at about \$3.19 billion in 1984 and \$8.78 billion in 1983, as compared with a surplus of \$6.4 billion in 1981 and \$11.6 billion in 1982 (see Table One).

Table One: Current Accounts Budget of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (in Billions of Dollars)

	1981	1982	1983	1984*	1985**
Saudi Arabia	38,353	-1,000	-18,433	-13,220	-11,000
Kuwait	13,702	4,460	4,590	5,300	6,000
The Emirates	9,207	6,211	4,500	4,300	2,200
Qatar	2,384	1,124	409	400	300
Oman	315	357	-73	-30	--
Bahrain	262	545	220	60	100
Total	64,223	11,597	-8,787	-3,190	-2,400

*Preliminary estimates ** Expected.

Table Two: The General Budgets of Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, 1981-82 to 1985-86 (in Millions of Dollars)

	1981-82	1982-83	1983-84	1984-85	1985-86
Saudi Arabia					
Total Revenues	107,761	71,690	64,378	60,225	55,400
Total Expenditures	83,352	70,974	74,392	73,136	55,400
Surplus (or Deficit)	24,409	716	(10,014)	(12,911)	--
Kuwait					
Total Revenues*	15,454	11,074	10,359	10,646	10,352
Total Expenditures	13,464	10,752	12,681	12,969	12,497
Surplus (or Deficit)	2,011	322	(2,322)	(3,323)	2,145
The Emirates					
Total Revenues	6,318	4,372	3,526	3,502	3,500**
Total Expenditures	5,621	5,245	5,014	4,696	4,000**
Surplus (or Deficit)	697	(873)	(1,488)	(1,194)	(500)
Qatar					
Total Revenues	5,170	4,514	2,400	3,280	2,650
Total Expenditures	4,069	4,166	3,900	4,644	4,694
Surplus (or Deficit)	1,101	348	(1,500)	(1,364)	(2,044)
Oman					
Total Revenues	3,654	3,402	4,178	4,519	5,105
Total Expenditures	3,258	3,061	4,777	5,110	5,695
Surplus (or Deficit)	396	341	(599)	(591)	(590)
Bahrain					
Total Revenues	1,427	1,512	1,663	1,449	1,350
Total Expenditures	1,132	1,389	1,681	1,149	1,350
Surplus (or Deficit)	295	123	(18)	--	--

*Does not include revenues from foreign investments. ** Preliminary estimates.

The council countries' oil revenues in the past 10 years exceeded the allocations made for spending in these countries' budgets, and large surpluses were accumulated by these countries. The governments became the main motive force of economic and commercial activity, leaving the private sector to play a secondary role in the overall development process. However, these countries' budgets started to register a deficit after their revenues from oil exports dropped. While the Saudi budget calls for a balance in the revenue and expenditure sections, Kuwait, Qatar, the emirates and Oman expect that there will be a deficit greater than last year's (see Table Two).

This striking shift from surplus to deficit has of course led to the occurrence of structural changes in the economies of the region. As a result of that, the high growth rate which characterized the seventies disappeared, to be replaced by an average decline in growth of 3 percent in 1984. The real growth rate of council members' non-oil gross domestic product came to about 3 percent in the past fiscal year (4.5 percent in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), the lowest rate to have been recorded in the course of this decade. It is also expected that the growth rates for 1985 will be lower than that, while it is expected that the current decline will drop to its lowest levels at the beginning of 1988. The end of the eighties and the early nineties will witness a resumption of prosperity in the area's economic conditions, thanks to the expected increase in world demand for OPEC oil.

Moving over to the area's commodity imports, we find that they recorded a negative growth in 1984, having realized growth rates of 50 percent in the years 1973-78 and 17 percent in the period 1979-1981 (see Table Three). Thus the council countries' total imports from the United States, Britain, Germany and Japan dropped by 24 percent in 1984 compared with 1983. The country most affected by this decline was the United States, since the rise in the exchange rates of the dollar made Japanese and European imports cheaper.

Table Three: Gulf Cooperation Council Country Imports from Main Exporting Countries (in Millions of Dollars)

	America			Germany			Britain			Japan		
	1984	1983	Per- cent	1984	1983	Per- cent	1984	1983	Per- cent	1984	1983	Per- cent
Saudi Arabia	5,564	7,903	-42	2,189	2,816	-28	1,835	2,242	-21	5,634	6,687	-16
Kuwait	635	741	-17	621	656	-6	403	505	-25	1,432	1,763	-19
Emi- rates	695	863	-24	425	484	-14	724	862	-19	126	1,357	-17
Oman	168	174	-3	211	160	-32	521	681	-31	508	468	8
Bahrain	145	135	7	114	142	-25	185	227	-23	274	329	-17
Total	7,291	9,996	-37	3,643	4,369	-20	3,865	4,845	-25	8,149	10,837	-18

This decline in imports growth was accompanied by a corresponding drop in local consumption. The commodities most severely affected by this were the basic consumer commodities, such as foodstuffs, clothes, electronic goods, cars and finished consumer goods. While the rates of growth of consumer spending amounted to about 10 percent in the late seventies, these expenditures registered a drop ranging from 2 to 3 percent in recent years.

Demographic (population) changes constitute one of the distinctive manifestations of the adjustment process. The total number of people coming to the Gulf area in 1982 amounted to 6 million, representing about 45 percent of the total population of the council countries, which comes to 13 million. In 1984, these countries' total population registered no increase for the first time in their modern history. It is expected that more than 2 million foreigners residing in the council countries will leave these countries in the course of the next 5 years.

The other phenomenon which marks the adjustment process is the growth of the private sector. In 1970, this sector contributed 38 percent of the region's total domestic product, but it is assumed that this share rose to about 55 percent in 1984. It is also expected that this sector's contribution will exceed that rate in the foreseeable future, after the economies of the area have made adjustments to give this sector broader scope to participate in their various activities. For example, the rate of annual increase in the magnitude of private sector activities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has come to 13 percent.

It is likely that public and quasi-public companies such as national airline companies, refining and petrochemical complexes and telephone, telegraph, postal, electricity and water companies in the kingdom and the other council countries will take steps aimed at gradually transferring their ownership to the private sector.

The countries of the area expect that the private sector will contribute a greater role to the development process. These countries point out that this sector has managed in the past 10 years to acquire tremendous assets. For example, the banking sector in the area has about \$70 billion in its possession. However, the banks invest these sums outside the area. It is expected that real estate and stock prices will continue to drop up to 1988, when the process of economic revival is expected to start.

In spite of the efforts taken to reduce expenditures in Cooperation Council countries, probabilities for the medium term do not inspire pessimism, since it is expected that the transitional stage the economy of the region is witnessing at the present time will lead to more stable economic growth, while not, however, reaching the high levels by which the past decade was characterized. The tremendous revenues these countries realized in the seventies (which are estimated at about \$200 billion) will continue to constitute their safety valve during the periods of stagnation and consolidation.

Demand for oil in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development recently began to rise and it is expected that the glut will end. Therefore the question which has now been raised is, will the private sector in the

council countries increase its participation in the economy of the area and start bringing the foreign assets of its investments back into the local market?

The drop in prices is also to be considered another manifestation of the main phenomena by which the current transitional stage is characterized. The area as a whole witnessed a perceptible drop in living expenses. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the inflation index dropped by 1.5 percent in the fiscal year 1984-85. In another area, the countries of the region experienced some decline in wages which in some cases reached a rate ranging from 30 to 50 percent. The merchants are also finding themselves compelled to accept low profit margins as a result of the drop in prices and the slowdown in rates of economic activity. Thus, high profit margins, which sometimes came to 200 percent in the past decade, have disappeared.

The factor most influencing the financial conditions of council country merchants is the drop in the value of real estate and stock. For example, the value of real estate in some major cities in the area dropped by a rate of as much as 40 percent in some cases. It should be observed that a large number of residential facilities in the Gulf area are not being rented out and that it has become difficult to obtain financing for new projects.

The condition of the stock sector has not been better than that prevailing in the real estate sector. The price index of stocks officially traded in the Kuwait markets dropped by 50 percent in 1984; it is believed that the true rate of the drop is higher than this figure, because 18 of the companies listed in the securities market, totalling 47 companies, registered no trading activities in their stock. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the prices of bank stocks dropped to half compared with their level 2 years ago, and from [line missing] oil in the world markets with the advent of the end of this decade. In another area, the council countries will increase their rate of oil products exports while the region's revenues will be bolstered in view of the rise in volume of its sales of petrochemical products and fertilizer. It is also expected that the industrial sector's existence will be greatly consolidated in the course of the next few years and that the contribution of the private sector in the council countries to gross non-oil domestic product will increase.

It is expected that the stability of geographic and political conditions will lead to the enhancement of economic expansion in the countries of the region, especially since the end of the eighties will witness the end of the effects left by the al-Manakh market crisis and the setting of a limit on the war underway between Iraq and Iran. It is expected that economic activities in these countries will experience substantial improvement as a result of the reconstruction and development activities the two neighboring countries will require after many years of combat.

It is also likely that in the nineties the area will experience a strong growth period after the world reverts once again to heavy reliance on Gulf oil, which after 10 years is expected to account for more than 75 percent of international oil exports. It is not unreasonable to expect that the revenues of the countries of the region from oil exports and petrochemical products will lead to prosperous economic conditions in this part of the world once again.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

TURKS 'OFFENDED' BY WORLDWIDE ARMENIAN PROPAGANDA

Athens AZAT OR in Armenian 10 Sep 85 p 1

[Text] The Turkish papers are once again "offended" by the current anti-Turkish propaganda effort, and they consider it unfair. Thus based on reports from their Brussels correspondents the Turkish papers write: "The Armenians are using every means at their disposal to influence world public opinion and to discredit and to disgrace Turkey in the eyes of the world. Most recently, they extended their propaganda work in that direction by turning the so-called 'Armenian genocide' into an cartoon booklet."

The Turkish papers clarify what they mean later on by stating that the source of their "resentment" is a newly published 50-page anti-Turkish booklet called "The Blood of Armenia" created by two cartoonists named Vidal and (Clave) and published by a relatively unknown publishing house called Dargo.

"The book, which is already on the market, incorporates on its final pages several photographs and a map which depicts the territory of a fictitious ancient Armenia."

That is how the Turkish press describes a publication which supports Armenian rights; furthermore, it considers it as anti-Turkish propaganda.

The Turkish propaganda machine also uses other methods to "smear" and to discredit this publication. The Turkish papers find the publication "unattractive" and contend that it was printed with "relatively primitive methods."

The Turkish papers further claim that the goal of the said publication is to promote the Armenian cause and "to level certain accusations against Turkey."

The booklet was created by a Frenchman named Guy Vidal. The events take place on a fictitious island called Ohanian in the Black Sea. The booklet conveys a true depiction of the Turks' character and their despicable ways.

In the story, the governor of the island has a red, blood-colored dog, and he instigates the local population to assault the Armenians. The Turkish papers claim that the Armenians spent large sums of money to have maps showing the borders of Armenia printed on high-quality glossy paper.

According to the Turks, by this publication the Armenians want to create new provocations and to resurrect the massacres which began in 1894-1896 and which continued intermittently through World War I.

The Turks are offended because this booklet depicts the genocide perpetrated by the Turks against the Armenians and because they see no need to talk about such things which discredit them since they believe that an Armenian genocide has never taken place.

The author of the booklet, Guy Vidal, who tells the story of a massacred and tormented nation through his illustrations also includes an historical map which he calls Armenia. It is this map which irks the Turks most.

One part of the booklet deals with the sufferings of an Armenian refugee named Dikran.

The booklet also talks about a Jemal Nazim Pasha who is appointed as governor of the island. In the story Jemal first sends all the stray dogs on the island to another island nearby and then unleashes the Moslem population of the island on the Christian populace, and these events are used as a vehicle to tell the history of the massacres.

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CSO: 4605/7

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

EDITORIAL SCORES SOVIET VOTE ON UN GENOCIDE RESOLUTION

Athens AZAT OR in Armenian 14 Sep 85 p 1

[Text] Persistent efforts by Armenians in the last decade resulted in political success in Geneva when the UN Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities approved Paragraph 24 [of Benjamin Whitaker's report] which contains references to the Armenian genocide.

The outcome of the voting, which followed sharp exchanges of views and intense debates, was to keep British expert Benjamin Whitaker's report unchanged. Fourteen delegates voted in favor of the report, 1 voted against it and 4 abstained.

Fourteen favorable votes is an outstanding result which contains all the elements of a triumph.

Some of the delegates that abstained are Turkey's traditional friends, so that their stand does not surprise us so much.

However, the stand taken by the Soviet delegate, Sofinski, who attempted to defeat the motion to endorse a report containing references to the Armenian genocide, evokes in us more repugnance than surprise.

Such an attitude was completely unexpected from the Soviet delegate.

On the contrary, the Soviet delegate would be expected to defend the motion more strongly than anyone else.

But what we expected did not happen. We got exactly the opposite.

Would it not be appropriate to ask Mr Sofinski by what unwise reasoning was he led to take such a stand?

How will he explain his vote to the Armenians of the diaspora and, especially, the government and the people of Soviet Armenia and the government and state representatives and officials of the other Soviet republics?

Will he suffice by confessing that he was under orders to take that stand or that such a posture was suggested to him?

Will he suffice by stating that the already martyred Armenian cause was once again "sacrificed" on the sacrificial pedestal of Turkish-Soviet political and economic interests?

How cynical can one get? When the delegates and experts of states and governments with more friendly ties to Turkey did not go further than abstaining, Sofinski preferred to remain alone and dared to raise his hand to express his disagreement with the endorsement of a resolution on the Armenian genocide.

In addition to the ARF's [Armenian Revolutionary Federation] Armenian national committees, the alert guardians of the Armenian cause, the entire Armenian nation closely watched the developments and the voting on the resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide. The committees and the people were not dismayed by the outcome which is valuable as a starting point for future successes in the political domain, as a means of keeping a favorable record in the annals of this great international organization and as a source and basis for future studies and references.

Such significant victories can be achieved in our national and political pursuits, and major as well as minor successes can be realized in the course of our persistent struggle, but all these must not "intoxicate" us and lead us to complacency and inaction.

It is obvious that Turkey must be enormously enraged by the voting on Paragraph 24 (formerly Paragraph 30). The Turks will not rest; they will knock on doors, they will apply pressure wherever they can, they will blackmail whenever they can, they will make promises to anyone who needs their promises and they will make concessions where they have concessions to make. They will make every effort and use any means to prevent the endorsement of a similar resolution in the [UN Human Rights] Commission.

The Turks are terrified about any reference or inscription in international forums on the genocide perpetrated by them against the Armenians. They continue their blind and insensitive policy based on denial and distortion.

The Turkish propaganda machine has probably resumed its work through official and governmental channels to prevent a second voting on this resolution in the [UN Human Rights] Commission. In that commission the delegate of each country will show his political maturity, honesty and moral integrity and whether he can stand on his principles and thus deserves to remain at his post.

Whatever the outcome of the voting in the Commission, the voting in the Subcommission does not cease from being a crucial victory.

The outcome of the voting must not lead us to excessive joy and daydreaming. More correctly, it must serve as a starting point for political successes in our future struggles and broader plans, until such time as the Armenian reality becomes a matter of conscience in the hearts of all persons by its past, its present and particularly by the realization of its demands in the future.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIANS SAID TO BE IN QUEST OF DOCUMENTS AGAINST TURKS

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 25 Sep 85 p 1

[Text] MILLIYET correspondent Sami Kohen reports from Washington:

The House Resolution [HJR] 192 on the Armenian question which has remained on the agenda of the House of Representatives for weeks is, to use an appropriate term, asleep. This resolution, which is based on allegations about the Armenian genocide, is revived every April and is put on the agenda for discussion. This year, too, it has been waiting for attention in the files of the House Rules Committee.

Congressmen who are sympathetic to the Armenians have recently been working very intensely to take the issue out of the hands of the committee and to bring it before the full House. Indeed, most recently Connecticut Representative Barbara Kennelly and California representatives Tony Coelho and Charles Pashayan have resorted to new means to keep the issue alive. These three congressmen are searching through Congress archives and examining its minutes in the last part of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century. Whenever they find anything that is favorable to their cause they lift it from the dust and publish it in the daily publication, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

A document mentioned by Barbara Cannelly refers to 24-27 January 1896. In those days, the U.S. Senate purportedly protested the mistreatment of Armenians by the Ottoman authorities. In its note of protest the United States demanded from the countries which participated in the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to guarantee the security of Armenian lives and property. This forgotten document, which is completely unrelated to the main Armenian allegations, was thus revived 89 years later and included in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD which contains the official minutes of the Congress' deliberations.

Tony Coelho has demanded that newer documents related to the events of 1915 also be included in the minutes. He succeeded in his pursuit and had recorded certain events in Anatolia in 1915-1920 about which a senator named Warren Harding spoke at the time declaring that all Armenians within the borders of the Ottoman Empire had been exterminated. It is also interesting that this document also contains references to the Armenian republic established near the Soviet border and records the satisfaction expressed by the United States and Washington's message of congratulations and good wishes to the said republic. Meanwhile, Pashayan had a document about 1896 included in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

It is evident that Coelho, Pashayan and their sympathizers are displeased with the current course of events and the shelving of HJR 192 and they have turned the full ire of their disappointment on the Administration.

The Administration does not want the said resolution passed in Congress; Secretary of State Shultz has asked Congress to vote against the resolution when it comes up again for voting.

It is generally believed that the said resolution will not be able to rally the support it needs and that it will ultimately fail because the issue is waning and it is losing its urgency among congressmen and in the press.

9588

CSO: 4605/8

ALGERIA

DISSIDENT EXPATRIATES DEMAND POLITICAL PLURALISM

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Brahim Younessi, a former journalist of Algeria's Radio-Television and Dr Abdelkader Sahraoui, a former member of the FLN French Federation and a publisher: "For Democracy!"]

[Text] To free political prisoners, abolish the single party and return civilians to power.

If, at the time independence was achieved, there was hope that, as a first step, an even pretended political pluralism could become established in Algeria despite the trends of the then government, chances for such a possibility were compromised by the 19 June 1955 coup.

For 20 years, the Algerian nation, reduced to silence, has been deprived of its freedom acquired after more than 7 years of war against colonialism. National self-determination does not just mean independence from foreigners, it also means men's individual and collective freedom to choose democratically their institutions, representatives and type of society which better meet their aspirations.

Luckily, it is extremely rare for a sovereign nation to choose a dictatorship over democracy. This statement would undoubtedly be confirmed if the Algerian nation had the right to express its opinion freely. Moreover, for several years now, it has shown a little more openly each year, its dissatisfaction and desire to give itself some "areas of freedom."

It is in that context and for the purpose of warning international public opinion on the repeated attempts against civil rights that an Algerian League of Human Rights, not recognized by the government, was recently established. Unfortunately, its existence was short-lived. Most of its members, including its president, Attorney Ali Yahia Abdenmour, were arrested and charged with attempt against national security.

The negative, to say the least, attitude of the authorities before any attempt to publicize politics in Algeria risks, in time, to exacerbate the anger and plunge the whole country into violence. A nation cannot be indefinitely silenced without eventually reacting. Furthermore, the premonitory signs of an explosive situation are becoming increasingly more apparent. In order to defuse this situation in time, there are no other alternatives than to free all the political prisoners, without distinction, abolish the single party in favor of pluralism and return civilians to power for the purpose of forming a public safety government.

ALGERIA

FRENCH SOCIOLOGIST DEFENDS ALGERIAN POSITION

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Denis Duclos, a CNRS sociologist: "No More Serenity"]

[Text] In Algiers more than elsewhere in North Africa, political debates cut through the various social classes.

Maybe bequeathed in bitterness after his visit to Algiers (LE MONDE dated 20 July 1985), de la Guérivière's journalistic "will" seems too unilateral to me. Could not the "Algerian neurosis" and the "lack of serenity" which he is criticizing simply be updated signs of pride from a people who, having refused to be crushed by the colonizers, continues to reject any form of contempt, condescension or underhanded malevolence which often characterize the attitudes of the former colonial power toward a nation endorsing all opportunities leading to independence?

De La Guérivière's portrait of present Algeria systematically forgets the nuances and details which separate truth from caricature. To emphasize that longevity is shorter in Algeria than in Morocco or Tunisia without mentioning that Algerian statistics carry over the vestige of a liberation war, the full horror of which was not experienced by either of these two countries, is not very accurate.

To stress the "dirtiness" of Algerian towns while ignoring the spectacular progress made these past few years in the housing and town planning sectors, lacks elegance. To criticize once again the shortages and difficulties, real to be sure, in supplying goods without speaking about the recent efforts to promote distribution and short-circuit the black market, is to show partiality.

The Algerian Proletarian's Image

Could the feudal-liberal Moroccan "model" be preferred by the French over the Algerians' socialistic model?

Could the wealth-poverty contrast offered by an economy based on foreign tourism be supported by France because it flatters the feeling of exotism with which western tourism assuages its apprehension of always being the ascendant? Algeria refused that type of under-development leading to dependency and parasitism: Could we be blaming it implicitly for this refusal? This would explain La Guérivière's silence on the scope of industrial investments in Algeria and the insistence on the world-scale training of qualified cadres, replacing a "cooperation" which continues to be viewed unduly as charity to a backward country. This would also explain the silence over the efforts to promote a Saharan agriculture (threatening to reverse the flow of trade with the regions located further north).

On the other hand, why this insistence on immigration? Is it not because, maintained by us in the lowest and less remunerative positions of our economy, it brings back to our minds the picture of the Algerian proletarian as we would like him to remain forever: A subservient figure with whom it would finally be impossible to converse equal-to-equal? The migrants, whose wages today remain for the most part in France, may be the subject of a certain mistrust on the Algerians' part: to begin with, it is because, by refusing to normalize their situation and to integrate them in the respect of cultural differences (which characterize France), we make them into an uprooted population, channeled into engaging in marginal activities, currency trading and barter of French goods.

On the one hand, we take industrial and commercial advantage of this "specialization" of migrants and on the other, we use them to "screen" the new Algeria whose doctors and engineers, having graduated from the best world universities, no longer correspond to the archaic image of Algeria that we would like to retain.

Political Freedoms

To criticize without the proper perspective the attempts against human rights in Algeria, whereas at the time the de La Guérivière's article appeared, one could read in LE MONDE itself, the commonplace news of the undetermined number of immigrants' murders in the Marseille region, which had not been or were poorly prosecuted, or the arrest of an union leader in Tunisia, is dealing lightly with this serious issue about which there are no lessons to be taught by either side.

There is political repression in Algeria and I am the first to regret it (along with the signers of the petition in Yahia's support); but do people think that the recognition of minorities and the development of democracy in Algeria has been encouraged by having France yielding for many years to the "saturation point" themes to the extent that the "buddies" system had to be set up hastily to counteract the rising "lepenism"?

We cannot remain unconcerned by the curtailment of political freedoms and the trend toward authoritarianism and personal power in Algeria. We can only wish for a shift toward a regime supported to a greater extent by the civilian movement and allowing political pluralism. But it is unfair not to note that in North Africa, Algeria is probably one of the countries in which political debates cut through the various social classes; in which the voluntarist plan for society receives the most support from a mass of people turned toward a cultural ideal (the extraordinary mobilization of people around baccalaureate results is a case in point).

A Responsible People

Discussions about the Kabyl identity (which is purely Arab and not Kabyl in Algeria, going back to the 5,000 conquerors from the Orient?) and religious guidelines are part of the important problems of that society. It is to be hoped that they will take place more seriously, without foreigners, whether French, Saudi, or Moroccan interfering everywhere. But it is essential to bear thoroughly in mind that those are the problems of a sovereign Algeria and of a responsible nation which is not answerable to the former metropolis and which decides its options on the basis of worldwide criteria, France being no more than one of the many parameters to be taken into account. It is at the cost of this (simply realistic) respect that, in the future, we will be able to help build, in that African and European "time-zone" of the Wests where geography will determine for us a peace and development policy [as published].

ALGERIA

PROBLEMS OF RESETTLING URBAN POOR DISCUSSED

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 3 Oct 85 pp 16, 17

[Article by Messaoud-Khelifi Abderrachid: "To Restore Proper Conditions of Life"]

[Text] The transfer of residents of "bidonvilles" to the interior of the country is neither simple nor easy. In addition to the material problems there are in effect the more complex human ones. The attraction to the city remains very strong, even though people are often living under very poor conditions. Rapid action is needed to provide to the "transferees" at a minimum: housing, a school, but also work. Sidi-Hadjeres at M'Sila has realized that this is a race against the clock. Things are progressing in big steps, we are told by Messaoud-Khelifi Abderrachid, however a great deal remains to be done.

A few scattered houses that spring at random from mounds and hills, a few buildings on the rocky margins of a national highway that appear safe but are in fact so treacherous, a few inhabitants whom no mirage has been able to draw away are there, have been there forever, trying to live, to the extent that living in this desolate terrain is possible. A countryside without colors, as if in agony, that the sun of an ending summer enflames; that is Sidi-Hadjeres, in M'Sila wilaya, a village, a locality that the miracle and logic of an administrative decision, the latest redistricting, jointly produced. A quickly refurbished building is the headquarters of the infant people's communal assembly (APC), three or four offices in a line, a corridor that serves as waiting room, a door, and you are immediately outside.

Aside from the tufts of wild grass that decorate the surrounding empty space, there is no, or almost no, greenery, except for the already dull and dusty or bright and brand new green of the tents, where dozens of families moved from Algiers as part of the operation originally called "Capital Clean-Up" have been and are living. Perhaps this title was seen to have a rather ludicrous connotation, or at least a doubtful one... At any rate, the operation, which has not changed in substance, is today called "Struggle Against Unstable Housing," that is, the shanty towns.

Of all the wilayas, M'Sila is to receive the largest number of these transferred families. And in the entire wilaya it is Sidi-Hadjeres locality,

which is totally deprived, that will receive the largest number. A few dozen meters behind the line of buildings are the tents where whole families live, among the piles of iron and sacks of cement provided to them to do their own construction. There is perhaps some irony, it is hard to know where or what, in the fact that most of the tents are located at the base of a silo.

This young man, who lived with his family in a shack at El-Harrach, is now here at Sidi-Hadjeres, since immediately after his release from national service, and now what? "We have been here since 16 August 1983, and we are still in a tent. When we arrived there were no facilities to receive us! It was very difficult, extreme misery. No work, no water, rain, children. I myself took a year to find work. Before that, all I could do was get 100 DA here, 200 DA there."

At least in principle, families are given priority everywhere to be able to build for themselves. Our contact continued: "However, we were given 3.5 million, and what can one build with that? Almost nothing." And puffing on his poorly rolled cigarette, he listed the costs of the foundations, the mason, and the laborers. In the meanwhile the metal bars given to him are piled up in confusion around the tent, and the cement is inside it. "We sleep with it, that is how it is, otherwise it would deteriorate."

A few meters from us, a crowd of children, tin cans in hand, are busy, amid bursts of laughter, emptying water from a tank. The water was bought. For how much? "That depends on the size of the tank, and we must also pay for renting the tractor that tows it."

In 1983-1984, Sidi-Hadjeres, which was not yet a commune, received 125 families. In 1985, it will have received 265 families, for a total of 2,570 people. In relation to the means and resources of the new commune, this has been a real human tidal wave. The current population of the commune is about 7,000 people, the APC president said, "while in 1966 there were 24,000, before it was deserted." The APC president himself is, how shall we put it, a 'transferee.' A bizarre term, 'displaced'? To think that there is no term that is both correct and dignified, though the Arabic term is quite direct: 'removed from household.' Let us stop our digression and return to our APC president. A teacher at Reghaia, and with a house, it happened that he was with a relative in an El-Harrach shack when the census officers came through. Sick of the city, and sick of the school and many other things, he let things take their course... until he found himself in the very first convoys of the transfer operation. Originally from the area, though he had never lived there, he decided to stay, "because I am here." At the furnace and at the mill, in order to get settled himself and help other families get settled, he discovered the buildings, the equipment and the tasks, and also discovered in himself, as he said, "a passion for politics."

Returning to more mundane matters, he said that "the commune is virtually run by volunteer effort." In the way of resources, there is only a small income from the covered market and from a bus, so often broken down that one would think it had been built that way. Much is expected of several small projects, probably a leather work industry, to provide some stimulus. Unemployment in the locality was already severe, but since the arrival of dozens of families the situation is improving. No, that is not a paradox: the shortage is so

large and the pressures so acute that "major" answers were necessary. Under its own program the wilaya undertook a building project of 404 houses, in which almost 10 public and private enterprises are involved. In short, for the present there is work.

Those already there are, in one way or another, busy. Will those coming, and who will continue to come, experience the same difficulties, the same trauma, the same constant approaches to every administration for a tent, for a house, for a piece of land, for supplies, for work? In the meanwhile, the convoys continue to arrive at the rate of three per week, a rate that sometimes catches the local authorities totally short. Hamza, a draftee into national service who is in charge of operations in the wilaya, is virtually on a battlefield: receiving, orienting, helping, convincing, repairing.

This is neither simple nor easy. In Sidi-Hadjeres alone, there are 116 families still living in tents. As for those arriving, every effort is made to orient them ourselves toward their kin, but often nothing avails. Overcome by the emptiness and isolation, the families flatly refuse to get out of the trucks, and demand at least tents, "whose use has been prohibited, but in vain." In the beginning, that was all there was.

In 1984, 113 plots were granted for individual construction. In 1985 there have already been 125, with an average area of 300 square meters, in return for the symbolic dinar. Elsewhere, for example at Sidi Aissa, the land has been sold directly. The M'Sila wali explained to us that "the commune will have to repay the money to the buyers."

Since 1983-1984, only five houses have been self-built. As for the rest, the stage of construction depends on the resources and initiative of each family, and ranges from zero to 80 percent. Two block factories have been built on site, and the plan is to give probably 2,000 blocks to each self-builder. The financial aid has increased to 5 million centimes as of January 1985 since the emergence of a new trend: "People are more and more seeking to benefit from self-construction."

Under the amount of pressures and urgency, an effort was even made to construct "Berber style, however, it was recognized to be too expensive." Metal framing is lying around loose in the APC. In an operation recently undertaken, platforms have been built for 20 houses to benefit social cases.

Without any doubt, the transfer operation poses a host of problems, since families are sometimes living with only their bodies and their dignity. Looked at from the point of view of the families transferred, the operation is a painful experience. To suddenly have to break with a town, habits, a way of life, and an environment, and then find oneself there in a tent, in an empty landscape, and to have to begin all over again...

The communes see in it possible addition of skilled labor (luck had it that Sidi-Hadjeres found itself with 86 drivers!), however it sometimes threatens, when there are minimal conditions, to overwhelm them with insurmountable difficulties.

Finally, from the point of view of the central decision-makers, the operation has a vital nature: restoring a balance in occupation of space. The interior

of the country has been deserted, with three-fourths of the population concentrating in the north. The high plateaus policy thus has a strategic importance. It is dreamed that the train will one day reach Sidi-Hadjeres, going right by it. And what has been done already (the project for 404 houses, and self-construction) is being perceived as the initial outline for an entire urban belt, still to come, with its college of intermediate studies, market, and clinic.

In the interim before that happy time, the households total 15,496 people. In 1985 it is to receive 1,424 households, or 12,982 people. And that is not a theoretical figure, since in Algiers a "household" is counted as all the people living in the same shack. In reality, the household can include two families. In fact for M'Sila wilaya this breakdown yields the figures for 1985 of 1,620 households for a total of 14,832 persons.

Some families have benefited from urban housing; others from aid in self-construction, and still others have been settled in the agricultural villages, but how many are still living cooped up with their relatives or in tents?

For 1984, there are still 815 families that have not been housed. Not to mention the large number of "local" population who are still waiting for housing or a plot of land. This is agreed to be a thorny problem that crushes by its scope those communes that have weak resources and facilities. To handle it, the wilaya has outlined what could be called an "urgent program": 1,456 lots for self-construction, 500 housing units under construction, and 285 others planned. All, or almost all, of these housing programs not yet carried out in M'Sila have been assigned to receiving communes, including Bir Fedda and Sidi-Hadjeres.

The wali of M'Sila said in regard to these issues to be handled and others: "Housing comes first of all; we try to avoid as far as possible putting people in tents; we have promoted self-construction, which may be a solution. As for the rest, such as schooling for children, it can be concluded that there is no problem, they have priority admission. As for employment, that is another story. In Bir Fedda we now have 84 employees who have not been placed in jobs, and we are trying to direct them to other sectors. There are some problems, for example the national companies that do not want to recruit their own staff who have come from Algiers. Elsewhere, for example in Ain Erriche where agriculture is the sole possible alternative, there has been an experiment in acquiring land property. People have benefited from loans, tractors, from Mazda. There is a shortfall of jobs, so there must be an overall response. Several projects will be planned that will create many jobs. Small units will even be transferred to poor communes, and wilaya budgets will also be used to the fullest for isolated communes such as Maadid, for roads and electrification. We are trying to make life more humane for the people who come. And as for the basic thing, housing, we have been given all we asked for rural housing, it is underway."

Much still has to be done at Sidi-Hadjeres, where "there was nothing. It is a gamble that we are winning." The wali also mentioned the anomaly of the term "household" in covering two or three families; it is not the "household" that needs to be housed, but the three families, "otherwise one will not have settled anything."

The most rapid solution, the one that affects and concerns the largest number, is self-construction. On condition, of course, that one is able to promote energy, strictness in construction, and regularity of supply of materials, which is not always the case. Here, also, there remain things to be done.

Thus, at this time when the effort is being made to give new impetus to creating the conditions to receive the people, there have been 2 long and painful years for the families under the rough canvas of the tents. Seeing the loans made available, and the programs launched or to be launched in order to take care of them in respect for their dignity and their privacy, one finds oneself wondering what may have prevented, what can still prevent, doing what was necessary to provide for their reception before they were transferred, that is, to ensure that optimum conditions existed or were established before the transfer convoys left. The task appears possible. It would certainly be fairer and so much less tragic than the manner thus far used.

9920

CSO: 4519/12

ALGERIA

EXPANDED ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH HUNGARY

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 4 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by F. H.]

[Text] A draft agreement was signed on Monday between Mr Abderrahmane Belayat, a member of the Central Committee and minister of urban planning, construction and housing, and Mr Laszlo Samogui, minister for construction and urban development of the People's Republic of Hungary.

The Hungarian minister has been in Algeria on a visit since 29 August 1985, during which he has inspected the Souk-Ahras and Annaba construction sites, which have been taken over by two Hungarian enterprises, Komplex and Emexpokt.

It may be noted that Mr Samogui's visit is part of the process of deepening the very satisfactory relations between the two countries, particularly in the building and construction sector.

The opportunity was taken to examine more closely the possibilities of further deepening bilateral cooperation in numerous economic sectors.

The Ministry of Housing believes there is good reason for taking advantage of Hungarian expertise in developing this sector of the country's economy. The draft agreement concluded thus expresses a desire to expand such cooperation by exchanging delegations and utilizing the accumulated technological experience of both countries.

Cooperation concerning the training and improvement of Algerian technicians is also one of the features intended to expand and give concrete shape to bilateral relations. The holding of seminars and technical and specialized conferences, organized by Hungarian experts, was also noted.

The two countries have also agreed to compare construction strategies and policies in an effort to further stimulate bilateral exchange relations.

With regard to the building and construction sector, however, we should also note that the Hungarian enterprises involved in the Souk-Ahras and Annaba construction sites are far behind in completing the 1,700-odd dwellings which have been under construction since August 1983, with a 41-month deadline.

Mr Samogui's visit to the sites has made it possible to enumerate the constraints in taking the necessary measures. Hungary has promised to complete the works within the contractual time limits. The lack of organization at the aforementioned construction sites was criticized by the Hungarian minister: a planning schedule has therefore been submitted and measures have been taken.

Finally, cooperation between the two countries in this sector has resulted in the construction of a heavy prefabricated units factory, completed in 1977, whose proper operation requires Hungarian technical assistance and supervision. This very important aspect was also recorded in the aforementioned draft agreement concluded.

11915

CSO: 4519/215

ALGERIA

UNION LEADERS ADOPT ECONOMIC, FOREIGN POLICY RESOLUTION

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 10 Sep 85 p 12

[Text] Algiers (APS)--The boards of directors of mass organizations and the steering committees of scientific, cultural and professional unions have adopted a political resolution which reads as follows:

"The national boards of directors of mass organizations and steering committees of professional, scientific and cultural unions, having met during the national conference held in the Palace of Nations on Sunday in the context of enrichment of the National Charter;

"Following the inaugural speech delivered by Mr Ahmed Sbaa, a member of the Central Committee Permanent Secretariat and an official of the sector of mass and voluntary organizations, in the presence of members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee Permanent Secretariat;

"After taking note of the draft reports on the principal issues to be debated in the context of the National Charter, as outlined by the representatives of all mass organizations and professional unions;

"Following the productive and constructive debate characterizing this conference in a spirit of discipline and responsibility, the participants adopted the general report subsequent to amendment and submitted it to the National Commission for a contribution by officials of mass organizations and professional unions to that operation.

"On this occasion, the participants reaffirm their faith in the principles of the Socialist Revolution and defense of its achievements, in strengthening the Revolution's foundations and supporting the vanguard role of the party, mass organizations and professional, scientific and cultural unions in direction, organization and supervision to enable political enterprises to fully assume their respective roles.

"Taking into account the democratic climate characterizing enrichment of the National Charter, during which the participants stressed the necessity of the socialist path outlined by the principles and goals of our revolution, as expressed by the Algerian people during their long history and reaffirmed from the time of their struggle for liberation to the present day, the participants reaffirm their dedication to the socialist choice intended to build a society characterized by social justice.

"In this regard, they believe that the overall development process must be based on solid foundations, planning, strengthening of the public sector and organization of the private sector by limiting its spheres of action so that it constitutes a support for the public sector, which remains the pillar of the national economy, characterized by socialist management of national enterprises.

"As the Agrarian Revolution is one of the foundations of the economic structure, the participants reaffirm the need for its continuation, to expand its application and to find more flexible and more effective methods of developing agriculture.

"The participants also stress the need for strengthening democratic education, eliminating ignorance and generalizing use of the national language, since the scientific, cultural, professional and political education of the human element remains the basic prerequisite for assuring overall development.

"In view of Algeria's consistent positions aimed at solidarity with peoples devoted to justice and security in the world, the policy of being a good neighbor and noninterference in the internal affairs of others, as followed by Algeria in the Maghreb and expressed in the peace and friendship treaty concluded by Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania, represents a veritable milestone in the process of building the Greater Maghreb.

"In this regard, the participants believe that only the contribution of the region's peoples will make it possible to build true unity.

"In view of the prevailing situation in the Arab Maghreb, and in particular the expulsion of workers from the Libyan Jamahiriya, the participants believe that the most appropriate solution to current problems is summarized by the policy of being a good neighbor in the context of productive cooperation for the benefit of the region's peoples.

"The participants therefore reaffirm their solidarity with their brother Tunisian workers and express their devotion to the principles of the peace and friendship treaty, considered the sole means of constructing the Greater Maghreb.

"The participants consider the appeal made by mass organizations and scientific and cultural unions to militants and to all citizens to be a support for their brother Tunisian people. It is also the sincere expression of the fraternal ties uniting our two peoples.

"The participants call on all mass organizations and professional, scientific and cultural unions to continue their activities at all levels to express their solidarity with the Tunisian people, whose suffering is shared by our people.

"The participants believe that any pressure or other such practice is contrary to the unity of Arab peoples, to which we aspire.

"The participants reaffirm their firm position in support of the Tunisian people, against all provocation.

"They condemn the policy of economic alliances and axes transcending the interests of peoples and their legitimate aspirations.

"The participants stress their support of the right of peoples fighting for their independence, their freedom and their sovereignty."

11915

CSO: 4519/215

EGYPT

DOMESTIC, ISRAELI POLICIES TOWARD AFRICA COMPARED

Cairo AL-DIFA' in Arabic Oct 85 pp 92-97

[Article by Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Mashat: "Egyptian and Israeli Policy toward Africa"]

[Text] The visit I made to a number of African countries to give lectures at universities on the theory of national security, African security, Egyptian foreign policy and the Arab-Israeli struggle has encouraged me to write about this important issue. During the visit and after it my conviction of the importance of strengthening Egyptian relations with the African continent and transforming it to the main fields which concern and touch upon the African citizen grew. We will analyze the most important vital dimensions of Egyptian policy in Africa, starting with a look at the new changes, an analysis of the two main threats facing the continent and the African view of the Egyptian role.

First: New Changes and Old Documents

1. All Egyptian documents point to the importance of the organic, historic relationship between Egypt and Africa, which represents the second circle of Egypt's foreign policy activity, as cited in The Philosophy of the Revolution: "We will not in any case, even if we want to, be able to stand aside from the bloody, terrifying struggle which is going on today in the heart of Africa; we will not be able to for an important, obvious reason, which is that we are in Africa and the peoples of the continent will continue to look toward us, who guard the northern gate of the continent and are considered its link with the whole foreign world. In no case will we be able to abandon our responsibility to help as much as we can to spread awareness and civilization to the heart of the virgin continent."

The National Charter also stressed that although "our people believe in Arab unity, they believe in an African league and they believe in Asian-African solidarity." The October 1974 document stressed the same notions, when it pointed out that "The first thing which affects us in the movement of the developing world is the movement of the fraternal countries of Africa. We belong to this continent and Egypt has fought for the sake of the solidarity of its countries and has participated in the establishment of the

Organization of African Unity. The African countries belonging to the League of Arab States contain more than a third of the population of Africa; the ties are numerous and the interests are mutual. Egypt will not forget the stand Africa has taken alongside it, and it must respond to the hand of cooperation the peoples of Africa extend to it and take its natural place among them."

2. The passage of more than a quarter of a century since the African countries gained independence has revealed important issues connected to the internal structure within Africa and its foreign relations with the former colonial countries and the major powers in general. The internal situation for the most part may be characterized by a high degree of violence. The economic structure suffers from obvious disruptions which are not attributable only to natural disasters such as drought but, more seriously, to poor bases of distribution, not to speak of profound common links between these countries and the colonial powers. Complicating the circumstances peculiar to these countries is the failure to embark on a process of national consolidation and continued political differentiation on a tribal basis, not to speak of the sovereignty of the single-party system, if any party exists at all -- a party which is also connected to tribalism, which monopolizes political power. To all that, it should be added that in spite of the increase in the interests of the major countries in the continent, especially with respect to rare strategic materials, the continent is last among the priorities of the major powers, especially the European ones. This fact makes the continent an important arena for the political activity of the leading countries in the continent or what we call the central regional powers, such as Egypt, not by way of substitution for the major powers but as a realization of the mutual interests of the countries which belong to the continent.

3. In the past quarter century, Israel and South Africa's activity in the continent has increased. We reassert the obvious communality which brings both Israel and South Africa together, as minority regimes, as regimes founded on settlement on the land of others or on neglect of the rights of others in a manner which asserts intensive racism, or as regimes established on the basis of violence. The two countries' activity in the continent has started to constitute a real challenge to the central regional powers, as well as conflicting with the interests of the other countries. The question then is, How can the African countries confront this challenge? Connected to this, as we will see, is the question whether or not the challenge coming from these two countries is to be considered so serious that it will prompt the African countries to shelve their political and ideological disputes for the sake of the common confrontation. If the answer is positive, it entails more responsibility for the central regional powers since they will not only offer concrete form to this danger but also will attempt to set out a common agreed upon strategy of confrontation.

4. All the foregoing means that the continent is open to countries which want to engage in influential activity in the political, military and economic fields. There is no doubt that Egypt, as an African country, a committed country vis-a-vis African issues, and a country which stresses its effective role in the areas around it, is qualified to play a major, influential role throughout the continent, a role which is not alien to Egypt. It was an

active country in the fifties and sixties and is trying to activate its role and have it extend to the main areas of interaction among countries.

Second: Israeli Activity in Africa

We will consider Israeli activity in Africa from the angle of its negative effect on African security and also Egyptian security. Israeli activity may be described through a number of important characteristics, which we can sum up as follows:

1. Concentration on actual activities, whether economic, military or technical, without adherence to political symbols which might expose African countries to embarrassment, especially in their relations with the Arab countries.
2. Concentration on sensitive activities, whether related to military training and preparation or the relationship to internal security agencies in the countries, or even to medical care for heads of state, as is the case in Zaire, where President Mobutu's personal doctor is Israeli by nationality.
3. The Israelis are distinguished by patient, careful planning for the desired results. Therefore, their expectations are coordinated with their investments in certain areas. The Israelis do not wish for results, do not impose conditions and do not remind the Africans of their superiority over them in any area. However, in spite of all that, they push the Africans to praise Israeli aid in their media or in their gatherings.

We can stress the highest objective of Israeli activity in Africa, which is embodied in strengthening political, military and economic relations so that Israel will become the main country with which the African continent deals. Thus Israel does not just have the goal of frustrating chances for Egyptian activity in the continent or serving the goals of the imperialist countries; it strives to expand the African market and create a higher degree of African subordination to Israel. This means that Israel does not just have the goal of recognition but also of acceptance or, if one may use the expression, the goal of normalization. It finds that its alliance with South Africa is essential to this end. Israeli activity ranges from the economic to technical and military areas, as follows:

A. Economic activity:

Israeli exports to the continent have developed from \$41.5 million in 1970 to \$190.9 million in 1980, that is, an increase of 460 percent in 10 years, as the following table shows.

It should be noted that Israel is realizing a surplus of no less than \$60 million in its trade with the continent. It is also to be noted that Israel's trade covers the most important African countries, even though no diplomatic relations exist between Israel and these countries. Indeed, this activity was the decisive factor which prompted Zaire and Liberia to resume their diplomatic relations with Israel last year. President Samuel Doe of Liberia pointed out in the magazine AFRICA NOW last May that there was no justification for the failure to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and its continued isolation.

Country	Israeli Exports (Millions of Dollars)			Israeli Imports (Millions of Dollars)		
	1970	1975	1980	1970	1975	1980
South Africa	10.7	34.7	79.2	10.2	40.2	117.1
Ethiopia	4.4	4.4	11.2	2.0	5.6	1.8
Nigeria	3.6	13.4	44.3	--	--	0.1
Kenya	3.6	3.8	15.2	1.2	2.9	4.7
Ghana	2.1	2.0	2.0	0.6	0.4	--
Tanzania	1.9	1.9	8.6	0.1	1.9	1.4
Ivory Coast	1.2	4.2	7.0	0.9	1.8	4.8
Liberia	0.1	2.9	0.3	1.2	2.3	--
Gabon	--	1.2	0.6	1.6	4.8	5.1
Other Countries	13.9	5.3	22.5	12.3	8.8	0.7
Total	41.5	73.5	190.5	30.1	67.7	135.7

Among the most important Israeli economic activities are those related to commerce, contracting, the trade in pharmaceuticals, insurance activities and financial investment. In Kenya, for example, there are between 17 and 20 Israeli companies dealing in contracting (such as the Soleil Boneh company), financial investment and trade in pharmaceuticals, which is considered Kenya's second most important import after oil. In Zambia, for example, there are two Israeli families in charge of supplying Israeli agricultural equipment to Zambia.

B. Military and security activity:

This activity is mainly concentrated on South Africa, but it does extend to a number of African countries. Israel trains military experts in Zaire and Kenya and supplies weapons to Ethiopia. On top of that, Israel is in charge of training the special forces in these countries, training the intelligence agencies of a number of countries such as Kenya, and exporting security products through an Israeli company known as Amiran. By means of these relations, Israel has the objective of influencing the political decisionmaking process in these countries.

C. Artistic and intellectual activity:

Israel trains experts in agriculture in many African countries. In Kenya, for example, more than 1,000 experts have been trained in agriculture and irrigation. It should be noted that this technical area supplies the most

important needs of the African countries in times of drought or in times of rain.

Israel takes part in United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) meetings. Heading Israel's delegation is a retired Israeli army brigadier general who is treated as an ambassador, Brig Gen Amos Shetiled. Israel has used its delegation's administrative office in Kenya to carry out consular activities related to the conscription of the Falasha Jews and issue passports to Israel in the case of those who are educated. To that it should be added that the Israelis in these countries issue cultural bulletins through which they try to distort the picture of the Arabs in Africa, not to say create African loyalty to Israel. An example of these publications is the British Israeli World Federation.

The most serious thing embodied in this activity is the possibility that it might extend to some African countries which take progressive positions in support of Palestinian and Arab rights, including Tanzania and Zambia, since these countries' positions are related to the personal presence of the president. Here we must remember the magnitude of the military interaction between Israel and the People's Republic of China after the death of Mao Zedong, which comes to about \$1 billion. There is no doubt that this constitutes a challenge and more than one question is raised on ways of confronting it.

Third: South Africa, the Other Alien

While Palestine is the only country in Asia which has not yet become independent, Namibia is the only country which has not yet become independent in Africa, because of South Africa's refusal to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations bearing on Namibia's independence. South Africa pursues numerous policies toward the countries of the continent aimed at increasing the level of its dealings with them. In this regard one can point to two important types of activity:

1. Military activity: South Africa is considered the least powerful of African countries, including the confrontation states, from the military standpoint, especially as regards traditional weapons. This fact is not known to people who engage in the study and analysis of South Africa.

It is true that South Africa, through cooperation with Israel, has managed to build an air force of high competence and ability, but it does not for instance have a navy worth considering. South Africa's real military superiority lies in nuclear and chemical weapons. There is no doubt that strong cooperation with Israel is one of the main reasons for this superiority. Here one might mention the extent of the firm cooperation between Israel and the war industry body in South Africa, known as Armsco. Therefore, South Africa in 1984 resorted to concluding two non-aggression agreements, with Angola and Mozambique, among the most important confrontation states. More than that, it was rumored recently that South Africa made a deal with Somalia, a member of the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity, by which it will take charge of training the Somali army and supplying it with weapons in exchange for the use of Somalia's airports by

civilian and military aircraft belonging to South Africa. Might we imagine that these airports would be the connecting link between Israeli military bases and their counterparts in South Africa? That is a question which the near future will answer.

2. Economic activity: It is true that the African countries, like other countries of the world, maintain an economic boycott on South Africa's economic activity, but we must realize that the complex economic problems the African confrontation states suffer from drive them to economic dealings with South Africa. Suffice it for us to mention here that everytime confrontation states such as Zambia suffer from a shortage of foodstuffs, in particular bread, they get their requirements from South Africa. A close look at foodstuffs in the supermarkets will disclose extensive economic dealings between these countries and South Africa. In addition to that, also, South Africa operates some of airplanes in the name of the Comoro Islands and uses them to transport African pilgrims from the continent to Jiddah. The route may perhaps continue north to South Africa's ally.

Of course this diversified activity in the context of the failure to realize independence for Namibia results in great confusion between South Africa as a main source of threats to African security and as a source of cooperation with the African countries in certain areas.

This Israeli encirclement from the north and the east, and South Africa's infiltration into the southern half of the continent, must drive the central regional powers to the need to arrive at a collective formula for ways of confrontation.

Fourth: The African View of Egyptian Policy

It is not amazing that the Africans should stress the positive aspects of Egyptian policy toward the continent, especially during the sixties. Egyptian policy actively supported national liberation movements and sought the attainment of regional integration by establishing the Organization of African Unity and by condemning all forms of foreign intervention in the affairs of the continent.

The Africans are aware of the change of circumstances and the need to arrive at new formulas for Egyptian-African cooperation, but at the same time they want to understand the dimensions of Egyptian policy, especially in conditions of Arab contradictions and disputes regarding Arab issues. For this they blame the Arab countries which transfer their Arab disputes to the African summit conferences in the framework of the Organization of African Unity. There is no doubt that they honor Egypt's position regarding independence for Namibia in application of the United Nations resolutions. The Africans realize that all African organizations which were established in the sixties must be developed in a manner responding to the circumstances of the age. Such development requires that all regional and continental efforts be joined so that a higher level of effectiveness may be attained in the existing organizations and additional organizations with new functions may be established.

Here the importance of asserting the continuation of Egyptian African commitments, diversifying their orientations and expanding their substance so that they may include all political, economic and military activities stands out.

Fifth: The Dimensions of Egyptian Policy toward Africa

Before we spell out the most important dimensions of Egyptian policy toward Africa, especially new areas of activity, we must stress an important fact related to the orientation of Egyptian policy toward the continent. It is to be observed that except for Egyptian policy in the pharaonic era, we find that Egyptian policy toward the continent has merely been a substitute for Egyptian policy toward the Arab countries.

Egyptian policy toward Africa in the pharaonic eras was founded on the consideration that it was a political option and not a substitute for any other policy. The pharaohs viewed Africa as an integral part of an area vital to Egypt and policy was not just restricted to safeguarding the Nile as a source of life in Egypt. When the Egyptian fleet plied the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb, Egypt's interests defined the countries of east Africa as a natural southern extension of the Egyptian state.

In later eras, especially after the 19th century, Egyptian policy toward Africa was no longer an independent option. Rather, it became a substitute for Egypt's Arab policy, especially in periods of retrenchment of this policy. There is no doubt that this is the essence of the problem. The Africans are totally aware of this dilemma facing Egyptian policy.

Thus Egyptian foreign policy planning related to Africa must parallel Egyptian policy toward other regions, Arab or non-Arab. There is no doubt that the emotional and ethnic connection with the Arab region is a strong one, although the strategic connection with Africa is also strong. Thus it is clear that there is no choice or contradiction between the two regions. This parallel planning of Egyptian policy toward the Arabs and Africans will reassure the two parties and not favor one at the expense of the other, and it will correctly express the joint strategic interests between Egypt on the one hand and the Arabs and Africans on the other.

If it is agreed that Egyptian policy toward Africa should be considered in effect an option independent of Arab policy toward Egypt, we can define the most important dimensions which can be used to strengthen Egyptian-African relations as follows:

1. The military aspects:

The recommendations bearing on the establishment of a continental security council, continental troops, continental military training, a continental military industry or an intercontinental weapons trade will play an important part in strengthening Egyptian-African relations. Egypt is not just distinguished by being the northern entrance to the continent. It is also distinguished by being the continent's most developed country in the above-mentioned areas. Egypt can spare the continent the problems of subordination

to the major powers, especially in the area of the weapons trade, and it can spare its countries the hard currency needed to buy weapons by creating a common market in which agricultural and mineral products will be exchanged for weapons, equipment, ammunition and training.

Special problems might arise here over political and ideological differences as an obstacle obstructing the attainment of such new continental institutions. In the attempt to answer this logical objection, we must learn from the experience of the European countries. This is because the Atlantic Pact, the European community and the European Common Market include countries as members which have waged vicious wars against one another for more than a century. The obvious example concerns France and Germany. Some people might consider it difficult to base a comparison on the European experience because of the difference in circumstances between Africa and Europe on the one hand and because of the backwardness and poverty in Africa on the other, not to speak of Europe's exposure to colonialism.

This difference between Europe and Africa is real, but the circumstances Africa is going through make such continental harmony inevitable, and there is no doubt that that imposes broader responsibilities on the central regional powers, that is, Egypt, in this instance, for the sake of a continental political formula founded on an integrated continental will.

To add to the responsibilities of the central regional powers, there is the need to arrive at continental consensus on sources of threats to continental security. This consensus is to be considered an essential condition for arriving at the establishment of the abovementioned institutions.

2. The economic and technical aspects:

If the volume of trade among the countries of the continent is no greater than 4 percent, and perhaps less, of their total trade, this means that one dimension for strengthening Egyptian-African relations is embodied in the development of the economic and technical aspects.

The African countries need a high degree of technical cooperation in the agricultural and irrigation areas. At the outset, it is worth pointing to the activity of Egyptian irrigation experts in the continent and the role of the Egyptian National Center for Agriculture in training African experts, although the continent's needs in this regard require the establishment of an independent agency in the context of the government whose task will be to study the countries' needs and put Egyptian resources at their service. This agency could include the activities of the Egyptian Fund for Technical Cooperation for Africa belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not to mention all the other agencies in the Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation and so forth.

What is required here is to intensify activity and interaction in these major areas in the countries of the continent so that they do not resort to seeking aid from the experts of Israel or South Africa.

3. Education:

Many African countries suffer from a shortage of educated personnel, even in the context of university instruction. A large share of educated persons go back to the countries where they were educated, in what is called the brain drain. What is needed in this area is to open the doors of the Egyptian universities to people from these countries, especially in higher studies, to prepare faculty members for African universities. The Makerere University in Uganda, for instance, suffers from an obvious shortage in faculty because of the civil war. The University of Zambia suffers from a shortage in some areas of specialization, especially political science. There is no doubt that opening the doors to higher studies here to instructors from these universities is to be considered an important matter in helping increase the members of the faculty there.

4. Communications and the media:

This problem goes beyond African countries and involves the relationship between the north and the south, in what is called the new international media system aimed at liberation from media subordination. Here one might praise the expenditures the Egyptian Fund for Technical Aid is giving so that some African technicians may be trained in Egypt.

What is required in this area, however, is to increase the number of grants offered by Egypt to the African countries, especially since their media still to some extent require personnel who are trained in the continent. There also is a need to hold joint conferences between Egyptians and Africans in these areas to try to reach agreement over a continental media strategy taking the circumstances surrounding the African countries into account and concentrating on internal aspects of these countries.

5. Political aspects:

These include agreement and coordination over the political issues presented before international organizations, be those the United Nations, its specialized agencies or the Organization of African Unity.

They also extend to what we might call the political training of political personnel in the continent, in the area of political and party organization or intelligence. Egypt today possesses political resources which enjoy the respect of Africans as far as political organizations are concerned, and Egypt can also promote democratic ideas related to freedom and participation. These are ideas the African countries need during the stage they are passing through of transition from political independence to political, economic and intellectual development.

Integrating these dimensions and enhancing them through comprehensiveness and innovation are to be considered an important step in arriving at an effective Egyptian policy toward the continent. This is a policy to which the African countries are connected, and we ourselves also need it as we stand on the threshold of the 21st century.

EGYPT

HEAVY FRG INVOLVEMENT IN EXPANSION, UPGRADING OF RAIL NET

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German
12 Sept 85 p 2

[Text] In Egypt, the country along the Nile, the development of the railroad as an important transportation resource enjoys high priority. Recently further projects to modernize and expand the railroad lines have been planned, started or already completed, with a view to maintaining and further increasing its efficiency. International organizations and individual industrial nations are involved in financing the undertakings. The FRG is among those providing significant capital and technical assistance. For their part, German companies have been able to land important contracts.

In 1984, Egypt was promised financial assistance in the amount of DM 119 million by the government for railroad projects, through the Credit Institute for Reconstruction (KfW). Of this, DM 22 million was set aside to build up capital assistance for the restoration of the rail bed, DM 68 million was designated for delivery of locomotives and spare parts, DM 15 million for workshop equipment and spare parts and an additional DM 14 million for the purchase of spare parts. In 1983 DM a grant of DM 6 million had been approved for the restoration of the track bed.

Among the German companies which have become involved to a considerable extent are Siemens AG, Munich and Berlin, AEG-Telefunken in Frankfurt, Brown, Boveri & Cie, AG (BBC) in Mannheim, Thyssen Henschel in Kassel, Messerschmitt-Boelkows-Bloh, GmbH in Munich-Ottobrunn, Signalbau Huber GmbH in Munich, Krupp Industrietechnik GmbH in Duisburg and Deutsche Eisenbahn Consulting GmbH (DEC) in Frankfurt.

Since April 1983, the 200-kilometer long stretch belonging to Egyptian National Railways (ENR) between Cairo and Sidi Gaber has been monitored with the help of the train control system ZUG 100 from Siemens AG. The same system is to be installed on the approximately 500-kilometer long section from Alexandria by way of Cairo to Asyut in central Egypt. When the work is completed, about 500 vehicles and 1,200 installations along the track will be equipped with the ZUB 100, which is manufactured in Braunschweig.

In addition, Siemens AG won a major contract in the first quarter of 1984, worth DM million, for the expansion of the route from Cairo-North to Qalyub.

It includes extensions to the stations at Cairo-North, Tawdib, Shubra and Qalyub. Siemens had previously obtained two contracts (DM 22 million and DM 26 million) to supply and install modern signal equipment on the Alexandria-Cairo-Asyut route. Siemens installed the first up-to-date signal system in 1963 on the line between Asyut and Sawhag.

In the late summer of 1984, AEG-Telefunken AG in Frankfurt was given a contract worth DM million to supply the electrical equipment for 120 air-conditioned second-class passenger coaches. The contract from the Societe Generale Egyptienne de Material de Chemin de Fer (Semaf), which operates a coach factory in Hulwan, also includes supplying 15 complete sets of back-up equipment and enough spare parts for 3 years.

In the fall of 1984, BBC, which had already electrified the line between Cairo and Hulwan between 1953 and 1955, was commissioned by Semaf to supply air-conditioning systems for 120 passenger coaches belonging to Egyptian National Railways (ENR) and the initial requirement for spare parts for 5 years, a contract worth a total of DM 13 million. BBC is supplying 270 operational air-conditioning cabinets, which will allow Semaf to dispense with all the ancillary refrigeration work on the vehicle and costly testing before putting the coaches in operation. BBC had previously supplied Egypt with a large number of air-conditioning systems for passenger coaches. They were installed in coaches for which the ENR had contracted with the French company Carel Fouche Industries S.A. in Aubevoye and with Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH.

Egypt has become an important sales market for locomotives for Thyssen Henschel in Kassel. The company recently completed its 10th contract, which called for delivery of 21 diesel-electric main-line locomotives valued at more than DM 60 million. This increased the number of diesel-electric locomotives of the same model supplied to Egypt to a total of 232.

The Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH factory in Donauwoerth recently delivered 40 generator cars to Egypt. The Railroad and Transportation Technology division of AEG-Telefunken AG assumed responsibility for delivery of electrical equipment and spare parts for the cars worth DM 18 million. The generator cars are specially designed to run on non-electrified long-distance routes and they supply the entire train with electrical current through a full-length collector rail. MBB had earlier concluded a contract to supply 60 sleeping cars, 12 restaurant cars and 12 generator cars, which will be used for tourist traffic on the 1,100-kilometer-long route between Cairo and Aswan.

The company Signalbau Huber GmbH in Munich has joined those supplying the Egyptian railroad with technical equipment and traffic control systems. The company owns 25 percent of Signal[illegible] Corporation in Cairo. The remaining 75 percent of the capital is held by four Egyptian part owners. The Windhoff company was recently awarded a contract worth DM 2.4 million to supply four VG 80 multipurpose track-maintenance machines. The first one was to be used on the Cairo-Aswan line. In 1983, Krupp Industrietechnik GmbH in Duisburg was commissioned to build a railroad bridge across the Nile. Deutsche Eisenbahn Consulting GmbH (DEC), a joint undertaking of the Bundesbahn and the Deutsche Bank AG in Frankfurt, assumed important advisory tasks in Egypt for the rehabilitation of the track bed.

EGYPT

PRESIDENT INAUGURATES LONGEST NILE BRIDGE

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 21 Oct 85 p 3

[Text]

PRESIDENT Hosni Mubarak yesterday resumed his field visits to production sites by paying a visit to Beni Suef Governorate. During his four-hour tour, he confirmed the importance of self-help effort in implementing social and economic development.

He explained that the Government cannot be the be-all and end-all, due to the immense burden it shoulders. It is therefore the duty of individuals to help the Government, said Mr Mubarak.

He urged popular leaders in the governorate to raise funds for building schools to overcome shortages in this

sector. It is fair enough for the Government to pay wages, pave roads and offer subsidies, he pointed out.

The President inspected the various departments of the village local council of Kambish, following which, he lauded efforts exerted by the employees and officials. He then moved to souds village where he visited the Agricultural Mechanisation Centre.

The President also inaugurated Beni Suef new bridge which links the two banks of the Nile. The bridge is 1,086 metres long and 21 metres wide and thus is the longest Egyptian bridge built over the Nile.

The Minister of Transport,

Telegrammunication and Maritime Transport. Mr Soliman Metwali said that the new bridge will solve the overpopulation problem in Beni Suef city, and the concentration of agricultural land on the western bank of the Nile by creating a new urban society east of Beni Suef.

Mr Metwali pointed out that the bridge has four lanes, two in each direction, and two pavements each 3 metres-wide. More than 80 per cent of the bridge structure was built in four months. Its tonnage reaches 70 and its total costs amounted to LE 11 million, he added.

— GSS.

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CSO: 4500/16

EGYPT

REBUILDING DAM

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 22 Oct 85 p 2

[Text]

A DECREE has been issued to rebuild Rawaf'a dam in el-Arish so as to protect Arish valley from the danger of torrents and, in the meantime, to cultivate vast areas of land badly in need of irrigation, said the Governor of North Sinai, Mr. Monier Shash.

The Governor held a series of meetings attended by experts in agriculture and irrigation to discuss possible ways of protecting the valley against torrents which could demolish residences and bedouin tents.

The studies, in which some university professors took

part, pin-pointed the inevitability of rebuilding the dam which has been out of use for 39 years. The rebuilt dam will be 12 metres high and the capacity of its reservoir is estimated at 3 million cubic metres, said the representative of the Ministry of Irrigation, Mr. Abdul Nabi Zeki.

He said that the Ministry of Irrigation has approved the idea. He pointed out that reports by irrigation experts indicate that by means of the dam, it would be possible to cultivate more than 10,000 feddans alongside the valley. It will also provide an opportunity for urban expansion adjacent to the new cultivated areas. GSS

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EGYPT

BRIEFS

NEW CITY--The Minister of Reconstruction, New Communities and Land Reclamation, Mr. Hasaballa el-Kafrawi examined the final report of the New Nubaria city, 78 kilometres from Alexandria on the Alexandria-Cairo desert road. He said that the city will occupy an area of 1,600 feddans and is designed to include four districts, and having an accommodation capacity of 70,000 citizens. Sixty per cent of the houses will be allocated as low-cost housing. The city, said [words illegible] will be built in four stages. Implementation of the first stage will start this year, including the first district, and part of the industrial zone of the city.--GSS [Text] [Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 17 Oct 85 p 2]

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CSO: 4500/16

LIBYA

PRESIDENT'S VARIOUS SECURITY MEASURES, PROGRAMS REVIEWED

Tunis HAQA'IQ in Arabic 20 Sep 85 pp 6-10

[Article by Laroussi Lamri: "The CIA Wants My Skin: How Does al-Qadhdhafi Safeguard His Own Protection?"]

[Text] The protection of heads of state constitutes a weighty concern and responsibility as far as the security officials of host countries are concerned. Generally this difficult task is assigned to the departments having jurisdiction over political security, since there is no head of state, be he a king, sultan or extraordinary leader, who does not have enemies. Therefore, it is necessary that their visits be safeguarded, to protect the reputation of the host country.

However, following the investigations HAQA'IQ has made in this area, al-Qadhdhafi's visits to Tunisia should be considered among the most difficult of tasks assigned to the competent departments and all the security agencies. This is because the man considers that he is being followed everywhere; wherever he goes, he considers that there are people lying in wait to ambush him, especially since American officials have declared that al-Qadhdhafi constitutes America's number one enemy in the world, and that the CIA is watching his footsteps, so that it can seize the opportunity to assassinate him, though it is he who is ceaselessly striking out at American interests and on every occasion declaring his deep-seated enmity toward America, which the colonel considers the number one enemy of the Arab nation, alongside world Zionism and Israel. Al-Qadhdhafi himself justified his fear that he is being pursued by American authorities by telling us, during a visit he made, that no matter how much he is subjected to invective and curses by the official American agencies, no Arab head of state defends him, with the exception of Emir Zayid, who stated once, for the benefit of the Americans, that Uncle Sam's hurling of invective and curses at the colonel is generally an attack on the Arab nation, since the prevailing dispute between Libya as a country with its own sovereignty and America is a dispute between American interests and Arab interests. The emir offers as justification for his position that the colonel is attacked whenever he speaks in the name of the interests of the Arab nation.

After the colonel mentioned this situation, which he considers an honor to himself and the Arab nation, he went on to say, "Why don't all the Arab presidents, leaders and kings take a position like this? I have not attacked America on its own territory, I have not put my rockets and armor in front of the American coastline, I am on my own territory, my arms are on my own territory, and I have taken only defensive action against America, proceeding from the need for self-defense. Do you remember the aggression by American planes against the Gulf of Sirt?" This is how Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi expressed his quarrel with America, and this is how the colonel characterized the heads of Arab states. It is not odd, therefore, that he should consider himself threatened whenever he visits an Arab country, especially Tunisia, which, as he understands it, he considers a client of America's in its general strategic orientations. We all remember how Col al-Qadhdhafi visits Tunisia, heavily armed, with a guard of armed people from his country; this by its nature disturbs the Tunisian authorities since he calls the credibility of Tunisian security into question, and this the Tunisians reject.

After the investigation HAQA'IQ made into the protection of al-Qadhdhafi, it became apparent to us that the Libyan leader does not declare the details of the schedules of his visits. The explanation for this is that he changes his schedules whenever he considers there is a need to do so. Therefore you find all the security departments in a state of general mobilization, and examples of this exist.

While he was staying in Algeria in the course of one of his visits to that neighboring country, the colonel declared his intention to visit Tunisia. He said that the plane which would take him from Algeria would land at Gabes airport at 1100 hours in the morning.

The declaration was a surprise, prompting the Tunisian authorities to hasten to prepare the Gabes airport and provide full protocol committees. However, what frightened the Tunisian authorities was that the colonel, while landing at the hour announced, landed at Monastir airport. One should bear in mind that another airplane had left Algeria and landed at Gabes airport at the same time, that is, 1100 hours. Sending this second airplane was in itself an act of deception and cover for his landing in Monastir. Al-Qadhdhafi justified doing that by his fear that satellites were tracking his airplane and that they knew where he was headed and would do away with him. This act of security deception proved that al-Qadhdhafi does not feel secure when he travels, even by air, knowing that the CIA is pursuing him and that it has massive resources and an advanced technology which rely on advanced electronic observation. Espionage by means of electronic equipment and satellites is considered part of the CIA's massive resources.

After his visit to Monastir, the members of the Tunisian government were diverted to Sahel and forced to change the schedule of the visit from beginning to end.

After concluding the visit, the colonel expressed his desire to go back to Libya by land and to that end took the road leading from Monastir to Sfax and from there to Gabes, and then to Ras Gedir, as an itinerary. Along the way, the colonel was accompanied by a heavily-armed Libyan security team to

assume charge of protecting him. The Tunisians observed the presence of a number of girls wearing military uniforms among the guards. Here it is to be observed that the colonel, according to our notion, wanted to visit Tunisia in the company of the fair sex, as if he was thereby expressing his consideration for Tunisia's development in the field of women, and did not want to appear to be an oppressor of women. When we filmed him on video during his recent visit in Benghazi, we observed that when he knew that it was likely that the movie of the interview made with him would probably be distributed, he proceeded to do his hair and improve his dress as if he was on Tunisian television. These are important psychological aspects for understanding al-Qadhdhafi's aspirations toward Tunisia. He wants to "be liked." Let us not forget that there was much talk in Tunisia at some point of the possibility that al-Qadhdhafi would marry a Tunisian woman.

Therefore, we can assume that al-Qadhdhafi intends to be accompanied by armed women who are in charge of guarding him even if they are not qualified to defend their leader in the event attempts at an overall violent attack on the leader of the revolution arise.

When the colonel reached Sfax, he stayed at the Sfax Hotel. Some eyewitnesses say that he did not sleep in the house that had been set aside for him, but chose to spend his night in another one, and did not eat the dinner that had been prepared for him but sent out a companion and asked him to bring some drinks (such as coffee) from a store far from the place where he was staying. Some people observed that he requested the coffee at a late hour of the night, as if he refused to sleep. Some eyewitnesses also told us that he asked for a cheese and butter sandwich from an Arab shop along with some fruit. Al-Qadhdhafi refused to eat the food that had been provided for him. The reason given is that the colonel is afraid of being poisoned or even drugged. This anxiety is always present with al-Qadhdhafi. Some oriental magazines recently stated that the colonel was recently subjected to an attempt at poisoning. He has many enemies and adversaries in Libya.

When he left Sfax, the colonel took a number of security measures with respect to the retinue accompanying him. The official and security retinue consisted of approximately 50 or 60 people apportioned among Mercedes and Land Rovers and some trucks. The number of vehicles came to 15. It was related that at the beginning of the mission he was accompanied by our foreign minister, Beji Caid Essebsi, and after a few kilometers he asked leave of him, made the Mercedes stop and got out of it. When all the cars and trucks accompanying him stopped and the entire security team and all the Libyan officials got out, they all gathered around the colonel so that he then could not be seen and proceeded to move as a compact group from one truck to another, without leaving an opening for eyewitnesses to find out what vehicle al-Qadhdhafi had gotten into. After they had deposited him in the place he had chosen among the trucks, everyone went back to their original places and the procession continued on its course. After about 50 kilometers, the scenario was repeated once again, proving that it was al-Qadhdhafi who gave the signal to his companions to get down from their vehicles. This action assumes that an electronic device or small portable telephone is in the colonel's possession which enables him to give his orders even if he is in an official procession. His companions then got down from all the accompanying

cars and repeated the scenario -- the compact group, al-Qadhdhafi's disappearance within it, the move from car door to car door, the placement of al-Qadhdhafi in one of the Land Rovers and continuation of the route. One should note that al-Qadhdhafi never rides in the first car, the one leading the procession, to avoid the possibility of assassination. Some influential figures told us that he usually gets behind the steering wheel of the car he rides with his security men by himself and tries to change his clothes as much as possible so that he will not be recognized. This causes him much exhaustion on the trips he takes, and therefore we usually see him tired out, with sweat pouring from his forehead.

The process of changing the cars carrying the colonel is constantly repeated, to the point where no eyewitnesses can tell which truck or car the colonel takes his place in. This in effect distresses the local security agency which is assigned to protect al-Qadhdhafi. For this reason, whenever the retinue moves, you can find Tunisian security people taking every measure to protect the whole retinue, indiscriminately. Therefore the responsibility in such cases is weighty. Tunisian security has proved its competence, qualifying the Tunisian authorities, on every occasion the colonel visits Tunisia, to demand that the security team accompanying al-Qadhdhafi disarm itself and accede to Tunisia's needs to establish its sovereignty on its own territory. This is something that has happened on every occasion.

Some eyewitnesses say that after al-Qadhdhafi arrived at the Tunisian-Libyan borders, Ras Jadir specifically, al-Qadhdhafi asked for a plane to transport him, but at the last moment changed schedule and proceeded in a different direction. This proves that al-Qadhdhafi's anxiety exists not only when he comes to Tunisia but also when he goes to his own country, Libya.

I personally can point to all the security investigations made when we arrived in Libya, when we visited the colonel in Benghazi. When we stayed at the al-Jazirah Hotel in Benghazi, we were surrounded by security men on all sides. I assume that the house Bourguiba Ben Rajab and I were given was outfitted and equipped in a way which made it possible to know our every move. I do not rule out the presence of an electronic listening device in the house, and equipment observing all the trash in our suitcases, especially since we were not overtly searched at any moment, although we had in our possession a number of movie cameras, cameras, tape recorders and all the machinery and equipment accompanying the journalist in his pursuit of all journalistic activities. I might mention a time when we were holding a conversation with some Libyan media persons, in which I voiced an opinion which I felt was disturbing and could cause me distress. The conversation concerned the crisis in the Arab world, its problems and dilemmas, and so forth.

Without thinking much about what I was saying, I stated "The greatest system that exists in all the Arab countries is the intelligence system. This is our misfortune, because every Arab must repress his thoughts himself, and freedom does not exist." I would state such an opinion in Tunisia on every occasion, without feeling fear or discomfort. However, after I expressed this thought to my Libyan companion, I felt great anxiety and discomfort and considered that danger was at hand. I told myself that I was in the presence

of the Libyan authorities and that this statement of mine might be interpreted as anti-Libyan, especially since some security people we were accustomed to seeing every morning in the foyer of the al-Jazirah Hotel got up from their place next to us so that they could hear everything we said, went to the telephone booth and continued their telephone conversation with the entities concerned. Therefore I found myself thinking once again, moderating my expressions and apologizing for "verbal excess," slips of the tongue and so forth.

Although our companion, who had introduced himself to us as being from the Ministry of Information, while he was in reality from the revolutionary security agency, reassured us a number of times, I felt great discomfort, especially since many people were hovering around us.

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LIBYA

GOVERNMENT TO PAY DAMAGES, INTERESTED IN DRILLING ASSISTANCE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by John Crowo: "Libya Promises Settlement of 'Germa Lionel' Case"]

[Text] New York--Libya has agreed to pay damages set at \$500,000 in the death of sailor Bjorn Pedersen, the infringement on rights of the "Germa Lionel" crew and losses to the shipping company in the very near future.

This assurance was given to Foreign Minister Sven Stray at a meeting in New York Wednesday with Libyan Foreign Minister 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki. Libya had asked to meet with Stray, who is in New York this week in connection with the UN General Assembly debate. Al-Turayki was able to tell Stray that the Libyan government had resolved to pay the damages agreed to earlier by Norway and Libya following protracted negotiations.

During the meeting, Foreign Minister al-Turayki also expressed great interest in developing economic relations between Norway and Libya.

He was particularly interested in offshore oil-drilling assistance--an area in which oil-rich Libya has no experience. The matter of assistance in developing agricultural projects in Libya was also mentioned.

Foreign Minister Stray will now take the Libyan proposal to Norway, where it will be evaluated by the Ministry of Commerce, among others.

The Libyan government's decision to settle the "Germa Lionel" matter means this issue is now out of the way as far as the two governments are concerned. And, for its part, Norway is satisfied with the outcome; damages will be paid and important principles have been established with respect to Norwegian ships docking in Libya.

In his conversation with Stray, the Libyan foreign minister assured him that the matter would be pursued with the aim of clarifying what had happened. "All steps will be taken to find the guilty persons involved," he said.

The compensation, stipulated at 5 million Norwegian kroner in the agreement finally reached by Norway's ambassador to Libya Kjell Rasmussen, will go to the family of sailor Pedersen, who was killed during the Libyan detainment of "Germa Lionel." Furthermore the crew will be paid damages and the shipping company the expenses incurred over the 2 months the ship was detained.

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ISRAEL

EXPERT ON ISRAELI ARAB AFFAIRS ANALYZES CURRENT SITUATION

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Sep 85 p 5

[Article by Mark Segal: "Sounding the Alarm"]

[Text] ONE OF the country's leading academic experts on Israel Arabs is sounding the alarm about explosive trends in that community.

"I don't want to sound like an alarmist, but the clock is ticking away," says Eli Reches, senior research scholar at Tel Aviv University's Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern Studies.

Reches warns of a convergence of various trends, part of which have been exacerbated by a policy of benign neglect by the Establishment.

The dramatic encounter of Israeli Arabs since 1967 with their brethren in the territories produced distinct indications of what Reches calls "the Palestinization" of the Israeli Arab community, which has undergone profound, near-revolutionary changes in the past 37 years. What was in 1948 a largely backward, rural society with broken leadership and cultural institutions has in the course of time dramatically changed under the impact of the process of modernization, alongside the developments of Israeli society.

EXPLAINING why he was sounding the alarm bell, Reches dwelt on the current deterioration in relations between Jews and Arabs: the climate of tolerance that obtained ten years ago has vanished. Well before Meir Kahane appeared on the scene, the rightward radicalization process had begun among Jews with the Palestinian national movement gain-

ing ground among the Arabs, especially among the educated youth.

"Nothing stands still. Anyone who thought things would remain static is in for a rude awakening. Our society's dynamics don't work that way. We must devote much greater attention to the complexity of problems relating to the Israeli Arab community for the sake of our society's future.

"It's truly admirable that so much attention is now being given to educating Jewish children to understand Arabs; yet there is no parallel process of tackling the broader problems of that community, and raising them for once high on the scale of our national priorities."

Given the potentially explosive situation, the researcher fears that the constant anti-Arab incitement of the Kahanist group might serve as the catalyst that could spark the blaze. "Being a student of history, I regard in retrospect the "Land Day" protest in 1976 as the first open signal of a quiet revolution, which set off solidarity demonstrations on the West Bank, where they went on strike in support of Israeli Arabs' protest at land confiscation; the "Land Day" date entered the calendar not only of Israeli Arabs, but also that of West Bank Palestinians and the PLO.

REFERRING to the hooliganism directed against Arabs in Afula, Reches relates that at the time he feared a wave of Arab counter-

violence. "For Arab politicians these are classical conditions for mobilizing the masses." As for his profound concern about an unprecedented deterioration in Jewish-Arab relations, Reches refers to the report in *Ha'aretz* last weekend of strong anti-Arab sentiments among schoolchildren. "What must a young educated Arab feel when he reads such material? Reches asks.

Asked about the influence of terrorist acts Reches points out that it is definitely a prime source of the worrying trend of alienation. But he took pains to note that between 1967 and 1973, there were 350 Israeli Arabs involved in terrorist activity. Many of them belonged to networks involving residents of the territories. Since 1973, Reches notes, there has been a decided trend among Israeli Arabs of reduced involvement in terrorism. The assumption then is that they have concluded that serious political achievements are possible within the framework of the law.

THE SCHOLAR dwells on parallel socio-economic changes affecting Israeli Arabs. While a movement of return to their roots was developing, as part of a process of national awakening (which he discerns also among West Bank Palestinians) there was also a growing focus on cultural revivalism.

In one of our previous interviews, I reminded Reches he had reported how a prominent nationalist figure among Israeli Arabs had told him, "We'll beat you via the maternity ward." In fact, the gap between Jewish and Arab birth rates narrowed since the 1950s. Thirty years ago the figures were 1.7 per cent for Jews and 4.5 per cent for Arabs,

while today the birth rate for Arabs is about the same as for Jews, 3.6 per cent.

At present there are about 750,000 Israeli Arabs, or 17 per cent of the general population. They are divided up thus: 81 per cent Moslem, 11 per cent Christian and 8 per cent Druse. Most significantly, just over half the Moslem community are under 15 years of age with three-quarters below 29 years of age.

Looking to the political scene, Reches points to a high 72 per cent voter turn-out in the 1984 Knesset elections, which witnessed the emergence of an undisguised nationalist

party in the Progressive List for Peace. It emerged as the third force in the Arab community with 35,000 votes, or 17 per cent of the total. If in the 1981 elections, the turn-out was 67 per cent, the higher participation in 1979 was attributed to those who had previously heeded the ban against voting for "the Zionist parliament" issued by the ultra-radical Abna al-Balad (Sons of the Village), identified with the Rejectionist Front.

Most of the Progressive List's support came from Nazareth and the northern region. It drew part of its strength from Rakah, which while retaining 33 per cent of the Arab vote, declined by 4 per cent as compared to 1981. The Progressives apparently gained the 5 per cent lost by the Labour Party, which netted 24 per cent.

Significantly, in the 1984 polls the affiliated lists of Labour did not run separately, but were integrated into its general list. However the Labour Alignment failed in its design to displace Rakah as the leading party in the Arab sector, with the forces of Palestinian nationalism gaining ground, through Rakah and its new Progressive rival.

Reches interprets this development as indicating a crisis of confidence in Labour among its Arab constituency. This was largely due to its unfulfilled promises. Supporters of Labour felt shabbily treated when it came to the placement of their two candidates. While Abdel Wahab Darousha, a Moslem from Kfar Eksel, obtained a safe seat, Hanna Haddad, a Christian from Galilee, did not. (Today he is an adviser to Police Minister Haim Bar-Lev.)

THE TOUGHEST challenge for the hitherto dominant Communists comes from the Progressives. Its leading personality is its No. 1 MK, Mohammed Mi'ari, a Haifa Moslem, a veteran Arab nationalist and a former member of the banned El Ard list. Mi'ari, unlike some of his allies, was never connected to the Communists. He created an electoral alliance with the Association of Academics in Nazareth that did so well in the last city elections. Its two leaders are ex-communist Dr. (of Medicine) Salim Rashid and lawyer Kamel Daher. The latter's father was an MK associated with Mapai in

the 1950s, but was dropped by them at one stage. Some observers regard Daher's new affiliation as a form of taking vengeance on those who dishonoured his late father.

Another part of Mi'ari's alliance is with the ultra-nationalist Anglican cleric from Nazareth, Riad Abu Al-Asal, who was behind the proposal for an Arab college in Galilee. Completing the Progressive list is the remnant of Sheli and other defunct Israeli leftist groups led by Uri Avneri and Mattityahu Peled, who brought with them former Sheli MK Walid Sadik, a teacher from the Little Triangle.

As Reches explains, the challenge to Rakah was inherent in the formation of an Arab-Jewish list, based on a nationalist platform close to that of the Communists, but minus its Marxist-Leninist dogma. "Suddenly for the young nationalist Arab university graduate there was an alternative to Rakah," he notes. However, the researcher adds, no one should underestimate the difficulties facing the Progressive Movement. It lacks the machinery that Rakah possesses. Indeed, Reches, who is completing his doctoral thesis on that party, contends that Rakah has the best organized political machinery in the country, certainly in the Arab sector.

As to the Progressives' future, the scholar perceives sub-currents propelling it to an even more radical posture, which will call into question the Jewish-Arab partnership.

An indication of the Progressives' fostering of "Palestinization" among Israeli Arabs was their sponsoring by part of the movement this May of the First Congress on Palestinian Thought in Nazareth. Lectures dealt with Palestinian folklore, culture, music and so forth, all from a Palestinian angle, but never the slightest mention of any Israeli Arab connection, Reches reports.

In Labour MK Abdel Darousha, Reches sees an entirely new style of moderate Israeli Arab leadership. His stillborn, if highly publicized, attempt to fly to Amman to attend the sessions of the Palestinian National Council accorded him many headlines. As Reches says, such a move independent of the party bosses would have been inconceivable for a traditional Israeli Arab leader 10 to 15 years ago.

RECHES mentions that Rakah is regarded as one of the most orthodox of Moscow-line Communist parties, with its leadership frequently travelling to the Soviet Union and sending their children to Russian universities.

The researcher discerns sub-currents of dissent at junior levels of the party hierarchy over its rigidly conformist pro-Moscow orthodoxy. There have been incidents of dissidents being expelled from the party, but details are kept very confidential, he reports.

Under Moscow's orders the largely Arab Communist Party (at a conservative estimate of 85 per cent of its voters are Arabs) maintain a partnership with a dwindling Jewish Communist presence. Appearing in the Knesset in recent elections as the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality with two Arab MKs, Tawfik Toubi and Tawfik Zayyad and two Jewish MKs, party veteran and Secretary-General Meir Wilner and Charlie Biton of Jerusalem's Black Panthers. There are distinct signs of unrest among the Arab party cadres, making up more than 70 per cent of the Rakah apparatus, because the top leadership and much of the party's "politbureau" are Jewish, again in keeping with Moscow's orders. It is of interest to note how Wilner, one of the surviving signatories of Israel's Declaration of Independence, has managed to manoeuvre himself all these decades through the zig-zags of the fluctuating Moscow line.

The veteran Rakah Arab leadership offers an image of a cohesive social group. Zayyad, who is both MK and Mayor of Nazareth, is a Moslem, but he is surrounded by Christian comrades. His fellow MK, Toubi, who after Dr. Yosef Burg is our most senior parliamentarian, is a Greek Orthodox Christian from Haifa. A co-religionist was the late Dr. Emil Touma - he died earlier this year - who was the weightiest intellectual in the party, in Reches' considered opinion. Touma spent years in Russia where he completed

his Ph.D. at Moscow University. He joined the party in the late '30s and was one of the Arab Communists who combined with the Jewish section in founding Maki, which became Rakah after the 1965 split. Touma married a Jewish communist,

Hanna Kerberg, in 1954; the couple had two sons, Eyal and Michael. The former now lives in East Germany.

IN PARTY cadres Tawfik Toubi is accused of nepotism. His brother George occupies a key party position. Both have Jewish wives. Tawfik Toubi's sister Maggie is the wife of Zahi Karkabi, a Greek Catholic from Shfaram, who under his brother-in-law's aegis has risen to become Haifa branch secretary.

Reches dwells on one of the most significant developments in recent years – the formation in 1974 of the national committee of heads of Arab village councils over which Rakah has sought to gain control. At present the balance is 50/50 between the Communists and the moderates, but in effect it serves Rakah's interests. From a municipal lobby the committee has become a political force, which Reches says is regarded by many Israeli Arabs as a kind of Israeli Arab parliament. The Committee chairman is a Moslem, Ibrahim Nimer Hussein, head of the Shfaram Council. A canny independent in his mid-50s, he is considered a moderate but co-operates with Rakah. In Reches' recently published study (by the Dayan Centre), "The Arab Village in Israel – A Focus for Revived Political-National Activity," he regards the national committee as a further stage in the Arab villages' conversion into a major centre of nationalist activity.

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ISRAEL

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PEACE PROCESS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Aug 85 p 8

[English version provided by Israel Government Press Office]

[Text]

BY PROF. ZE'EV HIRSCH, "HA'ARETZ," 29.8.85 (PROF. HIRSCH HEADS THE JAFFEE CHAIR FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AT TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY'S SCHOOL FOR BUSINESS MANAGEMENT)

THE PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS WILL BE RENEWED SOONER OR LATER. EVEN IF THE ISSUE DOESN'T PRESENTLY TOP THE LIST OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES, IT'S LIKELY TO INSTANTLY CAPTURE THE LIMELIGHT, WHETHER FOLLOWING AN ADDITIONAL DECLARATION BY KING HUSSEIN, OR THE AMERICANS DECIDE THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO BREAK THE PROLONGED DEADLOCK IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OR THE PRIME MINISTER SUCCEEDS IN CONVINCING A LARGE NUMBER OF HIS COLLEAGUES THAT A CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS, DESPITE ALL THE RESERVATIONS, SERVES ISRAEL'S INTERESTS.

IT WILL IMMEDIATELY BE SAID: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS DEPENDS ON THE WILLINGNESS OF BOTH SIDES TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE ECONOMIC COMPONENT HAS LITTLE WEIGHT IN THE CONSIDERATIONS OF BOTH SIDES; JUST AS THE CONFLICT IS POLITICAL IN ORIGIN, SO, TOO, THE SOLUTION, IF AND WHEN IT'S FOUND, WILL BE POLITICAL IN NATURE, AND WILL HAVE TO BE BASED ON A READINESS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT WHICH THE OTHER SIDE IS WILLING TO LIVE WITH.

RIGHT AT THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARAB SIDE, ISRAEL'S SITUATION WILL BE SIMILAR TO THAT PRIOR TO THE PEACE WITH EGYPT: IN EXCHANGE FOR A PEACE TREATY, WHOSE TANGIBLE EXPRESSION IS A PIECE OF PAPER, ISRAEL WILL BE ASKED TO CONCEDE TERRITORIAL ASSETS OF STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC VALUE. THE SETTLEMENT AROUSED DISCOMFORT DUE TO THE FEELING THAT THE PIECE OF PAPER CAN BE TORN UP BY ONE SIDE, WHILE ASSETS CANNOT BE RETURNED WITHOUT A WAR. THE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAS IN FACT FACED DIFFICULT TESTS, INCLUDING THE LEBANON WAR, BUT THE THREAT OF THE PAPER BEING TORN UP HASN'T BEEN REMOVED. FURTHERMORE, THE EGYPTIANS HAVE, TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITY, REFRAINED FROM GIVING THE PEACE PEACE REAL CONTENTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, ECONOMIC RELATIONS COULD HAVE -- AND CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, ISRAEL'S THE BALANCE OF TRADE WITH EGYPT WERE LESS NEGATIVE, AND IF THE OIL IMPORTS FROM EGYPT ON AN ANNUAL BASIS

OF HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WERE BY A SIMILAR AMOUNT OF ISRAELI EXPORTS TO EGYPT, THIS WOULD CERTAINLY REDUCE, TO A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE, THE FEELINGS OF FRUSTRATION FROM THE MEAGER ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH HAVE EMERGED FROM THE PEACE. COMMERCIAL RELATIONS ON SUCH A SCOPE WOULD DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF GROUPS WITH A DIRECT ECONOMIC INTEREST IN FIRING UP AND DEEPENING THE PEACE PROCESS.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS MUST CONSTITUTE THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS OF THE PEACE, AND IN CERTAIN CONDITIONS THEY ARE A GUARANTEE TO ITS EXISTENCE.

SOMEONE LOOKING AT THE MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE WILL IMMEDIATELY DISCOVER THAT THE SHORTEST DISTANCE BETWEEN MOST EUROPEAN PORTS AND AMMAN, BAGHDAD, AND SOME OF THE PERSIAN GULF STATES PASSES THROUGH THE EASTERN SHORE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN. THIS FACT CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO AN ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE WHEN SPEAKING ABOUT SHIPPING COSTS. AND IN FACT, THE PRELIMINARY CALCULATIONS MADE BY ECONOMISTS IN THE PROJECT FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AT TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY, SHOW THAT TRANSPORTING A TON OF FREIGHT FROM GENOA TO AMMAN BY WAY OF AQABA COSTS 36 DOLLARS. IF THE FREIGHT WERE SENT TO THE SAME DESTINATION BY WAY OF ASHDOD OR GAZA, IT WOULD COST 16 DOLLARS. IN OTHER WORDS, IT'S POSSIBLE TO SAVE 20 DOLLARS ON EVERY TON WHICH IS SHIPPED IF IT'S SENT BY THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE ROUTE. IT'S POSSIBLE TO REACH A SAVINGS IN THE SAME RANGE BY SHIPPING FROM GENOA TO BAGHDAD BY WAY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN PORTS INSTEAD OF AQABA. THIS ROUTE IS ALSO PREFERABLE TO SHIPPING VIA THE IRAQI PORT OF BASRA. PRELIMINARY CALCULATIONS PREPARED BY THE PROJECT ECONOMISTS SHOW THE ECONOMIC VALUE TO CONSTRUCTING A PORT IN GAZA WHICH WOULD ALLOW FOR TRANSSHIPMENT OF EIGHT MILLION TONS ANNUALLY WHILE SERVING JORDAN, IRAQ, AND OTHER PERSIAN GULF STATES. THE SAVINGS, PRIOR TO CALCULATION OF INTEREST, INVESTMENT DEPRECIATION, AND ONGOING EXPENSES, REACHE, AS NOTED, APPROXIMATELY 20 DOLLARS PER TON, OR 150 MILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY. SAVINGS IN THIS RANGE WILL ALLOW FOR REASONABLE CAPITAL GAINS ON THE NECESSARY INVESTMENT, WHICH IS CAPABLE OF REACHING 500 MILLION DOLLARS.

THUS FAR, THE ECONOMIC LOGIC BEHIND BUILDING A PORT IN GAZA. WHAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT THE POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH A PLAN AS THIS? HOW WOULD THE PLAN INFLUENCE THE CONTINUATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS?

AN IMPORTANT ADVANTAGE OF THE PROJECT IS THAT IT'S POSSIBLE TO BEGIN TO GET IT UNDERWAY WITHOUT DELAY AND WITHOUT BEING DEPENDENT ON A SOLUTION TO THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF THE GAZA STIP'S ULTIMATE STATUS. THE PROJECT CAN BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH POLITICAL DECISIONS BY ISRAEL AND JORDAN, AND THE WILLINGNESS OF THESE COUNTRIES TO GUARANTEE THAT IT WILL RUN SMOOTHLY. TO ADVANCE THE PROJECT, ISRAEL MUST ANNOUNCE THAT IT AGREES TO THE PORT'S BEING BUILT AND THAT IT COMMITS ITSELF TO ALLOW THE TRANSFER OF GOODS TO AND FROM JORDAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES, WITHOUT LIMITATIONS. JORDAN MUST ANNOUNCE THAT IT COMMITS ITSELF TO ALLOWING THE IMPORT AND EXPORT OF MERCHANDISE WHICH WOULD BE UNLOADED IN THE GAZA PORT AND TRANSSHIPPED VIA ISRAEL AND ITS TERRITORY. THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE ANCHORED IN CONTRACTUAL GUARANTEES, WHICH WOULD EASE THE MINDS OF POTENTIAL INVESTORS REGARDING THE INTENTIONS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TO HONOR THEIR COMMITMENTS.

WHO WILL BE THE FOUNDERS AND OPERATORS OF THE PORT? ONE SHOULDN'T EXPECT THAT ORDINARY BUSINESS INVESTORS WILL BE READY AT THIS STAGE TO GAMBLE ON THE PLAN, EVEN IF IT'S POSSIBLE TO PROVE ITS ECONOMIC VALUE UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS. THE FUNDING WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO COME ENTIRELY OR PARTIALLY FROM POLITICALLY INTERESTED PARTIES -- THE UNITED STATES? THE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES? SAUDIA ARABIA OR OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES? THE GIVEN LOGIC IS THAT THE PROJECT WILL BE RUN BY A LOCAL BUSINESS CONCERN (IN OTHER WORDS, FROM GAZA), WHICH WILL RECEIVE FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THE APPROPRIATE RIGHTS TO CONSTRUCT AND RUN THE PORT, AND PERMISSION TO MOBILIZE THE NECESSARY FUNDS FROM PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOURCES, AS IT SEES FIT. ONE CAN SUPPOSE THAT IF THE ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN GOVERNMENTS GIVE THE APPROPRIATE GUARANTEES TO SETTING UP THE PORT, IT WON'T BE DIFFICULT FOR THE CONCESSIONAIRES TO MOBILIZE THE NECESSARY SUMS, MOST OF WHICH WON'T COME, AS NOTED, FROM BUSINESS SOURCES.

THE PROJECT'S ECONOMIC BENEFITS WILL BE DIVIDED AMONG THE INVESTORS AND OTHER BODIES, INCLUDING RESIDENTS OF THE GAZA STRIP, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED. THE INVESTORS WILL RECEIVE THE PROFITS FROM THE PROJECT, GAZA RESIDENTS WILL BENEFIT FROM EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND RUNNING OF THE PORT, AND WILL PROVIDE VARIOUS, ACCOMPANYING SERVICES. ISRAEL WILL RECEIVE SOMETHING IN RETURN FOR ITS PROVIDING TRANSIT SERVICES. THUS, IT'LL BE POSSIBLE TO INVOLVE ISRAELI COMPANIES IN PLANNING, BUILDING AND OPERATING THE PORT. JORDAN AND OTHER DESIGNATED COUNTRIES WILL ENJOY A SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS IN SHIPPING COSTS.

THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE SOMEWHAT MORE COMPLICATED THAN THE PURE, ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS DISCUSSED ABOVE. HOWEVER, AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THE PROJECT IS WORTHWHILE. AS NOTED, CARRYING OUT THE PROJECT DOESN'T REQUIRE A POLITICAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, NOR DOES IT EVEN REQUIRE DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEM. THE NECESSARY GUARANTEES FROM THE TWO SIDES ARE POLITICAL. THE ECONOMIC WORTH OF THE PLAN ISN'T TIED TO THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE GAZA STRIP OR SPECIFIC RESULTS OF THE PEACE PROCESS. IT IS LINKED ONLY TO THE ISRAEL'S AND JORDAN'S HONORING COMMITMENTS CONCERNING AN ARRANGEMENT FOR THE APPROPRIATE TRANSFERENCE OF MERCHANDISE TO BE TRANSSHIPPED VIA THE GAZA PORT.

An important advantage of the project stems from the fact that it will create a situation of mutual dependence between the sides, thus strengthening the peace process. If Israel or Jordan decides for any reason whatsoever to prevent the passage of merchandise from or to the Gaza Port via its territory, the two countries will be hurt, as will the Gaza Strip and other countries which use the port.

Jordan and the Persian Gulf states also have an economic interest in the project. Furthermore, they have a political interest in supporting the development of the Gaza Strip and the building of an "Arab" port there. Against these considerations is the consideration of creating a dependence on Israel.

The political logic which the Gaza port plan is based on is recognized by those who drafted the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, and it's acceptable to them. As is known, the agreement includes a clause regarding the paving of a road which will pass north of Eilat, joining the Sinai to Jordan. This road is supposed to fill a political and economic task similar to the intended

task of the Gaza port plan. It seems that five and a half years after the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt, there's everyone agrees that renewing the peace process depends on finding ways to integrate the Palestinians into the process. The innovation in the plan proposed here lies in its giving an active role to the Gaza Strip and its Palestinian residents.

12:30 hours

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ISRAEL

RAILWAY MODERNIZATION URGED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 21 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by David Rudge: "Call to Modernize Railways, Stop Manager From Quitting"]

[Text] HAIFA. - The entire senior management of the Israel Railways has petitioned Transport Minister Haim Corfu to change the railway status from that of a government department and thus prevent the resignation of railways general manager Zvi Tsafrii reporters were told yesterday.

Tsafrii told a press conference here that the government's inaction on the status issue and lack of railway development were the reasons for his resignation, due to take effect in December.

He said it was not due to his being offered the post of civil service commissioner, explaining that the offer was "no longer relevant."

Tsafrii stressed that he had pressed for several years to turn the railways into a government company, like the Electric Corporation,

or have it incorporated into other companies like Israel Chemicals or the Ports Authority.

Such a move would enable money to be pumped into the railways for development projects including the construction of a railway to Eilat, improvement of the existing passenger service, the development of suburban railways in the Haifa and Tel Aviv areas and the construction of a new modern line to Jerusalem.

These proposals had been put forward two and a half years ago as part of the master plan for the railways. The plans were ready to be implemented and all that was needed was the government's approval, which had not been forthcoming, despite intensive lobbying.

Tsafrii said he would consider reviewing his decision if there was a change in the government's attitude, especially over the status issue.

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ISRAEL

FUTURE PLANS PROPOSED FOR PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 21 Oct 85 p 7

[Article by Macabee Dean: "'Total Integration' Suggested For Petrochemcial Industry"]

[Text] TEL AVIV. - The best solution to the urgent problems afflicting the petrochemical industry in Israel is "total integration. The question is how to do this," says Pinhas Dror, board chairman of the Haifa refineries, which are owned 74% by the government and 26% by the Israel Corporation.

Dror points out that the five companies active in this field - Haifa Refineries, and four private companies, Israel Petrochemical Enterprises (IPE), Frutarom, Gadot Petrochemicals and Dor Chemicals, are in fact merged today - they are connected by many pipes to form one integrated complex. But they are under five different managements.

Only by merging management, in one form or another, can the five companies face up to the future, and become, if not profit-making concerns, at least "smaller losers," Dror said yesterday.

"The oil producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Mexico, are putting up their own petrochemical industries. They are sitting on their raw materials, and they can produce the basic petrochemicals such as ethylene at a much lower cost than the oil-importing companies.

As a matter of fact, when the oil-producing companies get their own petrochemical industries set up, they will probably opt to sell only the downstream products and not the crude," he added.

Dror said that Israel will have to maintain its own petrochemical industry due to geopolitical reasons. It was bad enough that Israel was dependent on outside sources for crude; depending on outside sources for refined products would make Israel even more vulnerable than it already is.

So far, between \$1.2 billion and \$1.3b. has been invested in the petrochemical industries here. They provide work for about 3,000 persons, 2,000 at the Haifa Refineries alone.

The best solution would be an outright merger of the five companies, "but while this might be 'the best' solution, in a democratic country it is also a difficult and perhaps an impossible solution," Dror said.

If one factor would buy all five companies (while assuring that the country received sufficient output for its national needs), the problem would be solved. But no one wanted to, or had the money to do this, he added.

Another possibility would be for the four private companies to buy out the Haifa Refineries. But this was also out of the question, since they did not have the money. On the other hand, Haifa Refineries is also unable to buy out the other four, since this would increase government domination of the industry at a time when the government wants to sell off companies it owns.

Since no outright merger of the five plants seems possible now, Dror

has another suggestion. Both the ethylene plant and IPE would increase their capacities, but all the companies would be run as a joint venture, with one accounting system and one "profit centre." There would be no stock switch, only a "working agreement" in the field, with the downstream products of ethylene being increased or decreased in amounts to take advantage of fluctuating prices of the main products. (IPE makes polyethylene, Frutarom makes PVC, Gadot makes BTX [Benzene Toluene Xylene] and Dor makes methane.)

"This will provide an integrated petrochemical industry; it will benefit all five companies and will reduce losses to the utmost - especially if each of the five companies cleans up its own house and introduces the most efficient methods."

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LEBANON

SHIITE RELIGIOUS FIGURE CALLS FOR POLITICAL REFORM

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 23 Aug 85 pp 12-14

[Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din by Bari'ah 'Alam-al-Din: "Destruction Is the Goal of the People Who Have Partitioned Lebanon!"]

[Text] Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, the deputy chairman of the Higher Shiite Islamic Council, is considered one of a few Lebanese leaders who, in spite of the changes the war has imposed, insists on pursuing the struggle for the sake of goals which the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese endorse.

In all his stands, Shaykh Shams-al-Din has worked for the sake of imposing these goals on the people who are harmed by Lebanon's survival. During all the years of the war, he said that Lebanon could be only a single country, unified in land and people, clear with respect to areas of rights and obligations and stable on the basis of a just balance among all Lebanese, with no preference given to Moslems among them over Christians or to Christians over Moslems except to the extent that they sacrifice for the good of their country and offer blood to protect it from its enemy of occupation, who is lying in ambush against it in the south.

Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din has constructed his plan, which aims at bringing Lebanon out of the vortex of destructive struggle and putting it back on the line of proper construction, on these bases, and has presented it to all factions and groups, summoning them to the truth which will save Lebanon before it is too late to do so.

Before beginning the conversation with him, we could only observe, with the amazement of a connoisseur of the true nature of security circumstances in Lebanon, how the area around his home in the Harik district were almost devoid of the barriers, armed persons, barricades and sandbags with which the streets surrounding the homes of the majority of political and spiritual leaders are packed.

In the reception room of his home, in our long conversation with Shaykh Mahdi Shams-al-Din, which lasted more than 3 hours, his eminence's conversation was thorough, calm and comprehensive.

AL-HAWADITH: Your plan, "numerical democracy," has been met by some supportive reactions and some reactions of rejection, for factional and political reasons, among them the belief that the direct election of a president by the people has been an attempt to put the presidency in the future in the hands of the Islamic, and specifically Shiite, numerical majority. What is your answer concerning all the reactions that have been presented so far?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: In the name of God the most merciful and compassionate, the negative or wary positions by which the plan for numerical democracy, founded on the principle of consultation, has been met may be attributed to various background elements. We have accepted all the answers which have been given with respect and appreciation, whether they were approving and favorable, moderate or reserved. I believe that the background elements to the attitude of wariness or rejection are not to be ascribed to a single basis, but to diverse ones, including the one cited in your question, which is a response based on a misunderstanding of the plan or an inaccurate interpretation of it. This plan does not make provisions for Shiites or Moslems; rather, it makes provisions for the Lebanese, the Lebanese citizen and the majority which is supposed to be in charge of decisions concerning the issue of choosing the suitable system for Lebanon or choosing the form of government which will arise from this system. This majority will not have a single sectarian religious character let alone a sectarian character. The system of elections which will be set out, considering Lebanon a single election district, as cited in this plan, is guaranteed to prevent the majority from being a sectarian or religious one. Regarding the existing system, we note, for example, that there always is a majority and a minority in the Chamber of Deputies. This majority has always been diverse. Why should the majority included in any plan for change be accused of having a single sectarian or religious character? Making the accusation that the plan is paving the way for the Shiites to be in control is erroneous; the Shiites are not the Lebanese majority; the Shiites represent the biggest faction in Lebanon, but as to being the majority of the Lebanese, no. The Moslems, yes, the Moslems in their totality represent the majority of the Lebanese, but we are confident that this majority will not all join together in solidarity within unified positions. Assuredly some of them will side with specific Christian notions, and there are Christian groups which will side with specific national or Lebanese notions. Therefore, this charge has no proper foundation. We are the first to fight against the notion of the rights of factions, so how about dominance by factions? If the Shiites want to work to be the ones who derive the main benefit from this system, they will be an Islamic copy of the Maronites, and therefore the corrupt situation will remain as it is. They must build and form a diverse majority; let there be a diverse minority to match it. This is one aspect.

The other aspect may not have been apparent in the question, but I am concerned to state it. This is the talk that the majority will dominate the minority. We do not have that in mind when we advocate the principle of consultation. We mean the principle of public referendum as a large element of that. When we observed that the regime should be balanced between a presidential and parliamentary system, so that there will be numerous diverse oversight agencies at numerous levels, we aspired also to have effective participation in the government process by the minority, so that it would not be isolated and ostracized.

We faced two kinds of fears, the anxiety which has been current concerning the Christian presence and the fears of dominance of the minority by the majority. What actually exists is dominance of the majority by the minority of the minority. We want to exchange this for a democratic system which basically will rely on the principle of consultation and broader participation for ordinary people in the choice of the system and the formula which will emerge in this system, in the governing system and social organization. The minority will be a participant in many people's and parliamentary oversight institutions, so that it will not be oppressed, despised or ostracized, but rather will be a participant in the government process.

AL-HAWADITH: Because there have been so many plans, though we appreciate the seriousness of some of them, the Lebanese have lost hope that they will advance beyond the state of propositions to the realm of application. Developments constantly remain more prone to change than plans for change, to the point where the Lebanese have started to feel that they are always the losers in this regard. Do you believe that the current stage is ripe for bringing about the change you recommend?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: Since 1967, from the constitutional document plan in the era of President Franjiah to the declaration of our plan, obstacles have been emerging. The reason for that is that these plans have always been reformist -- the constitutional document plan, then the general conceptions which were set out at the 'Armun summit, where we took part at that time in conjunction with Imam Musa al-Sadr and the rest of the other colleagues, after that the plan of the Higher Shiite Islamic Council, the paper on the Higher Shiite Islamic Council, and before and after that, the draft of the phased program of the progressive and national parties and forces, and many plans up to the plan of the Islamic constants which we had the honor of setting out along with a large elite of our brethren and even before or after that the Geneva and Lausanne plan. These plans were all reformist and would deal with the system on a basis where its essence would be preserved while they tried to repair it, remedy some of the gaps in it, on the basis of reformist thinking. Therefore every plan bore contradictions within itself and came into being encumbered with obstacles and barriers which prevented it from being applied. The events occurred, as you said, and made them history, or made it difficult or impossible to reapply them. The only plan so far which deals with an issue and confronts it in a radical, fundamental way, on the basis of the notion of change and not reform, is the numerical democracy plan. Therefore, we are confident that events will not overwhelm this plan. This plan will remain and will remain the ultimate policy, representing the ceiling. Events will not overwhelm this plan because it has presupposed a stage which events had reached, which the country had reached and which popular convictions among the Lebanese had reached when it was set out. I state for the first time, through your magazine, I advise everyone to put it into effect. We said that we advised people in late 1982 and early 1983. The opinion was as we are stating it, and after that there was the tempest. Our opinion was not put into effect at that time by the government or by the two oppositions, what is called the Islamic opposition and what is called the Christian opposition. What we had feared would happen was the tempest from the end of 1983 to this day, and now we say this plan is the plan for salvation. It is out of the question that any reformist

notion will be appropriate to the future. Perhaps the reformist notion, in its most remote chance for success, will guarantee that the problem is to some extent frozen, or the issue is frozen, but it is out of the question that it will solve the problem in a vigorous manner. If this plan is not adopted, the door will remain open to many changes in Lebanon.

AL-HAWADITH: Might we consider the plan an alternative to the Shiite working paper?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: In our estimation, all the reformist papers, including the Higher Shiite Islamic Council working paper, have become part of the history of Lebanese political thought and events passed them by, even before this plan. The council's working paper, like other papers, although set out in 1955, as God is the witness, is a sincere, sincere structure, and a lofty conception of responsibility for the sufferings of all the Lebanese. It was set out in accordance with visions, also reformist, and certainly was appropriate to that time. If the constitutional document paper had been adopted prior to that, it would have saved the Lebanese rivers of tears and tens or more than tens of thousands of graves and hundreds of thousands of victims. However, local, regional and international causes helped complicate the crisis and prompted many entities to spoil these efforts. Their fate was just to exist and they now constitute part of the political theory of the crisis. As far as representing something in actual conditions goes, they just represent history.

AL-HAWADITH: After the war of the camps in Beirut, do you believe that what some entities are saying about striking at the camps in Sidon and the south is serious and apropos?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: With regard to what has been called the war of the camps, which we ourselves have called the strife in the camps, we believe that we have been found innocent with regard to this war. We have considered it strife, have considered it a catastrophe for everyone, and have said that under no circumstance is it permissible to make any contribution to it except a cease fire and rectification of the strife. A great trap has been set and its results will continue to be a big embarrassment in our hearts, and our conscience, and we point out that we have condemned it. This of course does not mean agreement or silence in any way concerning specific Palestinian appeals or attitudes that have caused this war or strife, attitudes which are dependent on the principle of negotiating with the Americans and trying to create a new formula, such as the formula of the Amman Palestinian-Jordanian agreement. That does not at all mean that we are facing this issue with satisfaction or forbearance. We consider that this matter is one of the worst things the Palestinian cause has faced, assuredly, far removed from any Arab regional Arab struggles, and we considered, with respect to the state of affairs, that any neglect or what is called flexibility in dealing with the Palestinian cause, in the direction of the Americans or the Israelis, is a great threat to this cause, the Palestinian people, the Moslems and the Arabs, because we believe that America will not give anything and that Israel will take everything, and that every Arab or Palestinian concession will be met by Israeli rigidity and a new state of American deceptiveness. Of course the forces which took part in this fighting knew that

our opinion was one of opposition to participation, and we said clearly, and say now, that it is not permissible for any party to take part in this fighting because it is in no way permissible to enter into the strife. Both parties to the strife are wrong and bear responsibility. As to whether this strife can be resumed in Sidon, yes, it can be resumed in Sidon, and the facts on that, most unfortunately, are building up there. We may hope that the lesson the two parties learned in Beirut will be of use to them in Sidon and that neither of them will create circumstances of tension which will ignite a state of combat. Efforts are being made by all parties in Sidon, as we know, especially on the part of influential people in Sidon. These efforts, God willing, will be aimed at keeping this situation from resuming and occurring.

AL-HAWADITH: Can one believe that the war of the camps in Beirut has ended?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: Yes, my assessment is that it has ended.

AL-HAWADITH: Relations with the Palestinians today are considered a major point at issue in Lebanon. How would you like them to be -- as spelled out in agreements such as the Cairo agreement, as a return to the state that existed before the Cairo agreement regarding the imposition of security in the camps, as a final agreement on a military alliance, or as the transfer of the Palestinians' camps from Beirut and the south to the al-Biqa' and the north?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: I believe, in the state the condition of the Lebanese nation has reached now, that it is not realistic for us to talk about agreements. Who will agree with whom? Therefore it would be best for this point not to be raised now. Of course the time will come when it will be raised. As regards the war, all in all, I can say:

First, the Palestinians are present in Lebanon by the current and historic acquiescence of the Lebanese. That is, they did not come in against the will of the Lebanese regime or people. They enjoyed the approval and agreement of the Lebanese regime and the Lebanese people at that time and were distributed throughout Lebanon, where they now are, in the south, Beirut, the north and the al-Biqa', under the aegis, agreement and approval of everyone. They have the right to reside in Lebanon as long as their cause exists. There is absolutely no objection to their presence as a people, participating with us in all things. As to the talk about distributing the Palestinians, expelling the Palestinians and specifying where the Palestinians can be located, there is no legitimate basis to that whatever. What can take place through mutual understanding and agreement is something that can take place at any time. As to formulas of compulsion, we are not in agreement with any of these. What is called the Palestinian civilian presence is inviolate, there is no objection to it, and we do not agree that it should be infringed on harmfully. The Palestinians enjoy all the rights which Lebanese laws on the one hand, and agreements concluded between Lebanon and the Arab League and international organizations looking after the affairs of the Palestinians on the other, confer on them to enjoy. As far as this issue goes, there are no reservations and we do not accept any infringement on the safety, dignity, freedom and opportunities for prosperity of the Palestinian

presence in Lebanon. With respect to the Palestinian armed presence, specific arrangements for that exist among the Lebanese, since there is an agreement among the Lebanese, especially among the Moslems in Beirut, the south, the al-Biqa' and the north, that there should be no going back to the way things were before the Israeli occupation, before the summer of 1982.

On this issue, the same security must exist for everyone. The government will take charge of this security through its own agencies, which have been qualified by everyone and are strong and capable. The problem in this point, now, is that there is a situation, which is that the government in its present situation does not have qualified, capable forces. If qualified forces exist, as is normally the case now with respect to domestic security forces, they are not capable. If capable forces exist, as is the case with the army for example, they have not been endorsed by everyone. Therefore, there is no agency which is able to impose security on everyone. This constitutes the dilemma. At this stage, until the country is rebuilt and its security and military agencies are rebuilt and they are both qualified and capable, what form can the temporary state of security take? This constitutes a dilemma for us all, for the Palestinians, for the Lebanese and for us all. It is necessary to invent formulas which will correspond to this need and this lack, so that there will be no internal security on the one hand and there will be an acceptable degree of public security and non-internal security. We believe that the Damascus formula, which arose from the expanded Islamic meeting in Damascus recently, last month, is the suitable formula for coping with this dilemma at this stage.

This formula is confronting this need now. It is not a complete formula, it is not a permanent formula, but it is confronting this need until possibilities emerge for creating security agencies connected officially to the government which are qualified and capable.

At this point we say that we believe everyone must exert their efforts and follow up on them to make the formula of the Damascus agreement succeed. As regards the security aspect, I would like to keep saying that that will benefit the situation, because the Syrian initiative in this area was basic, essential and very responsible. It in reality guarantees that this plan will be made a success. I make this statement because I want the people who are carrying out this plan, the Lebanese, especially people in the militias, to keep hearing it.

They are facing challenges, the challenge of the ordinary Lebanese man, like the ordinary Palestinian man, but they are in the first place facing the challenge of the ordinary man. They are facing the Syrian challenge and they must not act in a mistaken manner which will put an end to this Syrian initiative, subject it to frustration. So far, substantial progress has taken place, much less than what is required. Complaints are still being made, but there is no doubt that the situation in the Palestinian and Lebanese context is much better than it was. Therefore we are thus compelled to accept a temporary complex executive formula which will avoid talk about Lebanese or Palestinian internal security and at the same time guarantee a minimum climate of security that has been approved of.

With respect to the question, the resistance requires two elements. Of course we are not saying it requires a cause, because the cause exists. It requires two elements -- the human element and the financial element.

We in Lebanon, by the grace of God, in this stage against Israel, possess the purest and most elite human elements that can exist and that have existed in the history of the Arabs and the Moslems. Therefore, the resistance against Israel in Lebanon does not require the human element. That has been provided, so far, by the Lebanese Moslems and I can say frankly by the Moslems who are committed in the Islamic sense, in face of all the media disgrace and media and political usurpation of the resistance. As for the financial cost, I can say frankly that this honorable resistance is financing itself through ordinary people in Lebanon, out of legitimate wages, donations and alms, and it does not cost a lot. Therefore, it does not depend on foreign countries at all. Since the battle of Khaldah, the resistance has not depended on foreign financing.

AL-HAWADITH: But it does depend on well known parties and numerous organizations such as the Soldiers of God and the Party of God.

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: There are many resistance members who belong to the committed Islamic line who might be among the former or among the latter. There is what is known as the Party of God, there is the comprehensive civilian resistance, there are the independents and there are many people who belong to one party or another, but it is on their own responsibility that they make the decision to offer resistance. This is a matter of secret and covert resistance. Therefore, if we need aid in the future we will call on the Palestinians, as a resistance, and will call on others beside them. Therefore the armed Palestinian resistance for the purpose of resistance has its necessity. It might confuse the scene if that takes place. We are Lebanese and we are resisting Israel, which is occupying our territory, and will continue to resist it to the end.

AL-HAWADITH: Even if it leaves the south?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: This is another matter. Therefore we have discussed the question of the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon from its two standpoints. As to the Palestinian political presence in Lebanon, we most clearly and frankly are committed to the Palestinian presence with respect to the principle of total rejection of the notion of peace, the notion of negotiation and the notion of recognition of the Israelis from now to eternity. Therefore, we will not permit any Palestinian or Arab policy which bears a hint of such a notion to be politically active in Lebanon, and any body which is based on the notion of absolute enmity toward Israel will have the broadest positions in Lebanon.

AL-HAWADITH: What form are Lebanese relations with Syria to take -- economic, political and military treaties or units in the form of a confederation? When must that take place? In the era of what regime?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: First, there is an obligation which we must consider clearly. The Lebanese Republic has three border areas -- the area of its

Mediterranean borders, the area of its borders with occupied Palestine and the area of its borders with Syria. Therefore there is geographical continuity with Syria, the sea is a sea, Israel is an absolute enemy, a mortal enemy, and we are not entertaining the thought that there should be relations with Israel. They might be established in spite of us, but certainly we will not give agreement to them. This is one point. The other point is the human extension; there is hardly a family or human group in Lebanon, Christian or Moslem, which does not extend by blood and "ties of blood" to Syria, from its north to its south. Lebanon's only outlet to the heartland of the Arab world and Asia, even non-Arab Asia, is Syria. This is as far as local interests in accordance with the Lebanese-Israeli situation are concerned; it is a state of absolute enmity as we see it, and it cannot be imagined that Lebanon has a strategic heartland, as it has been said, except Syria. By virtue of Syria's position vis-a-vis Israel, of necessity, whether the Lebanese like it or not, whether the Syrians like it or not, Lebanon is Syria's flank or front in Lebanon, its flank or front in Golan in its common borders with Palestine, but, on its other side, Lebanon represents the Syrians' front line, as far as Israel is concerned. All these considerations, and others, make the Syrian situation in Lebanon a special one, and the Lebanese situation in Syria a special one also. Lebanon is of course an Arab country, and its relationship with all the Arab countries and all the Arab people are equal ones. However, this particular characteristic vis-a-vis Syria makes a specific need for having what is called a distinctive relationship with Syria regarding the strategic issue, the economic issue and the security issue. When we think of confrontation with Israel, we certainly think of every Arab country, but we think first of Syria because by virtue of geography we are considered, along with it, a single territory; when we think of apple harvest exports, or an imported refrigerator transaction, or something like that, or a commodity manufactured in Lebanon, we think of Syria, since it is our window to the whole Arab world. This all presupposes the establishment of what you call distinctive relations. The Arabhood of Lebanon does not arise from its being a country which has a relationship with Syria or Syria having a relationship with Lebanon. Lebanon is Arab, its people are Arab, and its Arab connection and identity are similar to any Arab country's. The particular geographic, human and political strategic character gives Syria a special status; I am very fond of a phrase I use, Syria is a Lebanese imperative and Lebanon is a Syrian imperative. How can this relationship be given concrete form in the political, military, security and economic areas? Will it be given concrete form by agreements, treaties, integration formulas? This is something which has not been raised now in the framework of the detailed research in my possession. This must exist and the suitable organizational formulas must be set out for it, because Lebanon exists and Syria exists, because Lebanon has an identity and a particular character and because Syria has an identity and a particular character, by virtue of the subdivision which was made in the Arab countries; in reality, as the generation that established these entities understands it, it has no reality.

AL-HAWADITH: Why are the Christians absent from this discussion?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: They may believe that we are talking about Arab unity. I tell them no, rest assured; the entity exists, and they are welcome in it

with full respect and appreciation. Lebanon's borders are international and recognized. However, will that come about in advance?

AL-HAWADITH: Will what come about, your eminence the sheikh?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: An organizational situation which expresses the need for the relationship between Syria and Lebanon. I personally do not have any conception of such organizational formulas, but I tell the people who are avoiding them, dear people, think how the notion of the unity of Europe developed since the thirties in Europe, I mean a little before World War Two, during the years of the war, and specifically after the end of the war, how the notion became prominent in the minds of great men like Churchill, and how it developed among peoples which have a history.

It developed by evolving through the Coal and Steel Organization, the European Common Market, and the European Parliament. That is, we are talking about a situation of near-unity which has almost reached the level of political units in some form among peoples connected to different races, languages and wills, among some of which there is a well known history of bloodshed. Today, there is talk about a specific arrangement between Syria and Lebanon or between one given country and another. I am amazed at this way of thinking and this situation; it does not exist within large ethnic groups, so how could it exist within a single people? How can one take a guarded view of any contiguity between two parts, one of which is dependent on the other in security, economic, strategic and military terms? The shattered world is trying to unify itself, especially in Europe. We deny that there is a distinctive relationship which is dictated by necessities. I ask, in this regard, if the Syrians, may God increase their bounties, told us "You have your problems and you have your concerns, your positions, and your opinions; deal with them apart from us," if the Syrians told us that, would these problems, concerns and hopes come to an end? Would we alone, without the help of brothers, arrive at a final solution to everything we are suffering from?

AL-HAWADITH: What is your view on the hijacking of the American airplane? How do you evaluate its results in the Lebanese Islamic and international contexts?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: We view all hijackings, the hijacking of persons and the hijacking of airplanes, and so forth, in a negative manner. We consider that these actions are improper and wrong, from the standpoint of principle and the political standpoint. They are improper from the standpoint of principle and they are unproductive from the political standpoint. We believe that they have created a situation which is not in the interests of the Moslems in Lebanon and that they have not realized the gains that were sought from them. However, while rejecting the method of hijacking, we must understand the motives and reasons of the people who choose it. It is not reasonable for Reagan, for example, to stand up and equate these motives with what is said about terror in the world, or for Israel to view these activities as terror directed against itself and forget or ignore its occupation of other people's land and consider that a legitimate act. It appears that the world wants to forget the sources of all the terror and wants only

to remember that there are operations it insists on labelling "terrorist operations," and put a single label on them, that is, Shiite terror. In this regard I wonder about all the organizations Europe has brought to the fore which have been engaging in this sort of operation for years, seeking specific objectives, for instance the Japanese Red Army, the Red Brigades, Baader Meinhof, the secret Irish Republican Army, and I do not know what army, and so on and so forth. Doesn't this mean that this phenomenon is not the inalienable property of Moslems, that it is a phenomenon that is expressive of a state which psychologists and sociologists have in recent decades treated and in which they have seen the result of despair and the phenomenon of frustration and rejection? The world must study the motives and reasons why it exists and must know how sensitive, repressed people who have been stripped of dignity and rights act when a big country such as America supports and backs Israel with regard to the lowest things done by any gang in the world against a whole nation, especially against millions of Palestinians, who were deprived of their land, and against millions of Lebanese whose territory was occupied under the cover of protecting the security of Galilee. Can such an act be compared with the incident of the hijacking of a plane, considering the latter a terrorist act and considering the occupation justified and a legitimate act on Israel's part?

The backgrounds of things must be considered. People can be wrong, and it is one of the simplest rules of justice that it should be seen what the circumstances of this error are. For them to be judged and found guilty in absentia, without knowledge of the circumstances, without appreciation of the circumstances, is not justice. As regards Islamic law, first of all Islamic law must be applied to its own people, and supervision of the application is not in the hands of everyone. We reject the method of blowing up shops. We also look on this method of action as wrong, and are not at all in agreement with it. We have stated time and again that such an action is wrong and is not the proper method. The proper method is the one which almighty glorious God advocated: "Call for the path of your lord with wisdom and good exhortation." Therefore government by Islamic law, the supervision of Islamic law must be applied and must be advocated and that which is opposed to it must be ended, according to the rule of ordering the commendable and negating the reprehensible. The method of ordering the commendable and negating the reprehensible is subject to the relationships mentioned in jurists' books and is embodied not in these methods but rather in the declaration of the opinion on the application of Islamic law against declared, obvious forbidden things. It is a legitimate matter that we should put an end to the drinking of alcohol, put an end to corruption and put an end to injustice, man's injustice to one another. This is the appeal of Islam and this is something that is required of every Moslem. Almighty glorious God says "In order that there may be a nation from among you, they order what is commendable and negate the reprehensible." Ordering what is commendable and negating the reprehensible is one of the greatest Islamic provisions and must be observed. It is a general provision for the whole nation, but this method, the method of application by violence, we consider to be unsuitable, one that has not been agreed to, and unproductive. Perhaps people abstain out of fear, but if their fear disappears they will go back to being the way they were, whereas conviction, exhortation and enlightenment are what produce, and this is the responsibility of all aware Moslems in the form of the

scholars of religion and educated persons, to spread about the idea and this belief among the Moslems and make them more thoroughly grasp the firm bond which is the bond of Islam.

AL-HAWADITH: Your eminence the sheikh, how do you view conditions in Lebanon? Are you optimistic?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: We ask almighty glorious God to make all sincere efforts succeed, so that they will be productive. I will not expatiate in discussing optimism and pessimism. An objective situation exists in actual fact, and people should either understand it and express their understanding or not understand it and say "I do not know." Now there are some positive features to the situation that in fact exists which we hope will lead to a solution, if only a tentative one. From the security standpoint of course we have repeatedly stated that the disruption of security should be prevented, that the sanctity and the rulings of the legitimate authorities should be endorsed, and whenever possible the security situation should be calmed down and stabilized on proper foundations, and this is everyone's duty. From the political standpoint, we hope that there will be an approach toward finding a political solution, but we do not consider that the foreseeable future holds the possibility of anything of this sort. There might be a state of paralysis, a state of settlement, which will allow people to catch their breaths, in order to deal with matters patiently and carefully and with calm nerves. On this subject, of course, we do not agree with any political solution focussed on the principle of a settlement, unless that is tentative in character, and we are not in favor of entering into a charter, unless that is based on the vision of change we expressed in the plan for numerical democracy founded on the principle of consultation.

This interview ought to have ended at this point, but successive outbursts took place in Beirut, killing hundreds of innocent civilians. The breakdown in security reached its peak in one of the most vicious and severe of military exchanges.

We contacted Shaykh Mahdi Shams-al-Din from London by telephone and asked him the three following questions:

AL-HAWADITH: What are the secrets and causes of this new breakdown?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: A few days ago we were asked about the secret of what was happening and why it was happening, and we said that the genesis of this outburst was that everyone was afraid of peace, because peace would dictate to them that they give up what they had for the sake of the interests of the nation, which they had apportioned among themselves. Peace would dictate to all of them that they revert to their ordinary size, which they do not want. Therefore, the outburst took place to guarantee the continued partition of the nation.

AL-HAWADITH: Who is responsible, specifically?

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: All the parties have taken the initiative and they are all responsible. There always is an action and a reaction.

AL-HAWADITH: There is information which holds that the latest explosion was a natural result of Murphy's visit, the Casablanca summit and other regional and international factors.

Shaykh Shams-al-Din: Will these explanations and reasons remain mere guesses, while the real ultimate reasons remain internal?

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LEBANON

PHILANTHROPIC FIGURE EXPRESSES VIEWS ON POLITICAL SCENE

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 19-25 Aug 85 pp 9-11

[Interview with Tamam Salam, Chairman of the Islamic Society of Benevolent Objectives, by Hashim Qasim: "Warning against Continuing the Perverse Practices and Security Excesses: Tamam Salam: The Milia Parties Are on the Road to Bankruptcy and the People Ask God's Mercy for the 'Traditionalists'!"]

[Text] In this interview Mr Tamam Salam, chairman of the Islamic Society of Benevolent Objectives, criticizes the security excesses and perverse acts the parties and militias are carrying out in various places, considering them a sign of the breakdown and bankruptcy of the parties and militias.

In the context of the nonexistence of democracy and stability of security, Tamam Salam calls for a return to intelligence and wisdom and to the option of unifying the people and institutions of Lebanon, as the sole national approach.

Here is the text of the conversation:

[Question] Where is [former] Premier Sa'ib Salam?

[Answer] Premier Salam is looking after his wife, who is following a specific cure in Geneva because of an illness to which she succumbed 10 months ago. To him, she is the partner of his life and comrade in his struggle. As long as she is weak, he will be by her side. This does not mean that if the circumstances dictate that he be among us, that he will be remiss in performing his role. We have always been accustomed to that.

[Question] Many people talk about the retrenchment in influence and effectiveness of the traditional Islamic political forces and the traditional political Christian forces and their influence in Lebanese political life, and therefore the emergence of political forces which the Lebanese war has brought to the fore (that is, the forces of the militias and parties) as implicit alternatives.

[Answer] When the events began, the expression "traditional politicians" was applied to the leaders who had been working in the public arena for many

years. The purpose in this was to suggest to public opinion that these people were a burden on the political situation in Lebanon. Time passed along with the perverse practices and excesses which accompanied it on the part of the parvenus and opportunists who promoted this expression, causing the people to ask God's mercy for those they had called traditionalists. If the traditionalists are proponents of genuine principles and values and national sincerity, they are welcome. However, if they are the young new symbols which are lacking in the proved capability to bear responsibility and are running after gain and self-interest in an attempt to attain positions and status (at the expense of the people), "God will gladden them and remove them." Many of them have accumulated great wealth, which they have seized by striking terror at the expense of the interests and livelihood of the citizen. Let them be blessed with it and live with it, by the doors to the international banks, "and let them spare these good people their evil."

[Question] The question has another meaning, as some people say; the traditional political figures have reached their end, or nearly so, in terms of their effectiveness and role. What is your opinion?

[Answer] The events in Lebanon are rushing forward and concentrating themselves grievously. Many are the events which are imposed by the force of arms and terror. This means that anyone who does not have a militia who is tyrannized and whose authority is thereby broken up must seek positive, constructive conduct which will help support the elements of patience and perseverance during this difficult period. The first condition of this is to avoid the limelight and the charged atmosphere which draws people's attention. Therefore it is occurring to some people that some of Lebanon's leaders and heads have abased themselves, but the important thing, in reality, is the daily aggressions that are being carried out by armed persons against the chastity and dignity of the citizen and the terrorization of people everywhere, of all devout people and people who have no connection to weapons or their environment.

[Question] What excesses are you talking about?

[Answer] The excesses start with the thefts of cars, then the burglaries of homes, then the violation of barriers and kidnapping, and many times reach the point of murder. The forbearing citizen always pays a high price. The strange thing is that people do not even let him grumble or cry out in a loud voice. The citizen I mean is the poor citizen in whom, and in whose causes, they traffic every day, who lacks the ability to carry out the designs of the militias and their gangs and the militia commanders behind them.

[Question] Will the solution be realized by the traditional political forces or by the sectarian and factional forces which have a monopoly on decision-making?

[Answer] If we want to work seriously to formulate serious, crucial solutions for Lebanon's future, the first thing we will need is a minimum of security stability. That is if we want to continue to preserve a democratic Lebanon, the homeland of freedoms and the homeland of free men. Democracy,

today, is almost totally lacking. We cannot abandon it to the leaders of the militias and parties who have usurped it while claiming to participate and be concerned over building the Lebanon of the future, unless they have a conception similar to the situation in the autocratic, dictatorial countries whose names they utter, in a loud voice, while repeating the term democracy, which, in its composition and structure, is totally alien to this. I am confident that if our good people are given the opportunity in a stable democratic atmosphere to state their view as thoroughly as possible, they will certainly cause the downfall of many symbols and leaders who are active on the political stage through their dominance and control of their militias. The situation is related to a suitable atmosphere and climate, and vice versa.

[Question] It is as if you are demanding that the circumstances be totally suited to political activity in Lebanon's current circumstances, although action for the sake of a democratic reform program will require a great effort commensurate with the scope of the state of terror which has gotten out of control.

[Answer] A review of specific political conditions is required during this stage and will not exempt anyone from performing his duty so that they may be changed for the better. We are attentive to this, and have made a pact with ourselves and our people. We miss no opportunity to scream out the truth and reality in the name of the people, no matter what risks that may involve for us.

[Question] So you are meeting weapons and repression with words?

[Answer] Words, in the area of enlightening public opinion, are among the strongest weapons to which people who are active in this field can turn, in addition to the social and care services we are offering, which help alleviate the burdens and weight of the events and the deeds of criminals. The organizational work which we are monitoring and observing is the positive building block in the enormous destruction and ruin that surrounds us.

[Question] What you are saying is a general statement which could not properly be endowed with the characteristics of the national program, but rather in the best of circumstances is a reaction to the actions of others.

[Answer] There are the ten constants of Islam which came out of the meeting of the House of Rulings in accordance with an Islamic and national consensus. These constants are the best approach for formulating a future national program for Lebanon. Alongside that, there is a horde of programs which have been proposed by factions, groups, fronts and alliances whose sole interest is to formulate statements and hide behind them on the claim that they will theoretically help set out future conceptions for Lebanon.

[Question] Is the National Federation Front part of what you mean?

[Answer] Of course. The National Alliance Front is one of the fronts and alliances I have mentioned. It seems they have decided to change its name, and it is now the National Federation Front. Thus as far as they are

concerned they play with things and with the destiny of the people behind them, although there is no one to oversee them or hold them to account.

[Question] Numerous political plans have been advanced for solving the Lebanese crisis. However, none of them has constituted a solution acceptable to all Lebanese. In this light, what features do you envision for the national plan?

[Answer] It is very difficult to set out general features for a national plan that is accepted by everyone. The hard circumstances we are passing through have imposed an adverse climate. The stage for a solution has not yet come.

[Question] Some people propose integration between Lebanon and Syria, some people propose a union, and others propose distinctive relations. What do you yourself understand from the three points, and what is your opinion?

[Answer] The three points are indeed apropos, in their entirety or in part, in one area or another, depending on the group, the faction or the sect. The Lebanese are not in agreement over a single conception of Lebanon's relationship to Syria. It is of the utmost difficulty, while Lebanon is in the weak, fragmented and disintegrated state it is in, for it to be possible to form an effective opinion in this area. It is also clear that Syria is in a stronger position to propose its conceptions regarding this matter. From time to time we hear opinions and orientations in the words of some people who claim to represent Syrian decisionmaking in Lebanon which fall within specific notions of the relationship with Syria, starting with distinctive relations and ending with complete unity.

[Question] What is your personal opinion on the subject?

[Answer] Every relationship between one country and another must start with some step in the context of rapprochement and interaction in a manner which will bring benefit to the two countries. It is well known historically that distinctive relations exist between Lebanon and Syria. However, we must admit that these relations have not been developed in a positive, constructive direction for the sake of making progress in a manner which will bring benefit to the two peoples and the two countries. If that had been the case in the past, we might perhaps be in a better position today to discuss this matter.

[Question] At this stage, what do you demand of Syria?

[Answer] The first thing I am demanding of Syria, on the basis of what I can gather from the state of tragedy the Lebanese are experiencing, is that officials in Syria should make a field trip to Lebanon, specifically to the capital, the main towns and the eastern section of Beirut, to get a direct sense of the truth of the situation in actual conditions, because I greatly doubt the truth of what Damascus is being repeatedly told by the leaders of the parties and militias, which convey the pictures it likes and conceal the tyrannical, domineering reality. I am consequently confident that movement in the field on the part of Syrian officials will lead directly to the

approval of positions and measures which help ward off the disruption and neglect of security which the parties and militias are engaging in.

[Question] How do you evaluate the political role of the AMAL movement and the Socialist Progressive Party?

[Answer] We cannot differentiate between the political role of the AMAL movement and the Socialist Progressive Party and the security role. The political positions and decisions of anyone who is living in the atmosphere of militia dominance and hegemony in dealing with people and the godfearing can only develop in a form that is in keeping with the requirements of this hegemony and its intentions, as far as partitioning the land, partitioning jobs and partitioning a livelihood goes, in addition to establishing quasi-statelets and areas of influence. This does not prevent confrontations between the AMAL movement and the Socialist Progressive Party on the ground in some cases, when one of them crosses over the borders of the other in terms of benefits, gains and spoils.

[Question] Don't you believe that what you have said now, and what you are telling the daily papers, constitutes violations against the red line?

[Answer] If the red line is the continuation of armed militia practices and excesses, we will not cease for a moment laying this bare before public opinion and levelling explicit charges against those who commit immoral activities which are harmful to people and their interests. Truth, sincerity and frankness do not know red lines. We will not at any moment abandon our responsibility toward our people in terms of showing them the things we consider harmful to them and speaking frankly to them with respect to them. Here I might mention, and mentioning it might perhaps be beneficial, that the AMAL movement specifically embodied the aspirations and ambitions of the people who had persevered against the tragedies and difficulties when it stood alongside us regarding important people's and national issues. Among them I might mention the issue of people's security in Beirut, the issue of the local councils, and so forth, when the national movement tried to dominate the people by means of the red line. We adhere to and call for the AMAL of Imam Musa al-Sadr, who took honorable positions regarding our national affairs, especially when he locked himself up and went on a hunger strike in the Workers' Faculty at the beginning of the Lebanese war, to show his patriotic and human feeling on how the violent events should be handled.

[Question] Security based on the legitimate authorities, security based on the militias and parties, or security overseen by Damascus in coordination with the legitimate authorities -- which form of security do you want?

[Answer] It is obvious that the optimum choice would be security based on the legitimate authorities, but if you want to be obeyed, ask for what is feasible. Security based on the legitimate authorities is nonexistent at the present time, because the legitimate authorities have abandoned many of their duties and much of their credibility. They have become the property of one group to the exclusion of another and have ceased representing the aspirations and ambitions of all the Lebanese. When legitimate authorities over which all Lebanese reach consensus come into being, the security which is

based principally on them will come into being. Security based on the militias is something that has come into being, and there is no embarrassment over that. It is everything except for the security the citizens who are the farthest removed from weapons want.

As for the formula which will deal with security in coordination with Syria, this is required at the present stage, and the groups could reach consensus over it. We have experienced an example which is similar to that in the case of the security measures and arrangements which have started in west Beirut following the appearance of Syrian officer observers.

[Question] From time to time, different appeals issue forth, among them bringing down the regime, changing the system, or the two together, as solutions to the Lebanese problem. What is your opinion?

[Answer] Many of these appeals are issued in a charged, disturbed atmosphere, and consequently are not founded on serious profound studies and research aimed at finding solutions to the Lebanese problem.

Demanding that the regime be brought down is legitimate and normal in a democratic country which is based on the rules of the parliamentary game. It is not reasonable that the subject of changing the regime be raised where there is no integrated conception of a new regime on which the majority of Lebanese will reach consensus, unless this proposal has the goal of destruction for its own sake, a sort of approach extreme anarchists are accustomed to engaging in.

[Question] What is meant is changing the system based on political factionalism!

[Answer] If that is what is meant, I and all sincere Lebanese support it, but within rules and principles over which everyone will agree. At the same time, the problem should be dealt with by formulating practical solutions which the persons involved will work vigilantly to carry out. Here we must clearly state that the people demanding that the Lebanese regime be changed today are those who derive their influence and authority from the purely factional and sectarian activities which they are demanding be abrogated. How can we grasp this contradiction?

[Question] There are people who repeatedly keep saying that the political movements and parties in Lebanon are bankrupt. In the light of this do you call for a comprehensive national reconciliation?

[Answer] The parties that have militias are in the process of going bankrupt. As long as they have not gone bankrupt for good, they will continue to constitute obstacles to a chaste, clean national meeting. As long as there are people engaging in violence in all its forms and types in order to preserve their gains and status, the wise men and sincere leaders in Lebanon will not take part in any compulsory process of reconciliation. Let them throw away their weapons first of all and distance themselves from violence, counterviolence, mutual violence and absolute violence. At that time they will acquire their true magnitude. Let us see if they hold on to any position in any process of conciliation.

[Question] Some people propose various forms of decentralization. What do you say?

[Answer] To simplify the issue, aside from federal plans and plans for a confederation or cantonments, I can say that political centralization is indispensable as far as a nation of Lebanon's size is concerned. Administrative decentralization is also a demand of the people's, in order to facilitate the citizens' affairs and business. In addition, administrative decentralization will directly contribute to the development of Lebanese areas which the delapidated central administration neglected for decades. In the context of fusing political citizenship in a single, tight crucible by which Lebanon can face all other countries, that can be done only through political centralization. In brief, there will be no solution except by the complete unification of the people, the land and the institutions.

[Question] After the war of the camps, a view has emerged which calls for international forces to be brought in to preserve the security of the camps. What do you say?

[Answer] The domestic and national notions on which we were raised are that the assistance of international forces should be sought to break up skirmishes, to supervise military contact zones, or to supervise the execution of military armistice provisions between two parties. These things are all embodied in the Arab-Israeli struggle. For the situation to develop to a reliance on the principle of international forces standing between one Arab force and another is very serious and brings us to new conceptions which are alien to us.

[Question] In this light, how do you evaluate the war of the camps, especially with respect to the statements being reiterated now, that they might resume?

[Answer] The war of the camps in any event is a curse on our people and our country, as on the Palestinian people. It is as if we are not content and the Palestinians are not content with the fragmentation, splintering, destruction and dispossession which have befallen them and us. It is not reasonable that our people should be a piece of straw to fuel the flame for the sake of a struggle among Arab axes from which no benefit can be gained. Abu 'Ammar resumed activity in Beirut a few months ago by sending his group to stir up the streets of Beirut and provoke discord on them in order to settle his Arab accounts on the territory of Lebanon. However, our people's awareness of what many people had gone through because of the Palestinian organizations in the past prevented the possibility of their being drawn in. We were very frank with Mr Yasir 'Arafat's representatives in calling on them to spare our perseverant people rather than pushing them into side struggles which were of no benefit. We had also hoped that the AMAL movement would not be pushed into the battles of the camps, because no one benefits from fighting among brothers except the Israeli enemy.

Today we once again urge Abu 'Ammar and the other parties to remove the source of explosion from the camps, because there is information which indicates that an additional acquisition of arms is taking place in the camps

and that an additional acquisition of arms is taking place outside the camps, specifically in the ranks of the AMAL movement. Here we are attaching our voice and effort to the effort of the wise people of our country, who are moving in the direction of stopping this bloody game.

[Question] There are people who advocate that international forces be brought in for all of Lebanon.

[Answer] If the Lebanese do not take the initiative of understanding one another and trying to find their own solutions for creating the elements of a Lebanese-Lebanese conciliation through the requisite sacrifice on the part of all groups, any international or regional force will perforce be incapable of providing our security and solving our problems.

[Question] What about neutrality?

[Answer] As far as international issues go, it is clear that Lebanon's neutrality has always been desirable. Through the special effort of Premier Sa'ib Salam, Lebanon joined the conference of the nonaligned nations in 1960 to assert Lebanon's international neutrality. As regards the national dimension, Lebanon cannot be alienated from its Arab circumstances or abandon Arab causes and its effective, distinctive role in the Arab world.

[Question] How do you assess the political status of the Lebanese Christian leaders?

[Answer] The situation on the Christian side is not very different from what we ourselves are going through. There also is dominance and hegemony on the part of an armed militia (the Lebanese Forces) over vital decisions and decisions regarding people's livelihood, in addition to political decisions. We always pointed to the grouping of the independent Maronite deputies and wondered "what are they independent of?" It is obvious that they are independent of Phalangist party militia dominance. The voices of intelligent and wise Christian leaders in Lebanon have been repressed. In the past we witnessed terroristic and repressive operations which are still dominating and cancelling out the free independent Christian voice. It remains for us to say that the results of the historic struggle over Maronite leadership have been harmful and bad for all of Lebanon, specifically for the Christians. Today it is our aspiration that President Sulayman Franjiyah play a basic role in the area of drawing together the ranks of a group of Lebanese, the Christian group, in the direction of forming the ingredients for entering into a future dialogue of national reconciliation.

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AFGHANISTAN

AIR, ARTILLERY STRIKES LAUNCHED AGAINST MUJAHIDIN

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 2 Oct 85 pp 1-2

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 1 (Dispatches) — Soviet and Afghan forces staged one of the most intense airborne operations ever against Islamic freedom fighters launching hundreds of air and artillery strikes against the Mujahideen outside Kabul, western diplomats said today.

The diplomats, speaking on condition they not be identified, said two Mujahideen commanders were martyred during the Sept. 24 offensive but the Mujahideen casualties were otherwise "minimal." There was no word on casualties among the Soviet and Afghan forces.

One diplomat said the operation around Paghman and Maydanschahr, just west of the Afghan capital, was aimed at Mujahideen units who shot down a helicopter Sept. 23, killing 10 Soviet and 15 Afghan soldiers.

"In retaliation, there were very heavy helicopter attacks... involving some of the largest airborne movements of the war," she said in a regular weekly briefing for western reporters.

Another diplomat said thousands of Soviet and Afghan troops were

deployed in a pincer operation to block escape routes from the area, while helicopter gunships flew bombing runs against Mujahideen positions.

"Soviet and (Kabul) regime helicopters made hundreds of sorties from Kabul airport in what Kabul residents described as one of the heaviest days of air activity in memory," he said.

"Numerous villages and suspected Mujahideen positions were repeatedly bombarded during the daylong operation, but there was no effort by Soviet ground units to move into the area to follow up on the air assault," he said.

"Soviet artillery batteries provided support fire during the operation," he said.

The other diplomat said "some 300 helicopter sorties were counted, including 86 during a two-hour period during the morning."

The diplomats said Soviet and Afghan forces launched additional bombing and artillery attacks on the area over the following few days.

In other developments, Soviet troops attacked a large Mujahideen contingent in the Mazar-i-Sharif area, about 30 miles (50 km) south of the

Soviet border, on Sept. 15. Five foreign doctors accompanying the Mujahideen escaped but 39 of them were martyred, the diplomats said.

Domestic Airliner Downed
The latest reports on the Sept. 4 downing of an Afghan domestic airliner by the Mujahideen said 28 Soviets and 20 Afghans were killed, according to one diplomat. It was the first time Soviet citizens were reported on the plane.

Official Radio Kabul said the airliner was hit by a missile shortly after it took off from the airport in Kandahar, about 190 miles (300 km) south of Kabul.

The diplomat said government troops bombed the village of Hati, near Ghazni, 75 miles (120 km) south of Kabul, on Sept. 23, killing "many civilians, including women and children."

Seven Soviet men and one woman — whose presence could not be explained — were killed the same day in fighting around Jalez, 40 miles (65 km) west of Kabul, she said.

American Journalists Killed
Meanwhile reports from Islamabad said one of two journalists from an American newspaper was killed in

Afghanistan and the other
was wounded in a rocket
attack by Soviet troops last
week, an Afghan resistance
source in Peshawar said
Tuesday.

CSO: 4600/49

AFGHANISTAN

UNRESOLVED CRIMES IN PAKISTAN ATTRIBUTED TO KGB

Paris LIBERATION in French 19-20 Oct 85 p 29

[Text] Multiple murders carried out with a club or hammer in Pakistan during the past 2 months have been blamed by the press and public rumors on a mysterious "hammer group" and have produced a virtual psychosis in the entire country.

The youth of the areas affected have been assigned by the population to keep watch at night, armed with cudgels. The press talks freely about "night-mares when fear lurks." As a result of rumors, other towns and villages have organized watch shifts, and no crime or macabre event occurs in Pakistan without attribution to the "hammer group."

The latest episode: discovery on Sunday of poisoned wells in the villages north of Peshawar (west) whose water reportedly caused the death of two babies and hospitalization of two others. To the local population there is no doubt that it was "the hammer." The police are more skeptical.

A few days earlier, a pedestrian was walking at night along a road. He was found unconscious. The pedestrian and rumors accused "the hammer." The police conclude that he slipped and hit a stone. Finally, there are the cases of crimes of passion or villainy, already identified, which the perpetrators have disguised in order for the "group" to get the blame.

Some say that they have "witnessed." Others tell secondhand about what witnesses saw: men dressed all in black who ran as fast as leopards and jumped as high as deer, with their bloody hammer in hand.

The crimes that prompted this phenomenon do arouse the imagination. On 11 August, 12 people, men, women and children of two families, were savagely massacred in a poor district of Rawalpindi, 15 km south of Islamabad. The emotion was so intense after this massacre that the town experienced a night of rioting.

In the night of 20 September, in Kashmir (northeast): five members of the family of a small shopowner of the town of Muzaffarbad, including three children, were savagely killed. Three others were seriously wounded. Since then, the population has been arming, making nightly patrols, and all strangers are checked. A few days later, six women and children of a village

near Haripur (60 km northeast of Islamabad) were massacred. The wave of panic grows.

There are at least four common features to all these crimes, which remain unexplained: the absence of money motive, nothing has been stolen and the victims are poor; use of an anaesthetic that makes the victims incapable of defending themselves and removes any memory from survivors; the use of hammers or clubs to crush heads; and the fury against children. What is more, in Kashmir, the assassins left a visiting card: a 2-kilogram hammer, red with blood, to which were stuck tufts of hair.

If the press is to be believed, the police have thus far not made much progress in their investigation. After having rejected the hypothesis of family or clan revenge, ritual crime was considered, but no known sect seems to practice such a macabre rite. The proponents of the "political" explanation have thus gained the forefront.

It is an attempt to destabilize the Pakistani regime. The most frequently cited perpetrators are the Afghan secret services, the Khad, which is said to recruit executioners among the some 3 million Afghan refugees now in Pakistan, when it is not the KGB or the Indian secret services.

The Afghan refugees have their own comments and favor the KGB theory. With a strong oral tradition and a taste for epic drama, they explain that the fact that the members of the "hammer group" can jump so high is because the KGB has provided them with special shoes with soles of a particular rubber. Educated Pakistanis are doubtful or smile, sometimes in a patronizing way, but pass on the "news."

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CSO: 4619/3

AFGHANISTAN

FRENCH CIVILIANS PROVIDE AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE

Paris LIBERATION in French 19-20 Oct 85 p 29

[Text] Two Frenchmen have introduced the pumpkin in an Afghan valley. This is an episode that may seem totally anecdotal, but it is nevertheless the symbol of a completely new approach to aid to the Afghans. The two Frenchmen, Bernard Juan and Alain de Bures, members of the Afghanistan International Bureau (BIA), both natives of the Pyrenees, are neither doctors, nor nurses, nor journalists: one is a farmer, the other a stock-raising specialist. They have just spent 6 months in the Kunar (an eastern valley in Afghanistan bordering Pakistan) from 17 May to 12 September.

Their purpose: to help the Afghans, resistance and farmers--but by their own testimony "it is impossible to distinguish the one from the other"--to improve their growing and stock-raising techniques. A big first.

However, the war caught them. Right after their arrival, and lasting for a month, they had to endure a very violent Soviet offensive against the Kunar valley, aimed at cutting off the resistance from its Pakistan sanctuary. The "guests" of the resistance would have preferred to be sharing the life of the Afghan farmers and mujahidin, who were being hunted by the Soviet troops.

Like them, they took refuge far from the villages in the high mountain pasture areas, difficult to reach for the shock troops, bombs and rockets. When the offensive was over, the Frenchmen were able to start their strictly "agricultural" work.

This particular mission was the idea of Alain de Bures, long familiar with Afghanistan and a specialist in stock-raising in Central Asia, where he has spent more than 15 years. From his previous stays in Afghanistan and through discussions with the most perceptive of the resistance commanders, Alain de Bures realized that it was possible to counter the Soviet tactic of emptying the countryside by burning and bombing the crops and herds.

That is where the pumpkin, turnip and squash come in: vegetables that Bernard Juan taught the Afghans to grow in order to improve their food supply. During the offensive, the two Frenchmen lived like Afghans: on nettle soup. Alain de Bures concentrated on the cattle. A difficult, patient task, since the Afghans have been accustomed for thousands of years to a certain way of managing their livestock and are stubborn against any advice, even from one speaking their language.

He tried to rejuvenate livestock to improve the ratio of males, who were not useful and numerous, to the too rare females. He also taught them to use veterinary products available in Pakistan, just across the border but never used.

Today, Alain de Bures is going to return to Pakistan to establish a project, in the same direction, but even more ambitious. For 6 years, the Afghan peasants in the Kunar valley, surrounded by the Soviets, have been living in complete self-sufficiency and can no longer obtain seed. They live off the harvested grain, whose germinating power declines because of the drought and the Soviet harassment, which forces them to harvest the wheat while still green.

In order to escape from this vicious circle, which ultimately--and this is the intention of the occupiers--dooms the Kunar farmers to exile and deprives the resistance of its "environment," the BIA and Alain de Bures have decided to make available along the border seed bought in the Pakistan bazaar. Any farmer bearing a request signed by one of the resistance commanders will be able to receive the quantity of grain that he requests.

This operation is financed by the BIA as well as by Norwegian, Swedish and British nongovernmental aid organizations. In a few months, a mission will go to the area to confirm that the grain has been well used and observe if the commanders have been able to motivate their men, as Alain de Bures put it, "to combine the sickle and the Kalashnikov."

9920

CSO: 4619/3

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

TROUP WITHDRAWAL---TEHRAN, Sept. 30 (IRNA)--Afghan Mujahideen took control of the Zazi, Chamkani and Khost cantonments and forced the Soviet troops to withdraw from Paktia Province with heavy losses, according to Agency Afghan Press report from London Monday. Soviet troops were sent to break the siege which has continued since last month. Chief of the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbaddin Hikmatyar was reported to have reached Paktia Province and planning a visit to the besieged cantonments. Meanwhile Mujahideen have frustrated all Soviet efforts to make Urgoon military airport operational after the runway suffered damages in an attack last Friday. [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in Persian 1 Oct 85 p 1]

CSO: 4600/49

IRAN

OPPOSITION PAPER COMMENTS ON AMERICAN HOSTAGES

GF281752 London KEYHAN in Persian 3 Oct 85 p 16]

[Text] One week before the release of the American clergyman Benjamin Weir, who was held hostage by the Islamic Jihad organization, President Ronald Reagan sent an envoy to Damascus to encourage Syria to take swift military action against the Islamic Jihad to free American, French, and British hostages who have been held for the past 18 months.

According to the NBC television network this special envoy was General Vernon Walters, the U.S. representative in the United Nations, who is familiar with Middle Eastern affairs. General Walters went to Syria in total secrecy and met Hafiz al-Asad and other Syrian officials.

According to the Kuwaiti daily AL-QABAS, Walters has been named "the mission-impossible-man" in the United States. He is reported to have told the Syrian president: If the hostages are released before the November meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the United States will take a very positive attitude toward holding an international conference to solve the Middle East crisis, which is what Syria wants. At the same time, Syrian efforts to release the hostages would prepare the groundwork for a meeting between Reagan and Al-Asad.

Reagan's envoy also told the Syrians that the United States is prepared to support Syria's role in Lebanon and to give the country financial aid. The Syrian president said Syria would very much like to see this problem solved, but unfortunately the key to the issue is in the hands of the Islamic republic, which controls the Hizballah and the Islamic Amal. It is also possible that any military action taken by Syria to free the hostages, whose whereabouts are unknown, would result in their execution, upon orders from Tehran.

According to American sources, the release of Weir was more a propaganda ploy by the Islamic Jihad than Syria's efforts. The Islamic Jihad benefitted from the propaganda following Weir's release to once again make its case for the 17 prisoners held in Kuwait, whom it wishes to exchange for its hostages.

AL-QABAS writes: During his trip to Syria, General Walters told the Syrian Government that if the hostages are released, the United States would be ready to make some compromise and to a certain extent change its policies toward the Islamic republic.

Other sources, while confirming this information, have disclosed that during the past month some diplomatic contacts have been made between Washington and Tehran through the Islamic republic's representatives in several European capitals. Most of the contacts concerned the release of the hostages.

According to AL-QABAS, during these contacts the United States has informed the Iranians that if the hostages are freed, the United States is ready to lift the boycott on the sale of industrial goods and spare parts for civilian aircraft and other goods that Iran may need, with the exception of weaponry.

The U.S. officials have informed their mediaries to send a message to the Islamic republic that if the slightest harm comes to the hostages, the United States holds only Iran responsible.

/12913
CSO: 4640/50

IRAN

BANK OFFICIAL DETAILS COUNTRY'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE SITUATION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 30 Sep 85 p 2

[Text] Economic Service—Dr Nurbakhsh, President of the Central Bank, gave a press conference attended by domestic and foreign correspondents in which he discussed the country's foreign exchange situation and answered questions on economic issues.

KEYHAN's economic correspondent reports that Dr Nurbakhsh began by saying: In general, as a legal necessity, our currency policy is based on saving more than we spend.

On the basis of Majlis legislation, in 1364 [21 Mar 1985 – 20 Mar 1986] we are authorized to spend 15 billion dollars. In addition, we can allocate up to 1.5 billion dollars in foreign exchange to be spent on investment projects. In other words, the total commitment for foreign exchange expenditures in the current year can go as high as 16.5 billion dollars.

The president of the Central Bank added: The registration of orders for import goods based on legal authorizations naturally continues. As of the end of Mordad in the current year [22 August 1985] six billion dollars in foreign orders have been registered, a figure significantly higher than that for the same period last year (5.5 billion dollars).

By the end of Tir of the current year [22 July 1985], the credit accounts opened had reached a total of more than 3.5 billion dollars, which is a significantly greater figure than that for 1363 [21 Mar 1984 – 20 Mar 1985] and even more than before the revolution. Therefore, we deny the claim that "in Iran we have stopped the registration of foreign orders."

Dr Nurbakhsh gave assurances regarding the country's foreign exchange income situation, announcing that our petroleum income last month was 1.6 billion dollars, and that it is estimated that petroleum income will be 1.4 billion dollars for the month of Mehr [23 September – 22 October 1985].

He added: Our income is proceeding normally, and in view of the multiple possibilities for exporting oil, there is no possibility of cutting our petroleum income.

The President of the Central Bank discussed issues pertaining to the rial, expressing satisfaction with the economic indicators. He said: Fortunately, by controlling the amount of currency in circulation, we have been able to keep its growth below 3.5 percent in the first four months of the current year [21 March – 22 July 1985]. As of the end of the month of Tir [22 July], private sector bank deposits, with a growth of around 6.4 percent, have exceeded 6,200 billion rials. On this basis, we have not yet issued any new currency bills.

In sum, we now have no debt to foreign countries, and we will have no problems meeting our commitments in the future, and for the same reason we will be able to operate according to plan.

Loan Agreement and the Reason for Cutting Traveler's Currency

A correspondent asked Dr Nurbakhsh about the likelihood of talks concerning foreign loans. He said: We have had absolutely no talks with other countries about loan agreements, and I do not think we need to do so.

The president of the Central Bank announced that travelers draw around 100 million dollars in foreign exchange annually, and that the reason for the reduction in the payment of traveler's foreign exchange is cultural issues and the limitations on the amount of foreign exchange allocated for the service sector.

Inflation Rate

In conclusion, Dr Nurbakhsh discussed the inflation situation. He said: The average monthly increase in prices in the first five months of the current year was 3.3 percent, and it is anticipated that the inflation rate this year will be less than that for last year (10 percent). He said that the reasons for the arrest in the drop in the rate of inflation are factors in money and finance policies.

9310

CSO: 4640/36

IRAN

FORMER PRESIDENT BANI-SADR INTERVIEWED ON POLITICAL ISSUES

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 19 Aug 85 pp 86-87

[Interview with former president Bani-Sadr by Ahmed Rafat; date and place not given]

[Question] A presidential election will be held next 16 August. What is the significance of this?

[Answer] None, because it is not an election. Fifty candidates were proposed, and only three were accepted as qualified by the electoral commission. The others, including the former prime minister and leader of the Iran Liberation Movement, Mahdi Bazargan, were excluded. Of course the commission did not announce the reasons for this decision. The three candidates who were accepted belong to the same party, the Party of the Islamic Republic. The "hojatolisman," Seyyed Ali Jammenei, the outgoing president and secretary general of the party, is the main candidate. On the other hand, three persons known for their incompetence and their limited popularity were chosen. With regard to the outgoing president, he is so incompetent that for important missions, the regime sent the president of the parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, in his place. The other candidate, the habibollah Asghar Oladi, who was minister of foreign trade, was dismissed from the last two governments for incompetence and due to the protests of businessmen. And finally, the third is a lawyer who, when he represented the interests of the government of Iran at the court in The Hague, lost absolutely all of his cases. The regime wants the people to choose the president from among these. You tell me if this is an election or simply a farce, since obviously the president will be confirmed by Khomeyni.

[Question] Thus in your view, very few voters will go to the polls?

[Answer] According to the reports I have received from within the country, there are few who believe in this farce and few who will go to vote next 16 August. In fact, the regime itself has seen massive reluctance on the part of the people. Khomeyni had to intervene personally a few days ago, threatening those who had indicated their decision not to go to the polls. "Those who do not vote in the coming elections," Khomeyni said, "will be regarded as enemies of the Islamic Republic." Earlier, in connection with other elections, he had asked the people to participate, while now he has issued a real threat.

Naturally, in a country where dissension is punished with a bloodbath, many will vote in the end out of fear of being branded opponents. But I am certain that many, on the other hand, will boycott the elections. Another event I regard as of the greatest importance is the convocation for this month of August of the Iranian Constituent Assembly.

[Question] Why do you believe that the convocation of the Constituent Assembly is so important?

[Answer] The Constituent Assembly has the articles of the Constitution under study. No 107 confirms the freedom of each of the faithful to choose his own spiritual guide. Among the Shiites, there is no unified spiritual guide embodied in one single individual, like the Pope for the catholics. The new article will confirm authority in a single individual whom all the Shiites must recognize. The other article, No 110, pertains to the symbolic role of this guide, without granting him any executive authority. Khomeyni has always had that authority, and no one has initiated debate on his decisions. In fact, the amendment of these two articles will be effected for the period following Khomeyni, and precisely because of this it is important, much more so than the presidential election. This change means that Khomeyni wants to institutionalize the personal dictatorship which he now embodies.

[Question] Recently there has been talk of a political scenario for the post-Khomeyni era, envisioning your return to the country, along with that of other exiles such as Admiral Ahmad Madani, as well as the formation of a new government, united with the domestic political opposition and headed by former President Bazargan and moderate sectors of the clergy.

[Answer] I do not believe in these schemes drafted by Westerners. However I can say that the Khomeyni regime is in its third phase, that is to say that which will end, sooner or later, in its defeat. The time factor depends on the internal development of the regime and the mechanisms of the opposition's action.

[Question] What opposition do you mean?

[Answer] Only the people of Iran living within the country can bring about the fall of the current regime. A political leader in exile can only await that moment, trying to stand aside from the international intrigues of the superpowers.

[Question] You accuse the "mujahedin of the people" and their leader, Massud Rajavi, of totalitarianism, yet just a year ago you participated with them in the National Resistance Council. How do you explain this contradiction?

[Answer] Since the triumph of the revolution, this group has had a single goal--the conquest of power. The repression imposed upon this organization by the clergy in power gave it an opportunity to represent itself as a victim, as persecuted. When, during my clandestine period in the spring of 1981, these gentlemen came to me proposing collaboration, I immediately stated things clearly, because I had little confidence in them. In that period, I drafted a sworn document in which I set forth the ideals of which I spoke. But these

gentlemen, who had just left Iran, trampled its main points underfoot. As a first step, they imposed their own hegemony on the National Resistance Council, followed thereafter by other authoritarian attitudes. Finally, shamefully, they reached agreement with the Iraqi government in 1982, which led to the total breakup of the Council. Today the "mujahedin" have been left in complete isolation, and in practice, the National Resistance Council does not exist.

[Question] Next 11 September will be the fifth anniversary of the beginning of the war with Iraq. Do you believe that a negotiated solution is possible?

[Answer] The reports which come from the regime itself refer to the nation's fatigue with this war and indicate a change of position on the part of some sectors of the clergy. But many of them took this war as an opportunity to repress the democratic freedom won by the people through the revolution. Despite this, I believe it is possible to force the Khomeyni regime to make peace. This will not be possible through international actions, but through a broad movement of the masses within the country.

[Question] How do you, who are regarded as a Shiite intellectual, explain the phenomenon of Shiite violence, which has even spread to Europe?

[Answer] Today as in past centuries a pseudo-Islamic regime is being used to combat Islam. This is an old story and, moreover, it has proved ineffective. There is talk of Islam as a violent religion. This is not true. The very word Islam means peace. If Khomeyni and his acolytes hijack a plane or kill a hostage, the fact is that one should not confuse this with the Islamic religion, just as one must not confuse the massacres perpetrated by the Lebanese Phalangists with Christianity, or the terrorism of the Red Brigades with communism. This kind of confusion works to the advantage of Khomeyni and his Lebanese followers. The truth is that these charges are used by the superpowers to conceal the reality of the facts. For more than 60 years, the United States and the Soviet Union have been waging an indirect battle in the Middle East, each moving its own local pawns. For some years now there has also been a violent reaction on the part of the peoples in this region who, moreover, are tired of being regarded as cannon fodder. The roots of the evil in the Middle East must be sought in the West.

5157

CSO: 3548/2

IRAN

ANTI-REGIME 'PLOTS' ELABORATED BY INFORMATION MINISTER

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 29 Aug 85 p 2

[Text] In a press interview commemorating government week, the information minister emphasized and thanked the people for the noticable role they have had in the success of the information ministry. He said: "During the year 1363, 21 March 1984 to 20 March 1985, 60 percent of the information about the counterrevolution was provided by the people of this ministry."

Hojjatol-Eslam Rey Shahri, the information minister who explained this ministry's operations during the last year for domestic and foreign media, yesterday afternoon explained the uniqueness of the intelligence system under the Islamic Republic order and its main difference from the complex intelligence systems of other countries in the world: "The Islamic Republic of Iran has several exclusive specifications. Among these is the observance of Islamic orders and observance of the law. Contrary to the complex intelligence systems of the other countries, in the Islamic Republic, due to the commitments of the intelligence system, there are limitations in regard to acquiring information."

He also referred to the humane nature of the intelligence system in the Islamic Republic and said: "Unlike people in other countries who do not play an important role in acquiring and submitting inquiries to the proper authorities, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, people consider it their religious duty to cooperate with the authorities to protect security and order. According to statistics, in the previous year over 60 percent of the acquired information about minigroups and counterrevolutionaries was provided and presented to the intelligence organizations by the people and it is interesting that 26 percent of the letters received by this ministry have been related to revealing counterrevolutionaries. One cannot find any intelligence organization in the world that does not interfere in the people's and the society's rights. In principle, in this world, they take any action in order to acquire information. Whereas in the Islamic Republic of Iran there is no invasion of the people's rights. It is the duty of the judiciary not ours to determine the crime of the accused and to punish him."

Hojattol-Eslam Rey Shahri emphasized: "No punishment or torture is inflicted on the accused in the information ministry."

The information minister referred to the information ministry and its emphasis on observing Islamic order and said: "The information ministry was one of the most successful intelligence organizations in the world last year. This success is the result of the extensive cooperation of the people in all respects and their faith in intelligence agents and their job and God's help." He added: "Despite the fact that the superpowers had the advantage of having the most complex intelligence systems, they were not able to carry out their plots since they were not able to understand the Islamic Revolution and the sensitive role of the people."

In explaining the formation and growth of the information ministry, Hojjat ol-Eslam Rey-Shahri said: "The information ministry was formed at a time when counterrevolutionaries imagined that due to the lack of an active intelligence system in the country, they would be able to disturb the society's security by creating riots. But they were wrong, because with the cooperation of the intelligence forces, the corps, the Komiteh, the prime minister's office, the public prosecutor's office, the army and as a whole, the information ministry, we neutralized all their plots."

The information minister proclaimed: "Last year over 3,800 different kinds of arms and 259 kilograms of TNT were discovered from members of counter-revolutionary minigroups. These arms and explosives were destined to be used for disturbing the security of the country. The details of the discoveries are as follows: 16 RPG-7s, 398 Uzis, a G-3, 271 Colts, 440 grenades, 104 bombs, 4 machineguns, 53 mines, 1,513 Molotov cocktails and flares, 1,011 percussion caps for firearms, 20 RPG missiles and mortar shells, and 7 warehouses full of ammunition belonging to the Fedaiyan-e Khala (Majority). He added: "During the same time, 62 cars and a large amount of printing equipment, a copying machine, seals, documents, and forged documents including birth certificates, driving licenses and military release papers were found."

Mr Rey-Shahri also referred to the vain efforts of the minigroups regarding planting bombs and said: "Among the counterrevolutionary plots was making plastic explosives for 200 pounds of TNT in a Peykan automobile and 90 pounds in a Jian automobile which were designed to be exploded during the election in Tehran. They did not succeed and up to now, 39 terrorist teams have been arrested. The members of these teams have taken part in planting bombs and setting cars on fire. A number of high ranking officials of these minigroups have been members of these teams." The information minister said: "Today it is evident to everyone that these minigroups, by assassinating ordinary people and placing bombs in public places, are seeking revenge from the hezbollah people. In principle, the target of their terrorist actions are the street and the bazaar people."

Hojatt ol-Eslam Rey-Shahri referred to the significant success of the intelligence and operation forces and said: "Up to now, 136 terrorist actions have been neutralized prior to their occurrence and their agents have been arrested or annihilated. In one plot, these minigroups had planned to poison (with poison brought from Iraq for them) a group of the nation's authorities including the commander of the ground forces, Colonel Sayyad Shirazi, but they were identified before the plot occurred and were arrested."

Regarding the discovery and arrest of counterrevolutionary agents prior to performing the plots he said: "Up to now, 41 cases of attacks on sensitive and vital centers, 100 cases of setting cars on fire, 9 cases of hijacking and 126 cases of armed robberies have been discovered before they were committed and their agents have been arrested."

In regard to the arrest of a terrorist team who intended to attack some sensitive centers with RPGs, among them the president's residence, the ministry of foreign affairs and the Komiteh located in Vozara street, the information minister said: "The leader of this team alias "Behruzi" and two others named "Balukehi" and "Huseyni" were identified and arrested. They confessed during their investigation that "We had been ordered that even if one brick falls from the president's building we have fulfilled our goal."

He added: "A terrorist team of hypocrites has also been arrested in Isfahan and their leader Asghar Suleymanadeh, a saboteur with a record of carrying out 30 cases of terrorist activities has been arrested." He also added: "It is anticipated that after this interview, they will use all their strength to show their existence."

In conclusion, he warned government employees, revolutionary organizations and those engaged in any type of intelligence activity and said: "The latest method of the counterrevolution is to acquire information about the Islamic Republic over the telephone. They make telephone calls to proper authorities and employees of the government and different organizations and even the ministers using familiar names and demand information. Officials must be very alert so that the counterrevolution is not able to succeed in its inauspicious goals."

The information minister specified: "The counterrevolution sells this acquired information to the Ba'th regime of Iraq and its masters."

To conclude, the information minister expressed joy for the approval of the information ministry's project in regard to the presentation of the counterrevolution's discovered arms to liberation movements.

9815

CSO: 4640/725

IRAN

STATE PROSECUTOR ON NEED TO MAINTAIN 'ISLAMIC ATMOSPHERE'

LD261359 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 25 Oct 85

[Text] State Prosecutor General Musavi Kho'iniha delivered the presermon speech at today's Friday prayers in Tehran. He elaborated on the issue of justice from an Islamic point of view and the judicial system's heavy responsibilities and duties within the Islamic Republic of Iran. He recounted the importance and esteem of a judge in society and said: If our people wish to have a strong judicial system to establish justice, all officials and groups of people must recognize the importance and value of judges and respect them since their social responsibility is very grave.

The state prosecutor, in another part of his speech, referred to the return of little satans and all those who under the previous regime violated the people's rights and pilfered the national wealth for themselves and now have come back asking for the remainder of their dues, and said: Some corrupt people respected under the former regime are still respected now. A person who oppressed the people under the Taquti regime [Shah's regime] has now come back to the country and intends to do the same. This is an issue which our people cannot tolerate anymore. It is the duty of the country's judicial officials to restore people's rights. This is the path which our judicial system must follow.

Addressing the combatants of Islam, the deprived people in the society, the oppressed, and the families of martyrs, the state prosecutor general stressed: As prosecutor general, I am determined, as is the Supreme Jusicial Council, to restore the rights of the deprived and society's oppressed masses from those who have violated them without any reservations. This heavy responsibility can be carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran's judicial system and it will do so.

The state prosecutor general, in conclusion, asked all official and religious figures, Friday prayer leaders, and various groups to maintain the Islamic and anti-Taquiti atmosphere in the country so that the corrupt elements will not dare show themselves. He stressed: Those prosecutors and judges not able to follow the path of the Islamic Republic of Iran should step aside. If they do not do so, they will be cast aside.

/12913
CSO: 4640/46

IRAN

MINISTER DISCUSSES ROLE OF IRGC IN WAR

GF181302 Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 22 Sep 85 p 4

[Text] Mohsen Rafiqdust, minister of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps [IRGC], took part in an interview with ETTELA'AT newspaper on the occasion of "war week." While outlining the activities of the IRGC ministry, he detailed the ministry's latest successes with regard to the imposed war.

The minister first talked about the role of the IRGC and the Mobilization Crusade in the imposed war and said: To review their roles we first have to look at the history of the war. The Iraqi regime knew some of the problems we had with the armed forces after the revolution and, with exact military planning and calculations, it started the war.

Our situation at the beginning of the war was such that we never thought Iraq would launch an all-out offensive against us. On the other hand, the enemy chose that specific time which coincided with the disorder in the armed forces and problems that the Bani Sadr clique had created in the country.

The minister talked about the problems and chaos prevalent in the armed forces at that time and said: The manpower in the armed forces was provided by the people who were in favor of and were alongside the revolution, but the command was linked to the monarchy. Because of this, during the first days of the revolution the top armed forces commanders were either removed from their jobs or purged from the services. In any case, we did not have a powerful organized system for the defense of the country. When Iraq attacked us in Khuzestan, we only had 20 to 30 tanks in the entire 92d Armored Division in Ahvaz. Most of these tanks were not even useable. It was with these calculations that the Iraqi regime started the war. Their ultimate aim was either to defeat the Islamic revolution in six days or to separate Khuzestan from Iran.

The Iraqi forces entered our country, in some areas up to a depth of 100 km. They reached within 10 km of Ahvaz and 15 km of Dezful. They took Khorramshahr, Qasr-e Shirin, Mehran, Dehloran, Musian, Susangerd, Huwayzah, and thousands of villages. Our armed forces, with the manpower at hand and facilities available, and popular forces stopped the enemy's advance in this area.

Rafiqdust added: When we wanted to send the IRGC to the battlefronts, this force did not have the necessary military formation or organization. The IRGC was not created to defend the country's borders but rather the main aim for the creation of the IRGC was to defend the Islamic revolution. It was at this time that we realized that the imposed war was not against our borders but rather that it was aimed against the Islamic revolution and was bent on its destruction. Therefore, we felt the need to mobilize the IRGC. But when the IRGC wanted to enter the war as a popular force it was faced with problems and obstacles put in its way by the ruling clique at that time.

To send IRGC forces to the fronts we needed arms, but these arms were not placed at our disposal. I myself wanted to get a letter from Bani Sadr to obtain some guns and to do this I traveled between Tehran and Khuzestan dozens of times and everytime Bani Sadr treated me unkindly. Once I even sat in front of his car until he signed the letter but then he issued an order in Tehran not to give us the guns!

The minister of IRGC said: The change in the war and our defense on the front lines which evolved into offensives to get back lost territory began once this deviated clique was ousted from power. The first organized offensive after this affair was to break the siege on Abadan. The IRGC emerged as an organized fighting unit, based upon new military tactics used during these operations. From that date on the role of the IRGC and the Mobilization Crusade and the popular forces was established as a frontline battle formation and this way very effective. Today, our war against the enemy is completely dependent on popular forces.

The minister commented on the formation of new units within the IRGC and said: When the Iranian forces started widespread operations, it was felt that the IRGC had to be present on the fronts in an organized formation. The organization and reshaping of the IRGC started with the establishment of border companies which took part in the breaking of the Abadan siege. These companies were later expanded to brigades and then armies. Today, the IRGC has organized armies and independent brigades and in each of these formations there are organized battalions.

The IRGC has armored and infantry units and in the infantry there are the artillery units which operate more or less along lines already established elsewhere in the world. All of the IRGC's weaponry comes from the booty taken from the enemy. After five years of war, no weapon has been bought for the IRGC and all that it has is booty taken from the enemy.

The IRGC minister continues: With regard to the tremendous sensitivity that the Persian Gulf region has for the Islamic revolution, it was felt that there had to be a naval unit within the IRGC and this was carried out successfully. At present, the naval units of the IRGC, alongside the regular navy, are ready to defend Iranian waters and the Strait of Hormuz which is the main artery for the Western economy. Air force units also have been created within the IRGC which, God willing, will soon be strengthened.

Rafiqdust then commented on the formation of defense units within the IRGC capable of dealing with chemical warfare and said: Following the Ba'thist enemy's inhuman attacks and their use of chemical weapons these units were created within the IRGC to counter such attacks. The equipment needed to counter chemical warfare has been produced within the IRGC in adequate numbers and we are helping other branches of the armed forces in this matter. The IRGC is even ready to help the Iranian people when it comes to chemical warfare, to teach people what to do so we can counter these inhuman attacks to defend the revolution.

The minister then talked about getting supplies of weapons and said: Keeping in mind the nature of the Islamic revolution, we cannot depend on the superpowers for military help. Therefore, research has been done in the IRGC in the field of arms' self-sufficiency to produce what we need ourselves. We always think along the lines that if minds polluted with alcohol and prostitution in the East and West can produce sophisticated weapons, then certainly our God-fearing people are better able to do such things since their minds are clear. This advantage that we have should even expedite this matter and our devoted people should be able to make for us the latest weaponry.

With this in mind we have started studies in the IRGC and other revolutionary organizations to make our own weapons. Fortunately, it has been proven to us that we can in a short time make what is needed to defend the revolution.

We started the hard way. First, we taught ourselves how to make missiles. In this test, with God's help, we were successful and we managed to make missiles. At present the production of one type of missile has started and in the future we shall solve the scientific problems of other missiles and we start making them as well. We have started this procedure in other areas including armor, artillery, chemical defense, and communications and we have made some progress.

The IRGC minister then answered two questions on the results of Iran's latest operations on the fronts. He said: With the experiences we have had in the war over the past few years, we have reached the conclusion that by giving the enemy time to think we are also giving him time to regroup and reorganize, thus enabling him to resist our major offensives. Therefore, keeping in mind the enemy's command weakness and weakness in his morale, it was decided that we should always engage in clashes along the lines we have with the enemy. In the limited operations that we have carried out during the past few months we have liberated sensitive and strategic areas with minimum manpower and minimum weaponry. Of course this does not mean we wish to continue the war in this manner. We also have plans for major offensives. When the time is right we shall start our widespread operations which will include several major and consecutive attacks.

Rafiqdust then gave details on what he termed "limited operations." He said: There are usually two types of such attacks. One type of attack calls for infiltration and hit-and-run tactics whereby the goal is to hit the enemy as hard as possible and then return to base. The other is to

liberate territory. We saw some of this second type during the Jerusalem operations.

The IRGC minister analyzed the superpowers' views on the war and said: At the beginning of the war both the United States and the Soviet Union regarded this war in a special way. The West wanted to calm the Middle East by weakening us and the Soviets were afraid of our revolution becoming powerful. The superpowers saw that the continuation of the war strengthened us every day and caused the Islamic revolution to spread throughout the world. They saw that our steadfastness in the war became an example for others.

Today, the powers of East and West are striving to ensure that this war does not end with an Iranian victory. Our victory in this war would certainly not be very pleasant for the superpowers.

The IRGC minister concluded the interview by encouraging the people to go to the war fronts. He said: The people with their mass presence on the fronts should give us the necessary power to shorten the time needed to end this war the way it is expected of us.

/12913

CSO: 4640/45

IRAN

ARMENIAN MARTYRS OF IRAN-IRAQ WAR HONORED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 29 Sep 85 p 14

[Text] Political Service—Ceremonies honoring Armenian martyrs of the imposed war were held yesterday at Tehran's Holy Sarkis Church, attended by Armenian compatriots.

In these ceremonies, which were held by the Tehran Armenian Patriarchate Council, several Armenian clergymen began with special religious ceremonies. Then Reverend Aharon Galestanian, the Patriarch of Tehran, gave a speech discussing the imposition of the war by the superpowers on the newly-established Islamic republic, as well as the active participation of Armenians in fighting the aggressors. He said: Armenian brothers and sisters, shoulder-to-shoulder with the rest of the people, have fulfilled their obligation to the Islamic republic well by providing financial assistance, with their direct presence at the battle fronts, and by giving many martyrs to the cause of the country's freedom and independence.

In conclusion he expressed the hope that with a victory for the combatants of Islam, Armenians, along with other classes of people, will cooperate extensively in building the country.

This report says: Then a message from the Tehran Armenian Patriarchate Council issued on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the imposed war, was read. Part of this message discussed the active participation of Armenians in the epic of holy defense against the Ba'thist aggressor forces. It said: Just as they stood beside their Muslim brothers during the Islamic revolution and after its triumph, Iran's Armenians were also active in a way in the imposed war, whether in sending aid to the battle fronts, or through the active presence of their children at the fronts. They had a kind of comprehensive participation, sacrificing the lives of their children liberally for victory of Truth in its battle against the Vain. Another part of this message said: The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran has guaranteed the survival of Armenians as an Armenian minority in Iran, and has also guaranteed them religious and cultural freedom. There is no doubt that the existing problems in the area of this minority's education will be resolved with the good intentions of officials. When this anxiety is resolved, Armenian society in Iran and its individuals will participate with stronger faith and firmer resolution, whether in activities pertaining to the war or building the country, and they will build a brighter future for the dear homeland, along with their Muslim compatriots.

Our correspondent reports that in the continuation of these ceremonies, Mr Vartan Vartanian, the northern Armenian representative in the Majlis, gave a speech discussing the plots of world imperialism to sow discord among religious minorities and those who follow different religions. He said:

In all the different areas of the Islamic revolution and the war fronts we have shown well that we are never willing to listen to this kind of nonsense. The Armenians themselves are aware that this is one more of the enslaving plots of world imperialism and exploitation.

At the conclusion of these ceremonies, Mr Ha'erizadeh, Birjand Majlis representative, praised the active presence of Armenians at the fronts while discussing the plots of world imperialism.

9310

CSO: 4640/30

IRAN

FOREIGN RADIO SAID TO DISTORT 'ISLAMIC AWAKENING'

LD270502 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0400 GMT 25 Oct 85

[Excerpts] In this program we will be looking at the propaganda of foreign radios against the Islamic awakening all over the world, to which we draw your attention. [passage omitted]

The Islamic awakening as an undeniable fact is today challenging all the leaders of blasphemy and infidelity; in a front which goes beyond national boundaries and nationalism it has mobilized more than one billion Muslims in a common struggle. Allahu Akbar--all that is meant by the holy slogan that God is Great has become a sweet chant on the clean lips of all Muslims and has endowed them with a limitless power and strength in their battle against the satans of the age; so much so that the dimensions of the Islamic movement are now so great that it cannot be ignored by superpowers or satans; nor can its greatness and glory be distorted through different stategames. Islamic fundamentalists, religious extremists, reactionaries, terrorists or rioters are terms which are being used by the enemies to describe the wave of Islamic awakening. However, the fact is that a reality unknown to them in the form of Islam has waged war upon all the evil existing in the 20th century and is giving the glad tidings of a felicitous life.

Imperialism, Zionism, Racism and Atheism are black and shameful blots upon the face of 20th century life which are now being threatened by the Muslims. While the Muslims are pointing the sharp end of their spears towards these vile and evil trends of the age, with their epic deeds each day they achieve greater successes and with the intensification of their blows they have rendered the satans desperate.

In a wide expanse of the globe from Iran, Lebanon and Afghanistan and in an arena extending from Asia to Africa the Muslims are attacking the triangle of imperialism, communism, Zionism and racism which are caught in a great and unremitting battle. In this battle the Zionists have received the most deadly blows and during the past few years they have suffered the greatest losses and casualties in the course of their shameful existence during the past few decades. In this holy and incessant war the racists have not been immune either, and now Muslims have thrown the challenge to them as well. The signs of this battle can be clearly seen in Egypt and South Africa, which are of great significance.

The growth of the Islamic movement in Egypt entails the decline and fall of Zionism in the region and the destruction of optimistic hopes for its stability and permanence in the future. It has now become quite clear that the reawakening of Islamic life has penetrated the depth of society in that African country, and that it is not confined to a special group or faction. [passage omitted]

While mass demonstrations and general unrest in Egypt is heralding the death of imperialism and Zionism in that country, in South Africa Islam is channelling racism. With the call of Allahu Akbar South African Muslims have announced that the life of apartheid is over. This demonstrates the determination of South African Muslims to destroy another manifestation of tyranny and injustice. [passage omitted]

In view of the fact that the BBC always gives a much smaller number of Muslim demonstrators, when that radio quotes a figure of 10,000 one can guess at the right number of demonstrators--it is certainly much higher than that. In this connection, it is sufficient to bring to mind the 5-million strong demonstrations on Jerusalem Day in Theran, which that radio said were only 300,000. Both in the Egyptian and South African demonstrations the important fact is that foreign radios refer to the awakening of Islamic fundamentalism on a wide front. For instance, in the case of South African demonstrations they say that they were carrying placards with sentences from the Koran and from Imam Khomeyni. [passage omitted]

In every part of the world where Islamic awakening is taking place and which is in the throes of revolution the Islamic revolution of Iran is a model for the Muslims. Neither West nor East can tolerate this model. The West is frightened of losing its plundering interests, and the East sees its ambitious hopes for occupying greater parts of the world, especially the Third World, through communist or socialist parties endangered. In fact, world arrogance has received an equal blow from the Islamic awakening, and the unity of action by the two superpowers in confronting the Islamic movement in the region has similar goals. [passage omitted]

/12913
CSO: 4640/49

IRAN

PROSECUTOR GENERAL APPEALS TO STUDENTS, DESERTERS TO BE IDENTIFIED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 6 Oct 85 p 6

[Text] Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Mohammad Musavi Khu'iniha, Prosecutor General, issued a message calling upon students and Iranians living outside the country to help expedite the investigation of violations by capitalists and counterrevolutionaries, the matter of their return, and the restoration of their property. He called upon them to cooperate with the identification of these people. The Prosecutor General's message was sent to the courts and prosecutors after a set of guidelines was issued several days ago concerning the sending of lists of capitalists who have fled the country who have reported to recover their confiscated wealth. The complete text of the Prosecutor General's message appears below.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Dear students, brother and sister Iranians living outside the country, now that through the will of God the time has arrived for the judicial power of the Islamic republic to recover according to the Constitution the plundered rights of the Islamic nation from the hoarders who have stored wealth through illegal means, now that it has become necessary to destroy another of the main foundations for the spread of sin through the Islamic society, now that the deprived and exploited are demanding that the team hideouts of these economic mini-groups, which are the remote trenches for America's invasion of oppressed nations, be destroyed, and that the firm bonds of economic and cultural dependence which keep our society from moving to a humanitarian and divinely moral atmosphere be broken one after another, it is necessary that any kind of information be brought to light that exposes the nature of the lives of these corrupt elements and the illegal economic relationships they have used to accumulate wealth, and given to the prosecutor's office so that, God willing, using this information, the judicial power, on the basis of religiously lawful criteria, which are the only criteria acceptable to the Islamic nation, will be able to return plundered assets to the public treasury and the rightful owners.

The prosecutor's office therefore calls upon all committed brothers and sisters, especially the dear students living outside the country, to quickly send the Prosecutor General any kind of information they may have on the sinful activities of those who have fled abroad from the Islamic revolution, including information on currency they have taken abroad, counterrevolutionary activities they have carried out or are carrying out abroad, their participation in counterrevolutionary activities in various countries, their cooperation with imperialist governments against the Islamic revolution, their participation in public sinful and corrupt gatherings, their relations with corrupt elements in the country, property belonging to these people left in the country which has so far escaped the notice of the prosecutor's office and their deputies in the country, or any other kind of information

that would be useful in expediting the prosecution of these people, so that with the help of Almighty God and the support of the nation of partisans of God, this information can be used and cited in the implementation of lawful measures to please the Almighty and Munificent God and gladden the good souls of the martyrs and the pure hearts of the combatants and the martyr-nurturing nation of Iran.

It is clear that in the collection and sending of this information, they will vigorously observe honesty and piety. Since there is the possibility that these people will transfer their wealth as soon as they realize it is about to be confiscated, it is necessary that the partisans of God brothers and sisters throughout the country be fully alert and vigilant, so that if they obtain information on this they simply report the facts to the local revolutionary prosecutor without interfering personally. All the country's document and property recording offices and official document offices, and other related organizations and directorates of private companies are obligated to refrain from registering in any way the sale of immovable assets or shares which are known to have had a restraining order issued by the revolutionary prosecutors and courts, as well as from registering the sale of the wealth and assets of those who have been prohibited from engaging in business by these authorities. With regard to wealth and assets which have been authorized for commercial transfer or whose restraining orders have been lifted, no measures may be taken before an opinion is sought from the authority issuing the order.

9310

CSO: 4640/38

IRAN

HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS TO RECEIVE MILITARY TRAINING

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 Oct 85 pp 1, 3

[Text] Next year all students in the third guidance class and above will receive one hour of military training per week. Likewise, three million trained mobilization members are ready to be sent to the fronts and destroy the enemy at the appropriate time. This was announced by Hojjat ol-Eslam Rahmani, supervisor of the mobilization of the oppressed unit, in an exclusive interview with our correspondent.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Rahmani began by discussing the formation of the mobilization of the oppressed and the 20-million-man army to oppose world imperialism. He said: In the early years of the triumph of the revolution the Imam of the nation perceived the depth of the plots of imperialism, especially world-devouring America, in connection with the Islamic revolution. Accordingly, he assigned the responsibility of preserving and protecting the revolution and its gains to the people themselves, and he issued the order to form the 20-million-man army and the mobilization of the oppressed on 5 Azar 1358 [26 Nov 1979]. It is necessary to note that the issuance of this order came while American naval vessels were in the Persian Gulf. He noted: After the Imam's order was issued, the mobilization of the oppressed unit was formed and began to recruit, train (militarily and ideologically), and organize the people.

Continuing his remarks, the supervisor of the revolutionary guard mobilization unit discussed the responsibilities of this revolutionary unit which has sprung from the loins of society. He said: I must say first that the goal in forming the mobilization of the oppressed was to establish the necessary capabilities in the nation's units for defending Islam and the Islamic republic, as well as to help the people in time of emergency. Therefore, on this basis, and in view of the necessity for everyone to defend Islam, everyone must receive military training so that in time of necessity they can stand against the enemy with force to fulfill their religiously lawful obligation. He added: Mobilization units throughout the country give training to volunteers in three phases of military technology.

A: The preliminary phase includes general and theoretical training given by regional defense staffs at resistance bases, schools, libraries, and places of assembly throughout the nation. After completing these classes, volunteers will go to the sacred bases and garrisons throughout the country for three days and nights, where they will have 14 sessions in weapons training, war tactics, sabotage training, relief training, and training in combat with chemical bombs in war. In conclusion they will be tested and become members of the 20-million-man army and receive cards of completion of the mobilization phase. Based on this, the martyr-nurturing nation may then report to resistance staffs and various bases throughout the country, and learn military technology.

B: Training for being sent to the front. During this phase volunteers will spend 35 days at a military base learning military science, such as methods of confronting the enemy, the use of various weapons, and so forth, and at the end of this cycle they will be sent to the front.

J: Continuation of training. During this phase, in order to continue military training, mobilization forces in combat units will participate in various war maneuvers so that their combat readiness can be evaluated.

He added: In addition to providing military training to the martyr-nurturing nation of Iran, the mobilization of the oppressed unit of the revolutionary guard has the responsibility of giving military training to Iraqis living in the country. In this regard, so far a great many Iraqis living in the country have been trained and sent to the fronts. Iraqi brothers living in the country, having received military training in the mobilization, participated in Operation Qods and dealt fatal blows to the enemy of Islam at Hur ol-'Azim.

Continuing his remarks, the supervisor of the mobilization of the oppressed staff discussed the establishment of training complexes at the fronts and behind the lines. He said: In order to further the studies of combatant students, education complexes have been established at the fronts and behind the lines in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Training, so that combatant students can study at these complexes and not fall behind in their studies.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Rahmani then discussed the study of military science in the schools. He said: Next year one hour per week in military training will be given to students in the third guidance class and above throughout the country. Textbooks for this class have already been prepared, and it is estimated that in a four-year period 4.5 million students will become familiar with military science and be added to the country's mobilization forces.

Continuing his remarks, he answered a question from our correspondent concerning the number of mobilization members and reporting by these people to mobilization units to fight world imperialism. He said: According to Hojjat ol-Eslam Rafsanjani, the Imam's representative on the Supreme Defense Council, so far the forces serving at the fronts a second time have announced their readiness to fight world imperialism and defend Islam and the Islamic nation. Likewise, many citizens of the nation of partisans of god who have not yet received military training have reported to the mobilization units in readiness to die and registered. He noted: The revolutionary guard mobilization of the oppressed unit now has now trained more than three million persons and prepared them for battle against world imperialism, and they are capable of going into action at any time.

It must be mentioned that among these people, more than 9,000 persons have been selected to lead battalions and companies.

In conclusion he added: It is expected that all trained forces, especially those in the Labayk Ya Khomeyni project, who have always been at the fronts of the war of the Truth against the Vain and have gained experience, will bring the enemy to his knees with their presence on the battlefields.

9310

CSO: 4640/36

IRAN

DOZENS OF MARTYR FOUNDATION COMPANIES SAID SHOWING PROFIT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 8 Oct 85 p 19

[Text] Brother Azadani, acting director of companies and factories under the auspices of the Islamic Martyr Foundation gave a press conference in which he answered various questions from correspondents concerning the way in which these factories are started, the way they operate, how their products are distributed, and how they are managed.

During this press conference he discussed the fact that more than 181 movable and immovable assets and companies given to the Martyr Foundation have been returned to their owners who have left the country, under court order. He also gave his views on revising the Iran Industrial Expansion and Preservation Law, which was recently denied presentation in the Majlis.

He began by reviewing the short history of the formation of the Martyr Foundation's economic affairs units. He said:

With the onset of the imposed war and with the expansion of the Martyr Foundation's services, the Islamic revolutionary courts, having obtained authorization from His Holiness the Imam, late in 1359 [21 Mar 1980 - 20 Mar 1981] issued an order for the management and supervision of some confiscated industrial, agricultural, commercial, and construction units in the interest of the Martyr Foundation.

In this connection, with an order from Hojjat ol-Eslam Karubi, the Martyr Foundation Economic Affairs Unit was formed, and began working to inaugurate, expand, and reopen these factories, with objectives such as employment of the deprived, the combatants, and the families of martyrs, and providing industrial services to the government of the Islamic republic. These companies and institutions were generally only semi-active or completely dormant in 1356 [21 Mar 1977 - 20 Mar 1978] and 1357 [21 Mar 1978 - 20 Mar 1979] because of accumulated damage from previous years, damage resulting from unpaid loans given to their owners who fled the country by banks and institutions, and the failure to pay their debts. However, with the investment and skill supplied by the Martyr Foundation economic affairs unit, not only did they recover from previous damage and repay their debts, but with the goodwill of managers and concerned employees they transcended consumerism and were able to become producers, in addition to achieving positive results in making slight quality improvements.

He discussed the accomplishments of the Martyr Foundation's economic affairs unit with regard to problems at the fronts. He said: Martyr Foundation companies have sent more than 30 million tomans in cash aid to the fronts, and they have sent more than 500 of their workers to the fronts. They have also been significantly active in road construction, and have often sent heavy equipment such as graders and bulldozers to the fronts.

It is worth mentioning also that significant measures have been taken in this foundation's factories to repair and put into operation sensitive war equipment. At this foundation's boot factory, almost 200 thousand boots needed by combatants have been made and issued to them annually.

He discussed the services the Martyr Foundation's economic section has provided to the families of soldiers. He said:

In this regard various services have been provided, some of which will be mentioned in passing.

The establishment and inauguration of major stores and chain stores and procurement of what is needed by these stores in order to provide them to the families of martyrs.

Priority in the purchase of some products produced in the production units such as parts for heating installations and the implements of health care.

Employment of hundreds of soldiers and deprived people in factories newly-established or inaugurated by the Martyr Foundation, including 180 people at Shahab Radio, 50 people at Fajr Electronic, 60 people at Payam Electronic, and 30 people at Shahed Electronic.

He also added: With the establishment of the Shahed Investment Company, the funds the little children of martyrs had in the Martyr Foundation which were not being used were put to use. In this way, the children will have significant savings they can use in the future because of having a share in economic activities.

The question was asked, what steps have been taken so far and what planning has been done in the agricultural, construction, and commercial sectors, and what have these sectors accomplished so far?

Azadani answered:

It is worth mentioning that when these companies came under the management of the Martyr Foundation because their usurper shareholders had fled, most had great debts, no currency credit, and no raw materials, which led to the unemployment of thousands of the noble workers of these companies.

In the agricultural sector, such as Ishraq Agriculture and Industry and Sharifabad Agriculture and Industry, these companies were destroyed and broken, unused lands, but in the Sharifabad Agriculture and Industry Company alone, with 30 million tomans in investment from the economic affairs unit at the primary stage, there are now hundreds of head of cattle and livestock, and this year 900 hectares of wheat, corn, and feed are being cultivated.

In the industrial sector, in the Tabriz Simkan Company in Azarbaijan the workers had created a crisis because of unemployment. On orders from the public prosecutor's office and the respected supervisor of the foundation, the preliminary steps were made to revive the company with initial

foundation investment of 120 million. Specialist managers were sent to this company, whose capitalist owners had fled and sold all its assets, even including the electric generators, and left it in debt. Now, with annual production of 2,804,213 kilograms of various kinds of wire and cable, it is one of the largest cable-manufacturing companies.

The Vitana, Radio Shahab, Steel Wool, and Khorasan Feed companies had been left inactive with several thousand workers when their usurper owners fled abroad. Now the Vitana Company, with daily production of 60 tons of cookies and other products, and the Shahab Company, producing thousands of color and black-and-white television sets and various radios, are among the foundation's successful companies.

The commercial sector companies eliminated a great many international middlemen by beginning to deal directly. They have purchased a great many goods at prices lower than 1356 [21 Mar 1977 – 20 Mar 1978], and have taken effective steps. Some of these companies have prevented goods from being imported into the country by producing them. The work of these companies in stabilizing the prices of medical and laboratory supplies and heating equipment has been striking.

The following statistics show the leaps these companies have made.

The Sajjad Middle East Company had preliminary capital of 280,000 tomans. Its current capital has increased to 10 million tomans, and at the present time this company's assets are more than 40 million tomans.

The Zakaraia Razi Company (formerly Shahla), producing medical supplies, had initial capital of 670,000 tomans. Its current capital is 10 million tomans with assets of more than 40 million tomans.

The Sajjad Medical Company (formerly Sufer) had initial capital of 600,000 tomans. Its current capital is seven million tomans, with assets of more than 50 million tomans.

KEYHAN's correspondent asked: What is your view concerning the revision of the Industrial Preservation and Expansion Law, whose presentation was recently denied in the Majlis?

The Acting Director of companies under the auspices of the Martyr Foundation said: Actually, an examination of the economic files of the idolaters brings to mind clear the priceless words of Imam 'Ali (Peace Be Upon Him) "no castle is built without spawning huts."

The files we have available all show the collusion between these people and the decadent shah's regime. Compromising with the court, usury, dealing with Israel, dealing with South Africa and imperialists, and importing assembly industries instead of producing goods logically are examples of the daily activities of people whose companies were turned over to the foundation. In view of the fact that the orders issued in the interest of the Martyr Foundation were issued late in 1359 [21 Mar 1980 – 20 Mar 1981], and that the files we have pertain to people who were hated even during the shah's time, how is it possible that a Muslim, even a non-revolutionary one, would be prepared to return a Khayyami, a Lajevardi, or an Alqanian to the Islamic republic to obtain political power along with economic resources, and make a shah for us? Therefore, those who have been assembled in the economic affairs unit and are serving can never allow the achievements of the Islamic revolution, such as the Industrial Expansion and Preservation Bill approved by the Revolutionary Council, to be lost. This bill has been affirmed by great and dear ones such as oppressed martyr Ayatollah Dr Beheshti and the hope of the Imam of the nation, Ayatollah al-'Ozma Montazeri. Why is there so much commotion to have capital specified? It is

to prevent people like Fazlollah Qasemi from coming back to the country and claiming ownership, people who have been able to accrue assets through various acts of collusion in a mistaken economic system. Are these people owners? In my view, even people who have earned money with the sweat of their brows should not be given anything if as much as one-fifth of what they have is increasing in value.

Then Fazlollah Qasemi came, a gambler and playboy member, and had his property confiscated. These people, in my view, are the termites of the revolution.

Azadani was then asked a question concerning the nature of the future production policies and economic activities of this unit. He said:

The policy of the economic affairs unit will be to plan for industrializing commercial companies and expanding production companies, and to invest to employ the families under the mantle of the foundation. At the same time, wherever the economic affairs unit feels that the country needs a new field, it will invest in that field if it has the necessary resources in order to meet the country's needs, create work for families, and to use profits gained in the interest of the foundation. It is worth saying that about 30 companies have been registered so far in this regard, and half of them have gone into operation and are showing a profit. Some of them are also undergoing construction and having machinery installed. In this connection we invite all inventors and explorers to send us their projects. If the Economic Affairs Unit Security Council or the Board of Directors of the Shahed Investment Company find any of these projects to be in harmony with the economic affairs unit's plans, they are prepared to continue the project with the participation of the same person who submitted it.

He discussed the method of distribution for goods from the companies and factories within the foundation. He said: Some of our factories, with the proper distribution methods they have, have been able to some extent to break the black market for those goods. For example, the Sajjad Middle East Company, which produces radiators and heating equipment, has to some extent been able to break the black market in the stores on Taqani Street.

He added: Goods the black market does not have are delivered to the consumer through ordinary means. Goods the black market does have are transferred to the consumer through the Ministry of Commerce and sold through gift shops, chain stores, and cooperatives.

9310

CSO: 4640/37

IRAN

EMBEZZLEMENT, BRIBERY, FORGED DOCUMENTS DISCOVERED IN AIRLINE

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 29 Sep 85 p 15

[Text] News Service—An incident involving trickery, bribery, abuses, and influence has been uncovered in an airline company, and its agents, a number of the airline's staff and profiteering middlemen, have been arrested.

In this incident, due to the trickery and abuses of a small group, the wages of a great many people have been lost, and millions of rials in bribes have been taken by profiteers. Likewise, a large number of various people have succeeded in leaving the country without authorization and with forged tickets.

According to this report, a number of these accused people are airline employees, as well as profiteering middlemen.

In the course of this incident, a number of airline employees in various agencies procured tickets out of turn and sold them to unsuspecting passengers. A number of others stamped these tickets with counterfeit stamps and made it possible for passengers to leave the country.

On the other hand, a number of profiteers, using another method, through trickery changed the foreign exchange import documents of passengers to greater amounts, sometimes enormous amounts, and some members of this group were caught.

Discovery of Bands and the Arrest of Accused Persons

The illegal acts of these bands were initially discovered by the revolutionary guards at the airport, as well as a number of committed employees of the airline. They were reported to the Tehran Public Prosecutor and after a series of investigations by the intelligence office into the files on this trickery and profiteering, the matter was turned over to the public prosecutor.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Qasemi, cross examiner of Tehran Public Prosecutor's Office Number 21, who is the official now examining this file, gave an interview to ETTELA'AT's correspondent in which he discussed the nature and method of the implementation of these counterrevolutionary measures. He said: After the illegal acts of the violators were disclosed, some committed employees of Iran Airlines informed the revolutionary guard and the intelligence office of the matter, and the investigation of the file was turned over to this cross examiner. After a series of follow-up investigations, a number of the accused persons were arrested and sent to prison. At this point

appreciation and thanks are in order for the committed employees and revolutionary guards stationed at the airport who took rose to the task of preventing abuses, influence, and wasting the wages of a number of passengers and who cooperated with the prosecutor's office.

Counterfeit Stamps

Hojjat ol-Eslam Qasemi added: Tickets belonging to five passengers were stamped with counterfeit stamps allowing three of them to leave the country three months sooner than the appointed time. The revolutionary guards at the airport subsequently became suspicious, but unfortunately some employees who were implicated in this affair did not provide the cooperation necessary to help the revolutionary guards at the airport and the committed employees prevent this trickery, indirectly aiding the profiteers. The case of the counterfeit stamp had a precedent recently in this company, but serious steps were not taken to question and arrest the accused persons. However concerned employees of this company noticed that the tickets of a number of passengers had been stamped with counterfeit stamps. This was reported to the cross examiner, and in this connection seven persons, including a number of employees of the airline and a number of middlemen, were arrested.

At the Airline Computer Department

The cross examiner at Tehran Public Prosecutor's Office Number 21 continued, saying: At the computer department, some employees opened the computers and entered the names of their friends and acquaintances out of turn, obtaining tickets for them and consequently violating the rights of passengers who had been waiting for days, and were forced to return to their homes when they heard the words "there are no more tickets."

Likewise, in another department, tickets obtained out of turn were procured and issued to a number of passengers by some of the travel agencies under the Ministry of Tourism and Guidance and some middlemen in exchange for money. In one day these people were able to procure several tickets for various people.

In the same connection, a number of others were arrested on charges of obtaining visas for various people (in exchange for 200,000 rials) from the embassies of various countries and countries in the Persian Gulf area.

In addition to these instances, in another incident these people took 600,000 rials from a traveler in exchange for procuring this person a visa to go to Germany.

In these incidents, even 5,000 rials were taken for use of the telephone by the suspects from passengers, which shows the extent of the deception practiced by this group. Of course the responsible person was arrested. The rest of the suspects escaped, and efforts to arrest them are continuing.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Qasemi added: Because of the spread of illegal acts of this kind, some committed Islamic Republic of Iran Airlines employees decided that passenger tickets should be stamped and precisely controlled, but continued investigation revealed that all of these tickets were not stamped. A number of passengers were smuggled aboard the aircraft and left the country.

In the same connection, one employee admitted under questioning that some passengers boarded aircraft secretly and "under the table" with unstamped tickets, and this affair is also currently being investigated and studied.

Continuing, he said: During this episode a large number of passengers have left the country out of turn with counterfeit tickets, and made improper use of more than 20 million rials taken as bribes. Assuredly, the amounts of illicitly obtained funds are greater than this, and the matter is being studied.

The cross examiner of Public Prosecutor's Office Number 21 also noted: In another instance, during a search of the home of a woman employed by this company, a number of tickets, visas, and exit papers belonging to a number of her acquaintances and various persons were found. She was planning to obtain tickets out of turn for them and make arrangements for them to leave the country.

This same woman admitted under questioning that a number of her colleagues collaborated in this, and they were also arrested.

Counterfeited Currency Documents

He likewise referred to another instance of trickery. He said: Another instance, of which the cross examiner learned from the revolutionary guards stationed at the airport, involved a number of violators who secretly became involved in the episode forging passenger currency import documents by performing minor modifications on them. For example, if a traveler returned to the country with 100 dollars, these people would change this 100 dollars to 1,000 dollars or more in the hopes that this passenger would later be able to leave the country taking the counterfeited amount with him. A great many such cases have been uncovered, and this case is also being investigated.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Qasemi also said: The primary reason for the abuses by the suspects is the ignorance of the passengers, who believed that by dealing with middlemen and unscrupulous employees they would be able to procure tickets and visas from embassies. In this regard, it is incumbent upon the employees of Iran Air to inform the people through the media that they must refrain from dealing with counterrevolutionary profiteers, violators, and middlemen.

In conclusion, he warned such misled counterrevolutionary individuals to stop their illegal activities. Otherwise, their names will be announced to the public through the media after their arrest.

9310

CSO: 4640/29

IRAN

MUSAVI-ARDEBILI: ILLEGALLY OBTAINED PROPERTY TO BE REPOSSESSED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 8 Oct 83 p 18

[Text] Ayatollah Musavi Ardebili, Chief of the Supreme Court, gave a press conference yesterday in which he answered questions from correspondents on the return of some capitalists and the judicial power's dealings with such people, confiscated assets, and hoarding and selling at high prices.

The Chief of the Supreme Court discussed the return of the idolaters and their followers and capitalists who have fled the country. He said: These days an issue more or less in the press is the return of those who have fled the country, the reestablishment of their leadership, the return of assets, and their sense that there is security in the country so that they can achieve their corrupt objective, which has prompted me to make a statement. I therefore declare that this is true to some extent, and that we feel this as well, but I must add that this issue is not solely one involving people who have fled the country. We also have another group who have not even fled the country, but have continued with their evil and are still doing so unobserved in the cities, at the center, and in various places. There are reports of people in this country who are living in luxury, who have divided lands in various places and are selling them illegally to the people. These people are the legacy of the former regime. Now, however, we are more or less involved with people who have become mini-idolaters since the revolution, even if they were not affiliated before the revolution. In their own words, they took advantage of a chaotic market, and with changed faces they trampled on the blood of martyrs and the aspirations of the sacred Islamic revolution, and are busy plundering. These people are ten times worse than the first group.

Concerning the confiscation of illicit assets, he said: Assets of this type, in accordance with sacred religious law, the Constitution, and the laws enacted by the Majlis, must be returned to their real owners. I declare that our plan is the plan of the government of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (Peace Be Upon Him), who said "I am confiscating these illicit assets and returning them to their owners, no matter how many officials they have." Some have suggested in this regard that all of this is just sloganeering, and my answer is that a lot of these assets have already been confiscated, but not enough of them. If you obtain a list of such assets from the courts and the revolutionary prosecutor's offices you will see how many of these assets have been returned to society. This is not enough, however. There are more assets remaining to be confiscated, and I must say that in a country with lands created for 2,500 years through crime, aggression, encroachment, or corruption, we will find that a great deal of the assets will be lawful, and a great deal of them will be unlawful. As to the question of how long it will take to investigate these assets, in view of the extensiveness of the task and the difficulties, naturally we will not achieve a final result in the short run. I call on all organizations and groups to work in coordination and not to be lenient so that, God willing, we will achieve a desirable result.

Ayatollah Musavi Ardebili continued: Those who have fled the country and are coming back to continue their corruption and evil are not working alone. They have tools with which to work and collaborate. When you attack one of them you will see that they learn from lawyers about the intricacies of the law in order to obtain money, and that they are even connected with influential people. They are not willing to give up their own position if they can help it. These people must realize that these activities and this influence will not help them, because no Iranian is willing to barter with them for the revolution and its prestige to satisfy the people who have fled the country, and they must not do things that will deface the revolution in the eyes of the people.

Some have views and tell us that if we say these things it will destroy economic security and the people will become discouraged, but what should we say? We say that the legal assets of the people belong to them, and that the illicit assets must be returned to the rightful owners. Actually, the return of illicit assets to their rightful owners not only does not destroy economic security, it is tantamount to economic security. This is what economic security is. If we do not take these measures, it will mean that the current situation will remain as it is and you will build an Islamic revolution on that basis. Can a sacred and religiously lawful structure be built on a crooked and religiously unlawful foundation? We say to them that we intend to establish Islam and uproot corruption. God willing, if we are able to accomplish this worthy objective, and if the people realize that the judicial authorities do not have an eye on their lawful property, they themselves will declare things without our having to come after them. In this connection I have two things to say to some of the brothers who are impatiently waiting for such a day and are constantly protesting and complaining. I say that we plan to uproot corruption, rather than eliminate one form of corruption and replace it with another. Turmoil everywhere, disruption of everything, and putting legality and illegality together in the same category is itself corruption.

The expectations of some are such that one would think the judicial powers were guilty. Sometimes they talk in such a way that they discourage the religious magistrates, judges, and others. I say to them that a judge or a religious magistrate has taken back illicit property on tens of occasions, and just because a mistake is made in one or two cases and it is given to its owner is no reason to start an uproar. Revisions and reversals of opinion are common judicial procedures. Sometimes a judge sees his own mistake, and sometimes someone else informs him. We now have 800 judges in the judicial power who have abandoned their lives and their study for their work. Among them we have a number of non-clergymen who would make more money if they gave up being judges and pursued some other work such as law or legal consulting. If we pressure these people by starting a controversy, they will surely give up their judicial positions and the country will suffer.

The Chief of the Supreme Court also said: It is in no one's interest to weaken the judicial power or any other power, because a country without a sound judicial system is not a country, it is a jungle. Of course there are judges who have problems at times, but the police judicial prosecutors and the police courts keep a close watch and there are warnings, suspensions, firings, discharges, imprisonment, and other punishments. We now have a number of judges in prison, both clergymen and non-clergymen. If a judge is wrong, he must be punished. On the other hand, if all their trouble is ignored and a commotion will lead to a judge quitting his job, we should show appreciation for the good ones and remove the bad ones from the judiciary.

He addressed himself to judges throughout the country. He said: Dear brothers, we know your difficulties. Place your hope in God, do your job with a judicious and Islamic conscience, do not stray from justice, and know that His Holiness the Imam and the martyr-nurturing nation will appreciate you when they see your sound and correct work, and you are working for God.

The Chief of the Supreme Court said that some of the problems in the judicial system are due to the lack of laws or a gap in them. He said: I have expressed my views numerous times regarding the weaknesses of the law. One of these laws is the Law of Companies and Commerce. Until this law is passed, we will be obliged to use the former law. I have said repeatedly that if the texts of the former laws are not religiously unlawful, their direction is, and the gaps and shortages in the laws must be remedied as quickly as possible.

Concerning hoarding and selling at high prices, he said: There have been various decisive dealings between the courts and such people. These problems cannot be solved solely by court action. The country's economic issues and policies must be studied and resolved.

Concerning the government vacating its rented places and schools, Ayatollah Musavi Ardebili said: The courts have refrained from issuing such orders, and before the law to vacate schools is passed in the Majlis, we are obligated to prevent such vacating. However, the law cannot be kept in its present form. We have therefore asked the Minister of Education and Training to submit a bill to the Majlis so that on the basis of Majlis action we can authorize the courts to refrain from issuing orders to vacate the schools.

9310

CSO: 4640/38

IRAN

BRIEFS

DISMISSAL FOR CORRUPTION, BRIBES—Economic Service—Iran Customs public relations has issued a summary of the organization's principal activities for 1363 [21 Mar 1984 – 20 Mar 1985] and the first half of the current year [21 March – 22 September 1985] as follows: (1) 578 people have been fired or discharged from service on accusations including having a reputation for corruption, bribe-taking, and administrative violations. The files of a number of them have been turned over to the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor's office, and a number of others are being examined by the Iran Customs Criminal Investigations Office. (2) The formation of classes in appraising and training for 127 newly-employed customs appraisers, of which 45 are now attending classes. (3) Transferring 30 customs staff and executives stationed in Tehran to the Government Management Center to undergo various training programs. (4) The formation of management classes at the Government Management Center to provide management training for 45 managers in Tehran Customs and staff units. The notification of 380 files with set currency values to the Central Bank, resulting in 1,189,170,106 rials in claims and issuances. (5) The organization's preparation, proposal, and approval of new customs units submitted to the National Organization of Administrative and Employment Affairs, as follows: Alborz Customs, Bandar Shahid Raja'i Customs, Fulad-e Mobarakeh Customs, the Susa Customs Office, the Dowlab Customs Office, the Gorgan Customs Office, the Siri Customs Office, the Pahel Customs Office, the Abu Musa Customs Office, the Tehran Refinery Customs Office, Mehabad Customs, and Esfahan Airport Customs. [Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 30 Sep 85 p 2] [Text] 9310

CSO: 4640/36

PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN SEEKS BIGGER U.S. AID PACKAGE

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Ashraf Hashmi]

[Text]

SEOUL, Oct. 7: Pakistan has asked the United States to double the Economic and Defence Assistance Package from 3.2 billion dollars to 6.5 billion dollars over a new six-year cycle starting 1987-88 on soft terms. This was stated here by Dr. Mahbubul Haq, Minister for Finance, after his preliminary 'fruitful' talks with Peter McPherson, the Director of the World Bank and IMF.

These negotiations held at various levels are expected to be finalised early next year with the formal signing of a new package deal.

Talking to Pakistani correspondents here, Dr. Haq said Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo and the Cabinet will first firm up the country's aid requirements before actual negotiations start with the U.S. Administration and the U.S. agency for Inter-National Development, USAID.

Dr. Haq said during his today's talks with USAID Head he listed Pakistan's priorities which are energy, irrigation, agriculture and commodity aid. Kalabagh Dam, he said, has been given preference in the energy sector. Pakistan has also asked for the doubling of the imports of edible oil under PL 480.

The new package, he said, would contain an enhanced share of economic assistance which might be more than 60 per cent this time.

The Finance Minister said that Pakistan had also insisted on further softening of the terms and conditions of defence assistance. Under the terms of the last aid package Pakistan, he said, had to pay 11 to 14 per cent interest on the purchase

of defence equipment with a repayment period of seven years along with a three years grace. This time he said we have asked for a repayment period of 30 years with 10 years grace and an interest rate ranging between three to five per cent.

The terms of the economic assistance, Dr. Haq said, would remain the same as they were already soft with a repayment period of 50 years, 10 years grace and an interest rate of two per cent. The USAID Director McPherson, Dr. Haq said, had assured him full cooperation and indicated that future terms of defence assistance would be considerably softened.

Pakistan, Dr. Haq said, at present was importing edible oil worth 500 million dollars annually out of which it gets 50 million dollars against PL 480.

Talking about the possibilities of the new aid package, Dr. Haq said, although the US Congress is normally opposed to multi-year aid commitments, the American Administration officials, however, were optimistic that the Congress would make an exception in case of Pakistan and would agree to give aid on a long term basis.

The Finance Minister said this was evident from the fact that though serious cuts were applied by the Congress in the past to various countries Pakistan was fully cushioned against any curtailment and the commitment of the current aid package of 3.2 billion dollars was honoured to the last digit.

The Finance Minister said he

had also asked Mr. McPherson to include financing of the construction of Kalabagh Dam in the new aid package.

Describing his talks with the head of the US AID as 'fruitful' Dr Haq hoped that as a result of these the country could expect a very significant softening of terms for financing military sales.

APP ADDS: Dr. Haq said Mr. McPherson was extremely sympathetic to his proposals regarding the new package which is to be designed on a long-term basis. Mr. McPherson is understood to have informed Dr. Haq as a result of the discussions here, Islamabad can expect a very significant softening of terms for financing military sales Dr. Haq added.

The U.S. administration is expected to send a team of its experts to Pakistan to study the Kalabagh dam project, in collaboration with the Pakistani experts, Dr. Haq added.

He said aid negotiations for the total package are expected to be finalised by mid 1986. He was of the view that tender documents for the giant Kalabagh Dam Project will be finalised by early 1986, and tenders floated the same year.

Pakistan will also ask the World Bank, the U.S. government and other potential donors to include the cost of interest on its loans in the Kalabagh financial package which means capitalising the amount of interest. Dr. Haq recalled that Pakistan had to pay interest totalling two billion dollars for financing the construction of Tarbela Dam.

PAKISTAN

MOVEMENT FOR BENAZIR'S RELEASE SAID STRONGER

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 7 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by Maleeha Lodhi]

[Text]

LONDON, Oct 6: According to reliable sources the Benazir Bhutto release committee is expected to be formed in the United States with John Galbraith as its Chairman and Senator Ted Kennedy and other prominent Senators and Congressmen as its members.

Meanwhile, Walter Mondale and Senator Pell have communicated their concern over Benazir Bhutto's continued detention to Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington.

Meanwhile, a motion has been tabled in the European Parliament expressing concern over Ms Benazir Bhutto's detention and urging her immediate release. The motion for a resolution was tabled by Eurq-MP from Belgium, Anne Marie Lizin on behalf of the Socialist group on September 9.

It expresses "amazement" at Ms Bhutto's house detention, noting that there was "no hostile act" committed during the funeral of Shahnawaz Bhutto, for which she had returned to the country.

It also expresses concern for "the defence of human rights" in Pakistan and calls for Ms Bhutto's immediate and unconditional release.

In London, more MPs from all three parties, Labour, Tory and Liberal, have written to the British Foreign Office expressing their dismay over Ms Bhutto's continued detention.

MPs who have said to have thus registered their concern include the following: David Steele (leader of the Liberal Party), Sir Bernard Braine, Michael Hirst, David Alton, Sir Peter Tapsel, Ron Brown, Bowen Wells, Tony Benn, Colin Morihan, Peter Brooke, Reg Freeson, Earnie Roberts, Dennis Skinner, Dennis Canavan, Donald Anderson, Lord Brockway, and Alex Carlyle.

In France the examining magistrate conducting an inquiry into Shahnawaz Bhutto's unexplained death said on Saturday that he had formally asked Benazir Bhutto and her sister Sanam Bhutto to be present in France on Nov 6 to give evidence in the investigation. He said he had summoned them as he would summon a witness in Switzerland or in Britain. He said if there was no response by the end of October he would have to issue summons through diplomatic channels.

CSO: 4600/53

PAKISTAN

EXILED PPP LEADER SAYS HE WANTS TO RETURN TO PAKISTAN

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Oct 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Maleeha Lodhi]

[Text]

LONDON, Oct 7: Pakistan People's Party leader, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, former Governor of Punjab, claimed he "desperately wants to return to Pakistan" because he feels that "sitting here all this time specially in the present circumstances is difficult to justify. One has no right to be in politics if one cannot risk one's life".

While speaking to 'The Muslim' in London the controversial PPP leader said "people want a leader to lead them not leaders who sit and wait to be invited for some kind of coronation". He claimed that he would return soon "Inshallah" and that he would make an announcement in this regard.

Asked to comment on the posters that have mysteriously appeared in the streets of Lahore, Khar said he did not know who was responsible for that. He said he was grateful for that which must be his well-wishers, who according to him had shown courage and taken the risk of putting the posters up.

He said he never doubted that "our people lacked courage". When asked about the convention he is reported to be planning to convene in London he replied "there is no

such thing as a convention but because of the deepening crisis in the country, we have long been thinking that we ought to sit together to analyse the grave situation and evolve a strategy". He further said "we need to warn the people about the deteriorating situation and keep them informed".

When asked to elaborate on certain cryptic statements that he made in recent Press interviews about the party leadership, Khar lamented that "our people have got into the habit of viewing parties in a Shahanshahi way". He said "if I express my honest opinion, this hardly suggests that I am planning a rebellion or hatching a conspiracy—those who do that don't talk about that." He also said that "my honest and genuine feeling should not be misconstrued as a personal threat". "To speak about the attitude of party leader in the larger national interest is our democratic right. He said "unfortunately, we have suffered in the past because of this attitude since those who criticise the leadership were dubbed traitors or branded as personal enemies".

Khar said "I am sitting in a free country; I am in the PPP out of my own free will, I accept the leadership of Benazir Bhutto in present

circumstances because I believe in it".

In response to the question why he was the only exiled leader not to have issued a statement on Miss Benazir Bhutto's arrest, he said there was no need for it since the Senior Vice President (Sh Rashid) had issued a statement". Moreover, he said "I am disgusted by the attitude which is reflected in merely issuing statements". This he characterised as "the politics of ineffectiveness. Claiming that he believed in action, planning and strategy" he said statements are misleading because they give the impression that 'we have fulfilled our obligations'. He added "I want to be practical and not to mislead the people. He also said that statements have no impact on an unrepresentative government which ignores public opinion and for whom the only two things that matter are the real threat on the domestic front and the external factor.

Finally on the question of broader political alliance, Khar expressed reservations saying that he still has to have detailed talks about the matter with Mr Jatui. But he also said "if there is a positive move to bring about the national reconciliation, not to hodgepodge the people, I would go along with it".

PAKISTAN

ZIA UL-HAQ INTERVIEWED

Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English 15 Sep 85 p 3

[Interview with Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan President, on 13 September]

[Text] JEDDAH, Sept. 14--Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq has reiterated his country's firm stand in support of the just cause of Afghan people and said they should be given the right to choose the political system and government of their own. "With a population of 90 million, Pakistan can withstand the Russian pressure for more than 30 years," he said.

In an interview with ARAB NEWS here on Friday, the Pakistan president dwelt at length on the relations with Saudi Arabia, India and the Soviet Union besides the economic situation in his country.

Following is the text of the interview:

[Question] One of the things Pakistan deserves credit for under your leadership is that it has stood firm on the question of Afghanistan despite the intense Soviet pressure. But, after all, how long can you withstand pressure from a super-power?

[Answer] I have been asked this question a number of times and I always reply that if Afghanistan can withstand direct pressure from a superpower for five years--they are only 15 million people we number 90 million and should last at least 30 years.

[Question] Despite the difficulties you must be encountering.

[Answer] Nations live and die for principles. We have taken a principled stand on Afghanistan, and if, in the bargain, we get roughed up, that's part of the game. Independence is sought not without a price; this is the price we pay for it.

[Question] How helpful do you find the support on Afghanistan from the Islamic countries, the West and China? Is there something you find lacking?

[Answer] No. We thank all of them--the Muslim countries, China and the West, in that order. We are very grateful for the political and material support we

have got from all of them. Because without their help we would not have been able to bear such a huge burden--the economic burden, for instance, the cost of supporting three million refugees on Pakistani soil. And we have no complaints, we have only gratitude; there is nothing lacking. Whatever anybody can spare ... that is helping us. We have no complaints. We are very grateful.

[Question] What is the meaning of this intensified fighting in Afghanistan near the Pakistani border? It comes so soon after the fifth round of the Geneva talks on Afghanistan, with the Reagan-Gorbachev summit and the sixth round of the talks approaching. What is the significance of this upsurge in the fighting at this point of time?

[Answer] From our experience of the past five years, we find that there is no link between the sessions of the Geneva talks and escalation in fighting. Particularly post-Geneva action--there is always a pre-Geneva action, pre-United Nations action, pre-Islamic-summit action. These are the times when the Russians twist our arms, bomb a few of our areas to see if Pakistan can be quitted down; but we have not done that so far. But the boost given to these actions now is something new. And this is the result of the decision of the Soviet Union has taken to seal off some of our borders, to take very aggressive action against those locals within Afghanistan who are aiding the Mujahedeen, and also to pacify, appease or obliterate areas (whose inhabitants) are standing in the way of the Soviet-Afghan suzerainty in that particular part.

[Question] What is your assessment of the military situation in Afghanistan?

[Answer] The Russian troops are about 150,000--50,000 more than they were in the beginning. And there are the Afghan troops, in addition. Such a quantity of forces is just enough to exercise control they already have. Which means the cities alone--the rural areas, the countryside are all in the hands of the Afghan freedom-fighters.

[Question] Don't you think that the Mujahedeen need further military support, more sophisticated arms, say, to make their resistance more effective?

[Answer] No. The Mujahedeen are not a regular force, they are guerrilla forces, and their form of fighting, their offensives are all based on guerrilla tactics. Guerrillas do not require too many heavy, sophisticated weapons ...

[Question] Weapons of better quality

[Answer] A better quality of the weapons which can fulfill their aims.

[Question] At least to break the stalemate.

[Answer] No, there is no stalemate. The guerrillas, the freedom-fighters are in a good position. The Russians have their own way. But whenever the Russians strike, the freedom-fighters withdraw. Sometimes, of course, they get the punishment also. But there is no comparison between the two, and there is no stalemate.

[Question] The Wakham Corridor in the northeast of Afghanistan, that has practically been absorbed into the Soviet Union ...

[Answer] The Wakham is totally under the occupation of the Soviet Union, the Afghans have surrendered the Wakham territory to the control of the Russians.

[Question] Obviously, to cut off any link between China and the rest of Afghanistan?

[Answer] Between China and Afghanistan?

[Question] Of course, you have taken into consideration the possibility that some day the Russians might get fed up with your support for the refugees and the Mujahedeen and attack Pakistan?

[Answer] Yes, it is a very distinct possibility. But in order to go beyond Afghanistan's borders and to enter Pakistan--for a full-fledged, deep thrust into Pakistani territory--that will require a larger number of forces. And the quantum of their forces existing in Afghanistan does not indicate the Russians' capability or capacity at the present moment to undertake such a large-scale operation. Yes, they can undertake small-scale operations--border excursions, attacking some of our border and posts--they can do that now. But for major operations inside Pakistani territory they require as many troops again as they have now. As long as they don't have that, we are secure.

[Question] What about the possibility of a crippling air strike?

[Answer] By us?

[Question] No, by them.

[Answer] Yes, in the border areas. They won't bring their aircraft--they dare not ...

[Question] ... Deep into Pakistan ...

[Answer] They can't. They know they will be punished. They only come in five, 10 kilometers, and then they rush back.

[Question] We are talking of the Russians, of course, not the Afghans.

[Answer] When we talk about the Russians in Afghanistan, we mean the Russians. The Afghan forces are negligible; their air force is practically manned by the Russians. All the important troop movements are undertaken by the Russians themselves.

[Question] At the end of the fifth round of Geneva talks, the U.N. mediator, Mr. Cordovez, indicated there were chances of important progress on the Afghan question. Were those false hopes, after all?

[Answer] No, no; they were not false hopes. A political solution of the Afghan problem is perhaps the only solution that can be found. There is no military solution to the problem. If the Afghan problem is to be resolved, it can only be resolved under a political plan. And for a political plan, the only vehicle we have is the indirect Geneva talks. There have been five rounds, and all five have been quite successful. And the mere fact that Geneva Six is coming in December shows that there is progress.

[Question] What is your assessment of the chances?

[Answer] It is difficult to concretize the chances of a political initiative. You can say it is likely to succeed. But sometimes miracles also happen, and I am a great believer in miracles. (Laughs) If Geneva leads to a Russian withdrawal, it will be a miracle of the 20th century.

[Question] Do you think the Russians are likely to withdraw at all? Given certain assurances? What kind of assurances do they want?

[Answer] The Russians say they want to withdraw.

[Question] All right; on what conditions?

[Answer] On the condition that Afghanistan is stabilized, that there is no outside interference, and that there is no internal strife.

[Question] Isn't it only their charges, after all, that there had been external interference? It's not proven.

[Answer] That's what they claim. ... At some time when the situation is such that they are prepared to withdraw ... These are some of the aspects of the discussions at the Geneva talks--how we are going to provide guarantees, how we are going to ensure that there is no outside interference. Not only from Pakistan, but from Russia as well. We have to ensure that there is no external interference from anywhere. The superpowers, or the permanent members of the Security Council, have to give guarantees. The United States has agreed, Great Britain has agreed, China has agreed, Russia has agreed. So these are the Russians' conditions, and they say that if these conditions are fulfilled, they are prepared to withdraw. And we are taking the Russians on their word.

[Question] Do you think there is a movement toward that?

[Answer] There is certainly progress at the Geneva talks. We hope we can, as I say, pull off a miracle. Inshallah.

[Question] Apart from the Afghan problem--or in spite of it--how are your relations with the Russians?

[Answer] Very good. Bilaterally we have very good relations, excellent. They have given us a steel mill, the largest steel mill in Asia, costing \$2.5 billion, on a very soft loan.

[Question] You consider that a gesture of friendship.

[Answer] Yes. But now they are saying, if you don't change your policy on Afghanistan, we'll have to take a different attitude. But we say, let Afghanistan be approached on a different plane; we have a bilateral relationship, let us continue that.

[Question] And the steel mill has been delivered already.

[Answer] It's functioning, completed. It took us eight years to complete.

[Question] So it is a great gift.

[Answer] A very fine gift.

[Question] But one gets the impression that there is a lot of Soviet interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, with the Soviet ambassador making provocative statements. For instance, criticizing the government of Pakistan for allegedly not allowing Pakistani students returning from the Soviet Union to get jobs, and so forth.

[Answer] All ambassadors do this.

[Question] To this extent?

[Answer] Yes. In Pakistan, in India, in Bangladesh, in Sri Lanka, in West Germany, in England--everywhere ambassadors make such statements. This is their job. As long as they don't say anything about a third country--but they can say anything about the host country, they can say anything about their own country. And this is their job; let's grant them that. Our own ambassador, given the opportunity in Moscow, would do the same. But unfortunately he hasn't got that much of a scope.

[Question] Generally you have struck a very optimistic note on Afghanistan.

[Answer] I am, ya akhi, an optimist by nature. And I have never repented.

[Question] Are you also optimistic about the success of the current OIC mission?

[Answer] Oh, yes; very much so.

[Question] On what grounds?

[Answer] The mere fact that we have met. And this is the second occasion when so many heads of state and heads of government have come. And I am sure that given the opportunity they will find a solution.

[Question] Have you received any indications this time?

[Answer] No, not yet.

[Question] And the stands of Iran and Iraq are still the same?

[Answer] More or less the same.

[Question] So what makes this mission more important than the previous ones?

[Answer] The realization--the realization that a committee was instituted for a purpose and that purpose has not yet been served. Therefore, the committee has met again, and taken a very serious note of it.

[Question] So what would you do this time that you didn't do last time?

[Answer] I wouldn't know this; they'll decide tomorrow.

[Question] You are going to send teams to Baghdad and Tehran?

[Answer] I'm not sure. This is the chairman's decision tomorrow.

[Question] The war has escalated a lot since the last time.

[Answer] Yes, that's true. The situation has aggravated. They have been fighting for the last five years, and the peace committee has so far been unsuccessful.

[Question] So there has been no substantial progress since the last time.

[Answer] No substantial progress so far. But we hope that the future movement will be toward the finding of a settlement.

[Question] How are Pakistan's relations with India? How are they in the post-Indira Gandhi era?

[Answer] Much better than they were before. And I must say that in spite of some disappointments that we have had, we find that, under the new Indian leadership, chances for better relations between India and Pakistan are greater than before. I have had three meetings already with the new prime minister, and I find that he also, perhaps, sincerely feels that the two countries must have good relations. And once there is realization, if there is the political will to do a thing of this nature, then I think a solution can be found.

[Question] Do you think he's more willing than his mother to find a way out?

[Answer] We find a very distinct change.

[Question] In which area do you think improvement is more likely to happen?

[Answer] Well, that is difficult to say. But first there is the question of having over-all agreement on the necessity of having good relations. And then, through the various instruments that we have devised--like the inter-ministerial conference, through bilateral relations, if there is more

trade, free exchange of visits, for people of divided families to have more access--so all those things automatically generate progress. If the political will is there, things can improve.

[Question] And you feel the will is there, or that there's a greater will?

[Answer] We feel the scope for improvement is much better.

[Question] What would you describe as the most outstanding problems between Pakistan and India?

[Answer] The most outstanding problems are suspicion, misunderstanding and lack of trust. Once these are removed, then there are no problems.

[Question] But how do you remove them?

[Answer] I think through better understanding. And the greatest hurdle in the way of this is Kashmir. On Kashmir it is Pakistan that has unilaterally decided: All right, we'll settle that problem one day, but, for the time being, in order to improve our relations, let us not talk about Kashmir. Let us talk about other things where we have agreement; then we'll come back to Kashmir to solve it.

[Question] Last year there were repeated clashes over a glacier in a remote area of Kashmir.

[Answer] They are still occurring.

[Question] How serious are they?

[Answer] Reasonable. As serious as any border clashes can be.

[Question] No more serious than that? Because that's a very sensitive area.

[Answer] No, it's not a sensitive area. It's an open glacier, which mountain-climbers pass through. And it's an area which has been in Pakistan's possession for the past 30 years, ever since the ceasefire. But this area was, somehow or other--there was no dispute, nothing--was not demarcated. And all of a sudden, last year the Indians started claiming it. There's nothing there, it's just a glacier, there is not a blade of grass there. But sensitive as people are, they won't even give up glaciers, and nor will Pakistan do that. And that's why the two sides have troops stationed, eyeball-to-eyeball, sitting and watching their own areas.

[Question] Has any territory changed hands because of the clashes?

[Answer] No. No territory.

[Question] How is Pakistan's economy faring?

[Answer] As far as the economy is concerned, we have had some good seven years. But this year, since the start of our financial year in June, we find we are having some difficulties. First of all, ours is a "monsoon economy." The backbone of our economy and commerce is the sale of cotton and rice and things such as raw hides, cloth. If there is good weather, we get a good crop, and we get good money. Unfortunately, last year's cotton crop was not so good. Because of natural factors. There were rains at the wrong times, the crops didn't come up well. The crop which was harvested in 1984 was a bumper crop, but then the prices went down, so we suffered. This year the cotton crop promises to be good. But the reverses of the past two years have affected us. The second point is that we have had a boom for a few years as far as foreign remittances are concerned. Now, of course, because of the glut in the Gulf, people are going back, so the remittances have been reduced.

[Question] By how much?

[Answer] Between \$500 million to \$1 billion.

[Question] It is quite a lot of money.

[Answer] It is. We had reached an all-time record of \$3 billion. Now we are down to \$2-\$2.2 billion. It's a large sum of money.

[Question] How many Pakistanis have returned home?

[Answer] Hundreds of thousands.

[Question] How are they faring? Any readjustment problems?

[Answer] They are doing well, they have saved some money. Which they have invested in houses. They have better houses in the countryside. The standard of living has risen. They have learned some good trades here. Of course, they may find things a little difficult, but I think that on the whole they will reconcile.

[Question] So the prices of real estate in Pakistan must have gone up.

[Answer] Naturally. But these are some of problems we have to face. On the whole, though, the economy has done well. If you take the overall record. We have had a six percent growth rate of the GNP. Then, we have had a 4.4 percent growth in agriculture, on the average, and a 30 percent rise in exports.

[Question] That's quite a lot.

[Answer] Yes. But the cost of living has gone slightly higher. However, at the same time per capita income had increased tremendously. We are now in the region of something like \$450 per head, which is practically twice that of India. So there are many aspects in the economy which are bright.

[Question] Would you like to say something about your relations with Saudi Arabia?

[Answer] They are wonderful. They can't be better, you can't even describe them. These are ideal relations.

[Question] Are you going to see His Majesty on this visit?

[Answer] If he can find time. But he is a very busy man, and there are so many other heads of state here now. If I were alone, I would have put in a request. If I asked to see him, he wouldn't refuse. But that won't be fair; there are 14 others. But I always have time, I keep on coming. We have good relations, we exchange communications. His Majesty is very kind toward us.

Thank you very much.

CSO: 4600/41

PAKISTAN

ASGHAR KHAN INTERVIEWED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 21 Sep 85 pp 1, 5

[Article by Maleeha Lodhi]

[Text]

LONDON, Sept. 20: In the most wide-ranging interview he has given in recent years, Mr. Asghar Khan candidly discussed with this correspondent a host of issues, domestic and foreign. He assessed the prospects for MRD's survival in the context of potentially divisive issues like party registration and the provincial autonomy question. While denying that he was trying to wriggle out of the MRD, the retired Air Marshal explained why he has always disagreed with turning the alliance into a single party or an electoral alliance, arguing nevertheless that there can be "unity in diversity". He qualified his intention to stay within the MRD by making it clear that the alliance would have to remain within the parameters of the objectives for which it was formed.

The Tehrik chief also talked of his concept of autonomy and thought that the NDP's rejection of the 1973 Constitution is likely to damage MRD unity. He answered criticism of the Tehrik and spoke at length about his position on Islam.

On foreign policy, he maintained that he is neither pro-US nor pro-Soviet. While critical of the present U.S. policy in Pakistan, which he feels is "endangering our security", he said he was not anti-US.

Here are some of the questions

and answers:

Q. How do you assess the implications of the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Bill, 1985, presently before the National Assembly?

A. I don't attach as much importance as it is being given because it is the logical and inevitable consequence of the non-party loyalist Assembly. The important thing is that the Assembly's status is questionable, so the value of this Bill for the Government is also doubtful. So I personally don't share this excitement. Who are the people who will give this indemnity? It is a non-political Assembly (its members have no programme). They agreed to stand for elections to an Assembly without knowing what powers it would have.

Q. Nonetheless, would you say that the adoption of this Bill in the form in which the Government has introduced it, makes the lifting of Martial Law redundant?

A. What it means in practical terms is to be seen. I believe that the lifting of Martial Law may not reduce the tremendous powers of the military regime. So it will not make much difference.

Q. The next bill expected to come before the Assembly is the Political Parties Bill. What is your stand on party registration? There is a wide belief that the Tehrik is ready to register.

A. We have not even discussed this as yet, but we are already a registered party. Our position is different from many other MRD parties. We were registered in 1979. But if parties are required to re-register, we will have to discuss the issue. That would depend on what the terms are.

Q. Some MRD leaders have voiced the view that it would be preferable

for MRD parties to evolve a common stand, as indeed the MRD adopted in boycotting the elections.

A. But this is not an election, its a question of registration. My personal view is that it is not a matter for the MRD to decide. We are united for four objectives, and this does not impinge on those. But you should not take this to mean we are wanting to re-register. That will be decided at the time. We have consistently taken the stand that we do not want to give to the MRD more authority and responsibility than was given at the time of its creation. Our view has been different all along. Many parties want to convert the MRD into a well-knit, close alliance with one structure, one programme, or into an electoral alliance. We don't subscribe to that view. So if we differ on this issue (i.e. the party registration), it will be consistent with our general line regarding the MRD.

Q. Do you think the issue could precipitate the MRD's collapse?

A. I hope not. After all there are individual parties who have their own thinking on issues. So there are differences, but there can be unity in diversity. We believe in that. The MRD cannot have one line on every issue. For example, on foreign policy, to my knowledge, we have never even discussed that. There may well be different views on this. It would be foolish for the MRD to hammer out one line. The MRD may suffer as a result. We are united for the purpose of a free and fair election. That is all. Not for trying to solve every national issue. Because if we tried to do that we will be involved in endless dis-

agreement. And that will affect the MRD unity. The broader and looser the alliance and the fewer the issues, the greater the unity.

Q. It is said that your party no longer thinks that staying in the MRD is politically useful and that you have been looking for an excuse to quit. Is there any validity in this view?

A. No, there is no truth in this. This (kind of thinking) is the result of a move on the part of certain well-intentioned MRD elements towards converting the alliance into one political party or to broaden the scope of the alliance. If people think in those terms, it might

appear to them that the Tehrik-e-Istiqal is an impediment. We are very firm on remaining in the MRD for the achievement of the objectives for which it was created. No more.

Q. Recently there has been considerable sparring, or one can go further and call it a war of words, between the Tehrik and the PPP, bringing to the fore what many see as fundamental hostility between the two. Hamid Sarfraz's statement is one example. If this is an indication that the Tehrik has gone back to its 1977 and pre-1977 assessment of the PPP as essentially "fascist"?

A. I saw the statement in the papers here in London, but I would rather not comment on it until I have verified what it is all about. I don't think it will contribute towards good relations between the two parties. I don't feel happy about this war of words. The fact is that we have been at two ends of the political spectrum, not ideologically, but in the sense that when the PPP was the government, we were in the opposition. There is no need to revive those memories. We should try to forget them and work for our common objectives. Indulging in a war of words does not help.

Q. A criticism that is often levelled at you is that your policy positions are tactical rather than principled, as for example your stand on Islam and your anti-Americanism. How do you respond to such criticism?

A. It is a very odd criticism to make of a person and a party that has consistently worked for certain principles and ideals. We opposed the military action in East Pakistan when everybody else was praising it and we suffered as a result. We consistently opposed certain policies of the PPP which we did not think were democratic at that time. We did not compromise and there was no tactical advantage to be gained from that. We left the PNA when we found two of its component parties working hand in glove with the regime. Later they joined the government and we were proved right. We joined the MRD and became allies of a party at whose hands we suffered a great deal for five years for the achievement of certain objectives. I think it's very unfair to say we have been opportunistic when we have stuck to our stand.

Now specifically about Islam, there is nothing tactical about our stand. We feel it would be a tragedy to allow any government to interfere with religion in a manner that we have seen happen over the last eight years. It is not tactical but a fundamental thing. The state should not interfere in religious matters. By doing this they would be creating instability in a society which has in effect several sects.

As for the other point, we are not anti-US and we are not anti-Soviet. There is too much of a tendency in Pakistan to be pro-somebody. I think it basically stems from a lack of sense of realism and an inferiority complex. We always

attribute all of our ills to some other superpower. We have seen Pakistan broken and reduced into half by our own follies, and we tended to blame the U.S. and India for that. Any superpower, any neighbouring country would interfere in your affairs when they see the country breaking up. Even now because of the highly centralised regime, certain things are happening and people will blame some superpower or the other, if God forbid, something happened. So we are not anti-US, but critical of the American role in Afghanistan in pushing us forward as a frontline state. We are not against them (the U.S.). We have had good relations with the U.S. for years and we would like to retain those, as indeed with the Soviet Union and China. But the present American administration wants to push Pakistan into a frontline state, thereby endangering our security. It is our duty, not tactics, to highlight this and say what we believe to be correct.

Q: Going back to your position on Islam, how do you reconcile your new stance with your previous stand as part of the PNA coalition that called for the establishment of Nizam-e-Mustafa?

PNA MOVEMENT

A: There is no difficulty in reconciling these. Firstly, there are two different things here. The PNA had a 32-point programme which was not for a religious state in Pakistan. There were certain aims and objectives, but we never thought of Pakistan as a theocratic state. The second stage was the PNA Movement. In that certain slogans, including Nizam-e-Mustafa, were raised. Don't forget Nizam-e-Mustafa doesn't forget things to different people. If a maulvi was raising it, he probably had a different picture of that. If somebody else was raising it, he probably thought Nizam-e-Mustafa meant a society in which the poor were better off. It is a vague term. You cannot give a programme in a slogan. And these slogans were not officially approved by the PNA. These slogans followed the Movement that came after the rigging of the 1977 election. Slogans were part of the Movement, whereas the (PNA) programme was made before the election.

Q: Nevertheless you were part of an alliance calling for Nizam-e-Mustafa. What is the difference between the political use of Islam by the present government and its political use by the PNA?

A: The PNA said they would have a system based on the principles of Islam. There is nothing wrong with that. We have not got away from that even now. We believe in that, because those principles are universal. They mean a decent society in which the poor would have justice. But a slogan is one thing, a programme is something different. The present regime has shown what they mean by an Islamic society. It means exploitation of the poor, injustice, all the ills you can imagine. This is nowhere near Islam. We do not want to establish a religious state in Pakistan. That's why we have come to the conclusion that it is best to make it clear that the state should not have anything to do with religion. That's a matter for the individual. The state should apply itself to the day-to-day problems of the people. Now we are giving our own programme. Then we were one of nine component PNA parties. In an alliance of nine parties you come down to the common denominator on which you can agree. But even then you are talking about a post-election slogan.

Q: Are you suggesting then that in their slogans, parties and leaders do not mean what they say?

A: I don't know, because, for example, what did the slogan 'Pakistan Ka Matlab Kiya', really mean? Slogans have a powerful appeal and they are used. But that does not mean a programme.

Bhutto said "Roti, Kapra and Makaan", but what did he mean by that? Did he mean everyone will eat until they get indigestion, that everyone will have a house? Did he mean everyone will be well-dressed? These are vague terms, but it generally meant that people will be better off. It did not reflect the PPP programme. That was seen in action later on. So slogans in a society like ours are symbols of the wish and intention of the people. I think slogans can be misleading, but I agree with you that this (Nizam-e-Mustafa) was a very powerful slogan.

People raising it meant what they said, but it meant different things to different people. For me, Nizam-e-Mustafa meant a decent life for people, freedom and end of exploitation.

Q: Your position on the confederation demand is well known. What is your concept of provincial autonomy? What is the extent of autonomy that you think is needed to keep Pakistan's disparate religious and ethnic groups together?

A: We stand for a degree of decentralisation that goes even further than provincial autonomy because we believe the basic unit should not be the provincial assembly but the 'halqa' assembly. That's been our position since 1979. All powers of the provincial assembly should be transferred to the halqa assembly, except the powers to coordinate and distribute the provincial budget to the various halqas. We want to transfer power to the lowest level. The jirga or the village panchayat should have their own police and small administration to deal with all the local problems of the people. So you are talking to the member of a party that believes in a very drastic and revolutionary concept of decentralisation. I will not go into details, but this should give you a broad idea. We also believe in transferring all powers from the centre to the provinces except defence, foreign affairs, currency, communications and the power to levy taxes for running these four subjects. We have quite an advanced concept of this issue which is fundamental to the survival of Pakistan as a stage representing people of different ethnic origin and speaking different languages.

Q: To what extent will the recent decision of the PPP's Central Executive not to expel Mumtaz Bhutto and Hafeez Pirzada strain MRD unity?

NDP'S POSITION

A: A more serious situation has arisen with regard to the NDP's position that they don't believe in the 1973 Constitution. If they say they no longer believe in one of the four basic pillars of the MRD, then that would damage MRD unity. On the PPP front, we were told their party has nothing to do with the confederation demand. We told them that is not enough. If you retain those who advocate confederation in the PPP it does not convince us and it confuses the people. But we will give them a little more time since they have suffered this tragedy. But they have to take a decision soon. We don't think it can ride two horses at the same time. They should make up their minds and we want to be satisfied on this issue.

Regarding the NDP, I read in the papers that no decision can be taken because so many leaders are out of the country. I don't agree with this. Our party is able to take a decision whether its head is there or not. We cannot wait for everybody to be in Pakistan. Somebody or the other is always away. This should not delay decisions on fundamental issues.

Q: Moving now to the Tehrik itself, it is said that despite efforts to adopt and project a more progressive, populist image, the Tehrik has been unable to build mass support and that it remains fixed in the public mind as a party of ex-servicemen. How far do you think this is true?

A: It is to be proved who has the nationwide support. I am afraid you will have to wait until an election is held, whenever that may be. Or come on a tour with us to see for yourself. I'm sorry to say the Press is very reluctant to travel. They do not go around and leave it

to local people and so much mutilation of news takes place before it is published. Anyway the issue will be decided later. I don't want to make any tall claims except that I found tremendous response in the rural areas of all the provinces I have been to. I think we are making very good progress. I don't know about the ex-servicemen. Don't forget this is one of the few parties that has regular elections. Our people are elected through a process ever since the party was formed in 1971. This is a record of which we are proud. There are two or three ex-servicemen in the party which is not much in a large party like ours. They are not debarred from holding office and are elected through a proper process.

Q: But having an ex-bureaucrat as Party Secretary General does reinforce a certain image of the Tehrik.

A: Or an ex-General. (The present Secretary General) Verdag has been elected by the workers whereas in other parties people have been elevated to this rank without election. With all humility and respect I think this criticism might be directed at them. They have appointed generals, bureaucrats, and policemen. In our party we don't appoint them, we elect them.

Q: Washington is said to be evaluating Pakistan's future defence needs after the current US military aid package expires in 1987. What are your views on this as well as the nature of present Pakistan-US ties?

U.S. POLICY

A: In general, the US is using Pakistan for its own global interest in a manner that is endangering our security. I, therefore, do not agree with the general policy that the US is following or the Pakistan government is willing to follow. So far as aid is concerned, we must keep our armed forces modern in every sense, although I do not like the shape and organisation of the Armed Forces today, which is run in a colonial fashion. We need a smaller regular force and a much larger territorial force or peoples' army. But whatever army we have would have to be well-equipped. Therefore, modern equipment will always be needed. But I think we should diversify the sources and not rely on one. More importantly, we should create an environment in which the threat to Pakistan is reduced. It is no use talking of military aid in a vacuum. If you work up a threat that you can't cope with and then try to get aid to meet that, that is not the right way to go about it. Whereas I don't say we should not receive aid from anybody, the first thing to do is to reduce the threat. And having reduced it, we will do well with a smaller force.

Q: Five rounds of U.N.-sponsored indirect talks between Islamabad and Kabul have not produced a settlement of the Afghan problem. Do you think the Geneva process can produce an agreement in the future.

A: If we are saddled with the kind of government we have today, no agreement is possible until the superpowers come to a settlement. I hope at the coming summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan, they will take a broader view. If they can settle their basic problems, this (resolution of Afghan issue) might be a fallout of that. Without that it would be very difficult. With a military government dependent on aid from the US, working entirely in accordance with their wishes, to expect a settlement to be reached by these 'Geneva talks is not practical. It has to be done at a much higher level between the two superpowers. Indications so far are that the U.S. is not interested in a settlement.

Q: What do you regard as the essential elements of a durable settlement?

A: It is not practical to expect the Soviet Union to disappear and give up Afghanistan. They will have to retain influence there. The quest

on is how much influence and to what extent the refugees can be resettled in Afghanistan. The longer they stay in Pakistan, the less likely they are to go back. Already it is doubtful that many will return—they have business and property here. But anyway a settlement

will have to satisfy these people so that they can go back. The Soviet Union will have to reduce their presence in Afghanistan. And a government will have to be installed (in Kabul), that will inspire confidence in the people who have struggled against the Karmal regime. These are the broad principles. It appears that we have been quite close to the achievement of these a couple of times in the last two or three years, but the agreement has been blocked. I think that since there is a Soviet desire—they are experiencing difficulties in Afghanistan and would like to get out honourably, not completely, but reduce their presence—settlement could be reached if the US wills so. They will want to do this if they can reach a bigger settlement on a global basis.

Q: What is your party's position on the Gulf war?

A: We have not taken a position on this. I think it (the war) is a very sad thing. But Iraq started this. We must accept that fact. I think it is being exploited by people outside. The people who are sending arms, ammunition, and equipment are probably quite happy if this goes

on. But the fact remains that Iran was invaded. I, therefore, have sympathy with their position.

Q: Recently, at your book launch, you spoke about the nuclear issue. Are you firmly against Pakistan becoming a nuclear power?

A: We are against the production of nuclear weapons. There is nothing new in this. General Ziaul Haq too says this. We do want to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. We should not be obsessed with what India has. It makes no sense at all.

Q: Do you not see any substance in the strategic doctrine that a nuclear balance of terror may be the only way of achieving durable peace in the Sub-Continent?

NUCLEAR OPTION

A: This is not a valid argument. It is a phoney one. It is thoughtless and makes no sense for a poor country like ours. It will endanger our

security, not enhance it. It is just a prestige thing to appease chauvinistic element. I am sorry that more political parties and leaders don't have the courage to say this because they think it is a device to get popular support. As far as the government is concerned, I don't see why they do not open Pakistan's nuclear facilities to inspection as called for by the international agencies. They say India should also do it. But why should we be conditioned by what India does or does not do? If I had anything to do with it, we would stop this business and concentrate on production for peaceful purpose and spend this money on generating power and improving the condition of the people.

Q: There is a feeling in Pakistan that your visit to Washington, which you call 'private', is aimed at lobbying certain quarters there. This feeling is linked to speculation that since the Americans appear to be sympathetic to the PPP, the Tehrik feels left out.

A: I am not a newcomer to politics and have a known record in the service of my country and people. The party and I have in the face of great difficulty and personal risk always worked to further the national interest, and have never sought help from outside. Those who have, lack patriotism and suffer from a inferiority complex. The Iranian example should be enough to show that no amount of foreign influence or pressure—even of a superpower—can stand up to the will of the people, provided they are united and properly led.

If I was in naked pursuit of power, or a share in it, I could have it for the asking. There were many opportunities in the past and there are opportunities now. If I meet an American or a Soviet diplomat it will therefore, never be at the cost of my country's interest. So far as my present U.S. visit is concerned, it is a private one. But that does not mean I will run away from any American if he wishes to meet me.

CSO: 4600/45

PAKISTAN

SBPF SAYS PPP 'AN ANTINATIONAL PARTY'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 2 Oct 85 p 1

[Article by Maleeha Lodhi]

[Text] London, Oct 1--The PPP has been decried an "anti-national organisation" by the Sindhi-Baluch-Pashtun Front. A statement issued here by Sardar Attaullah Mengal on behalf of the Principles Committee of the Front calls the PPP's reaction to the "question of nationalities" as "identical" to the "hostile disposition" of the country's military authorities.

The statement also gives details of the meeting of the Principles Committee held on Sep 29, in which PPP leaders, Mumtaz Bhutto and Hafiz Pirzada were asked to explain their positions while other PPP members of the Front were issued notices asking them to declare in writing by Oct 20 that they had resigned from the PPP.

The meeting was held to discuss the situation arising from the policy decision of the PPP's Central Executive taken in Lahore on Sept 7. The meeting of the Front's Principles Committee observed that the PPP had "singled out from among others, Mumtaz Bhutto and Hafiz Pirzada as the target of punitive action only because they were actively advocating the cause of the Sindhi people, and had thus committed themselves to the objects of the Front." "This," it described as being, "tantamount to denial of all genuine demands for the rights of smaller nationalities." It further alleged that "the PPP had tried to take a lead in this matter" and that "the PPP stood fully exposed as an anti-national organisation."

Proclaiming that there was an "ideological conflict" between the PPP and the Front, the Committee concluded that members of the PPP cannot be permitted to serve in the Front's organs. It then called on the two leaders to explain their position, whereupon Mumtaz Bhutto and Hafiz Pirzada reiterated their "commitment to the struggle of the nationalities and the cause of Sind." They also explained that the PPP decision amounted to their expulsion from the party.

Meanwhile other PPP members serving on the Front's committees have been given until Oct 20 to renounce their membership of the PPP.

CSO: 4600/46

PAKISTAN

ASPECTS OF CENTER-PROVINCE RELATIONS ANALYZED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 2 Oct 85 pp 4, 5

[Article by Nazim]

[Text] "Sorry! Provincial Subject"--this in effect was what National Assembly Speaker, Syed Fakhr Imam told the five Parliamentary Members who sought to move five identical adjournment motions to discuss the detention in Karachi, of Miss Benazir Bhutto, Acting Chairperson of the outlawed Pakistan People's Party.

Who ordered the arrest and detention of Miss Benazir Bhutto? The Martial Law authorities? The Federal Government? The Provincial Government? Yes and No which despite the Rules (about 'Central subject,' 'Provincial subject') doesn't make the picture straight and clear. This brings us directly to a discussion of 'Centre-Province' relations, which also has a "Fact and Fiction" relationship. Despite provisions for limited provincial autonomy, Pakistan has never been a federal state--the clear trend has been towards centralisation and unitary government. No provincial government could dare to act unilaterally even on an important provincial issue--for be it for the Province to take a decision on a national issue, Miss Benazir is a national leader, the principal challenge to the present regime. She cannot be confined to a single Province.

It would be interesting, however, to sort out the 'Fact and Fiction' of Centre-Province relations.

Autocratic central control with the provinces or states obeying the fiat of the ruler was the pattern of administration in the British colonies for over 150 years. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the Government Agent at the district level (counterpart of our District Magistrate/Deputy Commissioner) was described as 'God Almighty.' He remained the Agent of the Governor-General under an Act of the British Parliament during the East India Company rule and of the British Crown after 1857. After the First World War, the Act of 1919 attempted some measure of local self-government when the Provinces were granted a half-baked autonomy in some subjects. However, it was the Government of India Act 1935 which for the first time set up a federal structure with a considerable quantum of Provincial Autonomy. There was a lengthy Federal Legislative List, a Provincial List, and a

Concurrent List. If the Federal legislature enacted legislation on any item in the Concurrent list, it automatically superseded the Provincial law. Thus 'provincial autonomy' was in effect a fiction, as the Central Government remained exclusively in the hands of the Viceroy--even in the Provinces the Governor enjoying over-riding special powers. I recall how Mr Jinnah, the supreme parliamentarian and constitutionalist virtually forced the Congress to join him in getting the federal part of the Act rejected, and the provincial part accepted with certain reservations and conditions. Eventually the Congress did assume office in the Provinces on the condition that the British Governor would not use his special powers.

Pakistan was governed by the Government of India Act 1935, until the Constitution of 1956. The latter, and most of the successive Constitutions, were modelled more or less on the pattern of the 1935 Act. The 1956 Constitution had a Federal, Concurrent, and Provincial List, with a heavy bias in favour of centralisation. It incorporated the unpopular "One Unit," which sought to destroy the very foundations of provincial autonomy. The 1958 Army coup ushered in an era of undiluted military rule with Ayub Khan, the Army Chief, in command. Martial Law continued till the promulgation of the military ruler's 1962 Constitution. Meanwhile a new and unheard-of device to perpetuate Ayub's rule was invented in the name of 'Basic Democracies' in 1959, and made part of the 1962 Constitution. Ayub devised a hand-picked electoral college of 'basic democrats' (numbering only 80,000 or 120,000) to get himself elected as President and absolute dictator. The 1962 Constitution was the worst in Pakistan's chequered constitutional history. It negated all chances of provincial autonomy and virtually destroyed democracy; it established the omnipotence of the executive, indirect elections and the absence of parties, all elements carefully calculated to suit one-man rule. The 1962 Constitution, with Field Marshal Ayub Khan as President practically meant an extension of Martial Law in civilian garb. The Constitution defined the sphere of the Centre's exclusive competence, while all powers not directly referred to the Centre's authority were vested in the Provinces. It was claimed that the Provinces were fully competent to pass all legislation in matters within the provincial field (the fiction), but in another article of the Constitution the Centre enjoyed wide powers to legislate in the provincial field in the name of 'security' 'economy,' and 'stability' (the fact).

A mass popular upheaval ousted Ayub Khan in 1969. Soon after, the provinces were restored and the first ever democratic elections were held. Eventually the 1973 Constitution was passed with full democratic support. Far more than any previous Constitution, it secured the interests of the Provinces to a very considerable extent. For the first time an upper house was provided, representing the interests of the Provinces. There is a fairly extensive Concurrent Legislative List, and a Federal List, the so-called residuary powers remaining with the Provinces. However the bias is still in favour of centralisation. The Centre can constantly encroach into the sphere of Provincial subjects through the Concurrent List, where the Centre has prior claims to legislation. Moreover, all Constitutions, including the 1973 Constitution, provide for over-riding Emergency Powers, which make, or can

make Provincial Autonomy meaningless. Indeed these special powers have been one of the major causes of friction between the Centre and the Provinces. Here the British colonial legacy has been kept intact. Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935 empowered the Governors to take over the government of a Province. Under the 1973 Constitution, Article 234, could be and has been invoked to dismiss a provincial government. These are vast and despotic powers given to the Centre. The Concurrent list and the Emergency powers can always become 'The Fact,' while Provincial autonomy is reduced to 'Fiction.' Even the Federal List is too extensive and provides channels of encroachment into the provincial sphere. In many other ways the Centre can confer powers and impose duties upon a province and its officers. The Centre can enforce preventive detention under the excuse of maintaining 'public order.' It can give directions to the Provinces to prevent any 'grave menace to peace and tranquillity'; it can impose restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse between the provinces in 'the public interest.'

Finally there is the centralised colonial bureaucracy which is 'THE FACT,' Provincial autonomy and Local Self-Government to being no more than a 'FICTION.' Parliaments, Prime Ministers, Ministers may come and go, the real rule is in the hands of the administration and administrators. The Simon Commission had said in 1930: "Of no country can it be said more truly than of India that 'GOVERNMENT IS ADMINISTRATION.'" It was a colonial approach necessary for the survival of a Colonial Empire. In Pakistan's centralised colonial cadre, this approach has been preserved. This cadre has comprised two Services---in pre-Independence days they were the ICS and the IPS---the civil and police services, but rulership devolved mainly on the ICS. These services were well entrenched in their privileged positions, and irresponsible to public opinion, or to the public interest as defined by the people's representatives. These Services were not even under the control of the Governor-General, they were directly under the British Secretary of State in Whitehall. Their over-riding and despotic power is well illustrated by a story told about Sardar Patel, then Home Minister in the Interim Administration of 1946-47, when he could not get an ICS District Magistrate transferred for serious misconduct. He complained in the Constituent Assembly:

"I tried to get the District Magistrate of Gurgaon transferred. I could not succeed...I tried hard. I wrote to the then Governor of the Punjab; I pleaded with the Viceroy, but I found it difficult to remove him."

And the irony of this story is that it was Patel who after Independence pleaded for the retention of the ICS, despite Nehru's strong opposition. The reason was clear---Patel was himself a despot: he said he had things to do---all undemocratic---such as forcibly absorbing the several hundred Indian States into contiguous provinces/states, and carrying out a 'police operation' in the Nizam's Hyderabad. Who could be better suited to do this job than the colonial cadres of the ICS and IPS, who had been well trained through Imperial policy and experience to suppress the freedom movement in pre-Independence India. Indeed both the post-Independence Constitutions of India and Pakistan validated the existence and continuation of these Services.

In Pakistan they came to be known as the "All-Pakistan Services," and were also enshrined thus in the 1973 Constitution (Art. 240).

"All-Pakistan Service" means a Service common to the Federation and the Provinces, which was in existence immediately before the commencing day or which may be created by Act of Parliament. All Rules and Orders in force immediately before the commencing day shall continue in force, and may be amended from time to time."

In Pakistan the colonial approach has been further strengthened. In fact the ICS/CSP assisted by the PSP (Police) became far more powerful than the British ICS District Magistrate of the days of Patel. Today, even after 50 years, Simon's observation (Government is Administration) rings true, at least in Pakistan. Here the ICS/CSP (now called DMG-District Management Group) IS the Administration and IS the Government. It is this cadre of a few hundred that holds every important and crucial government position in the country, it makes both policy and implements it. All these positions of vantage are virtually reserved for them. Thus most of the Federal Secretaries, all the Chief Secretaries of the four Provinces, most of the Provincial Secretaries, most of the Heads of public corporations--think of any important job--they are all CSP preserves. One need not here discuss the competence of this cadre, except to say they are mostly ignorant of the subject they may be administering at a particular time, and that they all rise to the level of their incompetence (Peter Principle). Whatever Constitutional provisions may exist as regards provincial autonomy and local Self-government, they are rapidly reduced to a FICTION while passing through the machinery of government, which is firmly in the hands of this cadre and under its control. Chief Secretaries and Secretaries of this cadre posted in the Provinces have been known to ignore the instructions of Provincial Ministers and Chief Ministers after covertly and overtly consulting the Federal authorities, or receiving instructions from them in a similar manner. The Chairman of the Jhang Local Council has constantly complained of the interference of the local authorities (mainly the CSP/PSP set-up) in local government administration. It is obvious that a local body which is an elected institution, cannot function when Federal functionaries have over-riding powers even at the district level. How can she (the Chairman of the Jhang Local Council) function democratically and with authority in the presence of the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police over whom even in her own jurisdiction she has no control. Dr Mubashir's proposal has much validity: most powers of the bureaucracy must be transferred to elected representatives at all the relevant levels.

We are told that there is Provincial Autonomy, and that subjects in the Provincial sphere cannot be discussed in the Federal Legislature; but in actuality a Federally-controlled CSP/DMG Commissioner can execute orders received from the Federal Government without even the Provincial Chief Minister concerned having prior knowledge of the order and its execution. What is FACT and what is FICTION, a reader can easily decide.

In a federal state there has to be a clear division of legislative and executive powers between the federation and the federating units, and constitutional provisions to ensure that the Centre will not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Provinces or States. This is how the Quaid-i-Azam conceived the Pakistan Federal State. He had warned that each federating State or Province would have its own administration, judiciary etc. Pakistan has never been a federal state in this sense and throughout these nearly 40 years it has been governed as a unitary state through a colonial steelframe known as the ICS/CSP/DMG, recruited, deployed and controlled by the Unitary Centre. Provincial autonomy, local government, representative government, even democracy, all become illusory, legal fictions.

CSO: 4600/46

PAKISTAN

KALABAGH: MOTION IN ASSEMBLY RULED OUT

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Oct 85 pp 1, 8

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Oct. 2: The Speaker of the National Assembly Syed Fakhar Imam today ruled out of order on technical grounds an adjournment motion sought to be moved by a large number of members pertaining to the construction of Kalabagh Dam over River Indus.

The Speaker maintained that the Senate had already discussed a similar motion in the recent past so the matter cannot be agitated again.

The members, all of them from the NWFP, in their motions wanted the House to discuss the situation arising out of the reported statement of the Chief Engineer of WAPDA that a final decision has been taken for the construction of the Dam over River Indus at Kalabagh. According to the movers of the motions, the construction of the Dam near Kalabagh will adversely affect the province of the NWFP as two of its fertile districts, namely, Peshawar and Mardan, will be adversely affected and most of its fertile land will be inundated. As a result large number of people will be displaced and nearly 150 villages will be submerged under water.

The members referred to the statements of the Chief Minister of the NWFP on the issue in which he had opposed the construction of the Dam at the proposed site.

The Minister for Water and Power, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, while opposing the motions said that the final decision for the start

of the construction work will be taken by the Federal Cabinet in consultation with the Chief Ministers of the NWFP and the Punjab.

He said, the Federal Cabinet will take a final decision which will be in the best interest of the country as such the members should not feel worried about it.

The Minister in his detailed statement in the House refuted the contention of the members that lakhs of people in the NWFP will be displaced due to the construction of the Dam.

Mir Zafarullah Jamali said that the idea for the construction of the Dam over Indus at Kalabagh was conceived as long ago as 1954, i.e., 31 years back, after which lot of investigations and studies both at the national level and by the World Bank and other international agencies were conducted. He said it was in 1975, that the government had found the project feasible with a view to generating more power to ease the burden on the national exchequer on account of oil imports. He said in March 1984 consultants and experts gave technical feasibility on the construction of the Dam.

The Minister, while giving facts about the Project, said that only 59 villages of Kohat and Nowshera with a population of 22,000 and comprising an area of 64,000 acres will be affected. He said all these people will be rehabilitated in the new township to be constructed

for them where adequate houses, roads, schools and mosques and other amenities will be provided. He said it was wrong to say that two lakh people will be affected.

He said in all 159712 acres are likely to be inundated out of which 63 per cent will be in Punjab while 47 per cent in the NWFP. He said in all 68,000 persons will be affected out of which 55 per cent will be in Punjab and 45 per cent in the NWFP.

The Dam he said, will help in the generation of power to meet the requirement of the country and will provide the increased water supply for irrigation in the country. Besides, he said, the Dam will provide better water control system and regulate the control of floods.

The Minister said except for few cases, large number of displaced persons from Mangla and Tarbela Dams areas have already been accommodated in Punjab and Sind. He hoped the Kalabagh Dam area displaced persons will also be settled. He hoped that his detailed statement will remove the misunderstanding from the minds of the members and the people.

At this stage, Dr. Sher Afghan, from Mianwali rose on a point of order to point out that the construction of Kalabagh Dam will help the NWFP, and two of its districts, Bannu and D.I. Khan, will get water from the right bank canal over the River Indus.

PAKISTAN

QUESTION OF KHOKHRAPAR ROUTE RAISED IN ASSEMBLY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 7 Oct 85 p 8

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Oct. 6 : Minister of Production, Muhammad Khaqan Abbasi told the National Assembly today that the Government was earning annual profit to the tune of Rs. 1.1 billion through its various units functioning in the public sector.

Replying a number of supplementaries during the question hour, the Minister stated that the overall profit of all the units under the Ministry of Production was Rs. 872 million during the fiscal year 1983-84.

Referring to the Pakistan Steels, he said it would start earning substantial profits when it started operating to its full capacity. At the end of this year, the steel mills would be able to substantially overcome its losses.

STEEL MILLS

Giving various arguments in connection with the current losses of the Pakistan Steels, the Minister observed that the downstream industries should have been in production at present but due to the lack of response from the private sector, they could not go into production.

Mr. Abbasi further said that steel mills were lucrative nowhere in the world without downstream industries. He added we are restructuring the financing of the Pakistan Steels to bring down its losses.

The Minister said the downstream industries would be shortly in production and this would assist the Pakistan Steels in offsetting its losses.

In his written answer, the Minister said 16 units were running in loss during 1983-84 and they incurred losses of Rs. 274.11 mil-

lion. The loss making units during 1984-85 were 22 which incurred losses of Rs. 367.34 million. The losses of steel mills were Rs. 1.668 million in 1983-84 and Rs. 1.650 million in 1984-85, he added.

Responding to a question posed by Haji Muhammad Unis Elahi, the Minister of State for Production, Islamuddin Sheikh said the decision regarding the purchase of coal from Australia was pending and the report was with the Ombudsman. Citing the reasons for the import of coal, the Minister said that imported coal quality was not available in the country and efforts were being made to discover coal which could be used in Pakistan Steels.

Supplementary, the Minister said international tenders were floated for the import of coal and lower bid was accepted to supply the coal.

On another question by the same member, the Minister said that one letter of intent was cancelled on the basis of wrong statement.

On a supplementary asked by Gohar Ayub, Mr. Abbasi said that Pak-China fertilizer had earned a profit of Rs. 8.4 million during the fiscal year 1984-85.

Giving the answer in the affirmative asked by the same member, the Minister said the National Fertilizer Corporation was shut down for three months due to failure of electricity and irregular supply of gas. As a result of this, he said, 30,000 tons production of fertilizer had declined in this period.

The Minister assured if gas was supplied throughout the year, the production would be over 90,000 tons. The cost of production can be lowered if the tariffs on gas and electricity are reduced, he said.

In written reply, the Minister said that the cost of production in National Fertilizer Corporation was higher than other factories because of its small size, higher financial and depreciation charges, closure due to natural gas shortage in winter which distributes fixed costs over small volume of production.

In a written answer, Mr. Abbasi said that total number of industries set up in the public sector since 1970 are 33 including six projects which were under expansion in the existing units. Out of these 33 industries, three projects are under implementation. The Government does not have large-scale plans to set up new industries, in line with its policy to encourage the private sector, he said.

PRINTING PRESS

Referring to the Finance Minister's budget speech in which it was announced that there will be no need to obtain permission for establishing cement industry Mr. Abbasi further said this decision was withdrawn by the Cabinet due to the following reasons.

- Cement industries included in the list of specified industries attached to the industrial policy statement issued in June 1984,
 - It is highly capital intensive industry,
 - It is a high energy consuming industry,
 - Machinery for cement plant is partly manufactured locally and partly imported.
- Islamuddin Sheikh, the Minister

of State for Production, told a questioner that the Printing Press PIDC private limited would be disinvested with the condition that the employees already working there would not lose their jobs.

The Printing Press, he said has incurred a loss of Rs. 2.6 million upto 1984 and added that it was, therefore, being sold out to the private sector. The losses were caused due to shortage of demand for printing work, he added.

On a question by Mohammad Aslam Kacheela, the Minister of State for Production said that Ehsanullah Khan, Managing Director, Millat Tractors Limited was being retired on 11th October, next on attaining the age of superannuation.

On supplementary, the Minister made it clear that the extension of the service of Ehsanullah Khan was not under consideration.

The Parliamentary Secretary for Food, Agriculture and Cooperatives, Siddique Kanju, told a questioner that no export of fish took place from any of the Baluchistan ports. The entire catch comes to Karachi and is exported from there along with the catches of Sind coastal areas, he added.

To a supplementary, Islamuddin Sheikh said that out of the three projects, Bolan Casting and D.G. Khan Cement Factory would be completed by 1986 while Pak Cement would be ready by 1987.

KHOKHARPAR

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Zain Noorani informed the House that the Foreign

Ministry had realised the inconvenience caused to the people travelling between Pakistan and India through Khokharapar route. He said some Ministries and agencies had also opposed the reopening of route. The route was closed down in 1970s war, he said.

In written statement, the Minister said administrative, financial and operational difficulties had prevented the reopening of the Khokharapar — Monabao route. The laying of the railway track of eight kilometers and provision of related facilities would entail an estimated expenditure of Rs. 104 million. In addition, considerable expenditure would also be incurred on establishing customs and immigration checkposts. However, this question continues to be under review by the concerned authorities, he said.

Replying to another question, Mr. Noorani said the pillars demarcating the Durand line still existed but some of them were in need of repair. It was an international practice to repair them jointly but in the present situation it was not possible, he added.

Malik Noor Hayat Noon, Minister for Health, Special Education and Social Welfare said conventional methods were being applied for the treatment of the leprosy in the country. However, he said that homeopathic treatment would also be looked into.

Responding to various supplementaries, the Minister said that a total number of leprosy patients in the country was 24,000 upto Jan. 12, 1984 with Karachi registering the highest number. —APP

PAKISTAN

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH BANGLADESH REVIEWED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 7 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Abdul Majid Khan]

[Text]

The complementarity between the economies of Pakistan and Bangladesh is probably the highest, if compared to the complementarity between the Pakistan economy and the economies of other countries. The soils and climates differ and so the agricultural output. This complementarity extends from a number of food items such as rice, pulses, fruits and vegetables, spices and tea to industrial raw materials like cotton and jute, cotton and jute manufactures, iron and steel, chemicals and metal products, some consumers goods and machinery and transport equipment.

With march of time, this complementarity is likely to increase. Pakistan may increase, from Bangladesh, imports of raw jute to meet the demand of her expanding jute goods industry, tea, paper and newsprint, coconuts, products of small scale industries and hides and skins and other raw materials and consumer goods. In return, Pakistan can increase exports of rice, raw cotton, cotton yarn, cotton cloths, spices, edible oilseeds particularly rape and mustard, chemicals and chemicals products, iron and steel, metal products, machinery and a number of consumer goods. A strong trade delegation is going to Bangladesh to explore the possibilities of expanding trade with that country. In fact, Pakistani and Bangladeshi businessmen know each other and the markets of the two countries well and exchange of trade delegations may help expansion of trade.

ECONOMY OF BANGLADESH

Land area of Bangladesh is 144,000 square kilometers and population in the middle of 1983 was 95.5 million. Now population of Bangladesh is increasing at an annual rate of 2.4 per cent and by now it should be over 100 million. By 1990 the population of Bangladesh is anticipated at 114 million and by the year 2000 141 million. Urban population of Bangladesh is increasing fast. Urban population increased from 6 per cent of total in 1965 to 17 per cent of total in 1983. Population of working age groups increased from 51 per cent of total in 1965 to 54 per cent in 1983. In 1983, 74 per cent of population was in agriculture, 11 per cent in industry and 51 per cent in services.

Bangladesh is one of the least developed countries of the world. In 1983, her per capita income was 130 dollars - one half of that of India and one third of Pakistan. In that year, the value of her gross domestic product was estimated at \$10.64 billion and 47 per cent of it originated in agriculture, 13 per cent in industry and 40 per cent in services. One of the most serious economic problems of Bangladesh is the lack of domestic savings to finance investment to accelerate the pace of economic growth. According to world Bank estimates gross domestic savings of Bangladesh in 1983 were only 2 per cent of GDP. Gross domestic investment was 17 per cent of GDP, so, the country

depended on foreign savings for 15 per cent of GDP to finance investment. Foreign debt of Bangladesh in 1983 stood at \$4185 million which was 37.7 per cent of GNP.

Agriculture is the backbone of the economy of Bangladesh. However, its growth rate is slow. In 1983, value added from agriculture was \$6.545 billion against \$5.427 billion in 1970. Bangladesh is still heavy importer of food grains. In 1983 imports were 1.844 million metric tons. Food aid during 1982-83 was 1.252 million metric tons. Value added from manufacturing (in 1975 prices) increased from \$647 million in 1970 to \$1294 million in 1982 and its distribution by sub-sectors was as given in table 1.

Table 1. Bangladesh-Distribution of value added from Manufacturing 1983 (% share)

1. Food industries	30
2. Textiles and clothing	37
3. Machinery	4
4. Chemicals	17
5. Other manufacturing.	12

Bangladesh has heavy deficit balance of trade. In 1983, exports were valued at \$789 million and imports \$1502 million. About 2 per cent of all exports were food items, 36 per cent other primary commodities mainly jute, hides and skins and forest products, 47 per cent textiles and clothing mostly jute goods, 4 per cent machinery and transport equipment and 11 per cent other manufactures. In 1982, imports estimated at \$2300 million was classified among major economic categories as shown in table 2.

TABLE 2-BANGLADESH-
ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION
OF IMPORTS 1982-(% shares)

Categories	% Share	Estimated value (\$ million)
1. Food	26	598
2. Fuels	12	276
3. Other primary commodities	8	184
4. Machinery	22	506
5. Other manufactures (mainly cotton Yarn)	32	736
Total:	100	2300

Pakistan and Bangladesh, being Islamic countries have cordial economic and political relations. Both are members of the Colombo Plan, Organisation of the Islamic Countries at Jedda and its affiliate bodies like the Islamic Development Bank, Conference of Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, etc. Both cooperate with each other at different political international forums. On bilateral basis, Pakistan and Bangladesh cooperate in different fields like trade, educational, cultural and technical fields.

Due to recent floods in Bangladesh, large scale loss of life and damage to property and crops was sustained. As a matter of sympathy with the people of Bangladesh the President of Pakistan has instituted a fund for aid to that country. The people of Pakistan are contributing liberally to the fund within their limited resources. Latest estimates place deposits at Rs. 30 million.

Pakistan has well balanced trade with Bangladesh. Of the eight years, Pakistan had favourable balance of trade during four years. During these eight years, Bangladesh had favourable balance of trade, with Pakistan to the tune of Rs. 199 million or less than Rs. 25 million which is not much and stolerable. Pakistan and Bangladesh, both have balance of payments difficulties and cannot afford large scale annual deficit. Trade between the two

countries may be arranged mainly on barter basis and well balanced. Cash balances may be used to the minimum.

Pakistan and Bangladesh exchange a large number of primary commodities and manufactured goods. Imports from Bangladesh are mainly raw jute and jute goods, hides and skins, tea, minor items of forest origin, papers and boards and newsprints, occasionally fertilizer and some other manufactured goods. Exports to Bangladesh are more diversified as shown in Table 3

Pakistan and Bangladesh can collaborate in establishing industrial units in the two countries. Such projects may be selected carefully so that these are profitable to the businessmen of both the countries. These projects may be in the fields of processed foods, textiles and clothing based on cotton and jute, paper, board and newsprint, chemicals and petro-chemicals, metal products, machinery and transport equipment and several others. On the whole, there is bright scope for expanded cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

TABLE 3. PAKISTAN-MAJOR EXPORTS TO BANGLADESH
(VALUE IN Rs. 000s)

S.No.		1982-83	1983-84
1.	Rice	13,942	15,857
2.	Fruits and vegetables	5,408	5,377
3.	Spices	25,821	8,152
4.	Raw Cotton	291,069	200,633
5.	Chemicals and products	5,405	32215
6.	Rubber goods	3,499	72
7.	Cotton yarn and thread	138,478	33,876
8.	Urea		10,802
9.	All other cotton manufac-	2,759	5,233
10.	Pig Iron	7,107(7)	50,177
11.	Metal products and machinery-non-electric.	10,130	163,487
12.	Glass and glassware	11,193	77
13.	Electrical goods	2,498	3,753
14.	Transport equipment	54,228	1,735
15.	Other manufactures	3,657	6,279

PAKISTAN

ARTICLE EXPLORES PAKISTANI WAYS OF THINKING

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 4 Oct 85 Magazine p 1

[Article by Mohammad A. Qadeer]

[Text]

Independence from colonial rule has proven to be a boon for the middle-class (of course, the upper-class too) in Third World countries and Pakistan is no exception. New opportunities for jobs, business, and public offices have opened up and positions previously reserved for colonials have become available to the nationals. The economic development process has particularly favoured the middle and upper classes. Almost every development scheme or programme begins with the formation of a directorate, agency or office which invariably increases the number of officers, inspectors, clerks, etc. Correspondingly, in the private sector the ranks of Businessmen and tradesmen expand as new ventures come to fruition.

In Pakistan, the large-scale migration for work abroad has also contributed to the elevation of millions to middle class status.

All in all, the contemporary times have witnessed a rapid expansion of the middle-class. These expanding opportunities have allowed some upward mobility for the upper layers of the poor classes. The children of small farmers, clerks and school teachers have become doctors, engineers and army officers. This movement is the source of the large-scale ruralization of Pakistan's middle class.

The expansion of the middle-class is not merely a phenomenon of a larger number of people gaining a given culture and social status. It is a process of social transformation. New attitudes, values and behaviours emerge as the numbers increase, new recruits are added, and the material base changes.

Today's middle-class way of life bears only a faint resemblance to the 'Babu' culture of the 1940s and 50s. The self-assuredness, contentment and coherence of the old middle-class have given way to pushiness, truculence and self-indulgence. There is a made-in-Pakistan middle-class culture in which the old and the new values and behaviours are intertwined. On ideological grounds this new culture may not be acknowledged, but it is a living reality all the same.

The new middle (and upper) class way of life can be witnessed everywhere, on the floor of the National Assembly, on television, on the roads, in shopping plazas, in evening gatherings, and in marriages and receptions. It permeates the national outlook and underlies public decisions.

Pakistan's foreign relations and domestic policies are shaped by the perceptions and interests of its middle and upper classes. Obviously the national failures and successes are also to be credited to these dominant perceptions and interests.

The question, then, is what are the most significant features of the middle-class culture and mentality which have influenced the contemporary history of Pakistan? To answer this question, we

have to identify the themes constituting the ethos of middle-class culture.

AMBITION

Ambition has been unbounded in the new middle class of Pakistan. It is the driving force that has propelled the young to hard work and self-fulfillment. Undoubtedly it is a very positive force for the progress of a society, and Pakistan has benefited from the ambitiousness of its people. It is reassuring to witness a fish-merchant asking the Principal of Aitchison College: "Why can't my child be admitted here? I can pay as much as you want." The breaching of social barriers by the floodtide of individual enterprise is laudable. This is a fruit of Independence.

Ambition can also breed selfishness and recklessness. Unrestrained ambition can corrode the sense of community and subvert the public interest. And this is what has happened on a wide scale in Pakistan. There are no holds barred in the pursuit of self-interest. The social acceptance of lying, cheating, intriguing, bribing, influence peddling, and nepotism as a 'means' of individual advancement is the dark side of ambition in Pakistan. Ambition has redefined the rules of the game.

While two decades ago, one resisted influence-peddling and bribing officials to gain one's end, now one also actively intrigues to remove competitors. The duties and responsibilities of one's position are relegated to the considerations of furthering one's ambitions.

In every situation, one asks for 'who has the power, and not 'how' the rules operate. If a person wants to be promoted on the job, hard work and talent may have some bearing, but increasingly important are skills in flattering bosses, playing power politics, bribing and influence peddling. The enterprise now lies in finding the appropriate instrument.

A U.N. expert who spent two years in Islamabad recently summed up his impressions by saying: "Oh, those two years I was a job finding agent for my Pakistani colleagues and friends. Almost everybody pressed on me some C.V.s for transmission to New York. Even Federal Secretaries, the highest appointed officials, were no exception."

It has become an operating principle of life in Pakistan that with the appropriate use of force, influence, authority, or money, almost every situation can be 'fixed' to one's advantage. This social expectation has come to be an element of the Pakistanis' world view. Whether one wants to get a seat on a PIA flight or to escape WAPDA's load shedding, it is believed that with the investment of money and influence one can satisfy such needs, no matter what the situation. The faith in a 'fix' has come to be the operational philosophy of life.

The 'fix' is also an affirmation of the privileged status. It makes one a member of the high caste after all. It is an exception to the rules and even the laws of nature. This mode of solving problems and satisfying needs has been deeply rooted in Pakistani mentality. It is manifest in the traffic on our roads.

The motorist who drives on the wrong side, the scooter driver who ferries five passengers, the public bus that runs through the red light, are all counting on being exceptions to the rules.

Another example of how deep-seated is this outlook is the response that invariably is given by officials to persistent complaints about the inefficiency of their departments. "We can solve your (complainant's) problem. The system is likely to remain the same."

Similarly, a particular issue is resolved as a privilege for a complaining individual. The Chief Minister of Punjab orders the prosecution of police inspectors whose extortions are brought to his notice by members of the Assembly. Once again a personal fix and not a systematic reform.

The belief that almost everything can be 'fixed' has resulted in ad-hocism as a way of life. Every little act requires making special arrangements. There is little that happens by routine or according to rules, a great deal of uncertainty has come to characterize daily living. One may line up to deposit electric bills from early morning, but there is no assurance that the receiving counter will remain open long enough. You may have the money to buy meat, but the butcher may have disposed of the whole stock for a NIAZ. Every little act of living has to be individually negotiated and bargained for.

DAILY CHORES MEAN A SERIES OF EXPENDITURES INVOLVING CAJOLING INFLUENCE PEDDLING OR BRIBING THOSE ONE HAS TO DEAL WITH. One has to have a network of supporters to intervene forcefully in various situations. The more privileged the task, the greater exertion it requires.

Almost everybody who has travelled outside the country has a 'story' about how the passport and foreign exchange permit were arranged and departure managed. TO BUILD A HOUSE OR TO OBTAIN A JOB ARE TASKS THAT CAN RUIN ONE'S HEALTH SUCH TASKS ARE BIDDED WITH BRIBES AND INFLUENCE. One may have a cousin who is a commissioner, but the competition may be able to mobilise a General.

This competition among 'fixes' has made life all the more uncertain. PAKISTANS MIDDLE CLASS NOW LIVES WITH A PERVERSIVE SENSE OF ANXIETY AND INSECURITY. ALTHOUGH THE BELIEF IN 'FIXES' IS UNIVERSAL, THE CAPACITY TO DO SO IS PRIMARILY CONCENTRATED IN THE MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASSES. Thus a middle-class person has to 'calculate' all the time as to how a new acquaintance can be useful at some future date. The social relations are structured around considerations of mutual usefulness and power exchange. THE LOWER CLASSES SOON GIVE UP THE STRUGGLE. THEY FALL BACK ON PIRS AND PRAYERS. THESE ARE THEIR FIXES.

THE DOUBLE THINK

A disparity between 'beliefs' and 'actions' or 'statements' and 'behaviours' is a common human characteristic. Only Saints and Prophets have complete congru-

ence of thought and action. Yet for ordinary mortals, the disparity cannot be a wide chasm. Often the limits of tolerable disparity are narrowly defined. Pakistan's middle class has its normal share of contradictions between beliefs and behaviours, but it has also developed a capacity to passionately subscribe to two mutually contradictory beliefs and assumptions.

To say with full conviction one thing one moment, and to maintain an opposite viewpoint at another, with apparently an equal passion, is increasingly becoming a hallmark of Pakistani intelligentsia. It may not be that Pakistanis only are afflicted with the double think. There might be other societies in a similar bind, but let us limit our discussion to the subject at hand.

A common topic in every home is the extravagance of marriages and the burdensome dowries, but at the same time it is believed that the honour and prestige of a family lies in giving lavish feasts and impressive dowries at daughters' marriages. The double-think particularly comes to the surface in matters of religion and politics. Often it begins as a compromising measure whereby one assumes a 'public' face while maintaining 'private' beliefs, but soon the two become equally entrenched. It's also the result of a deep-seated contradiction and ambivalent emotional commitments.

Over the period of 40 years since independence, the influence of knowledge and learning in Pakistan's social life has declined. This statement may appear to be a contradiction of obvious facts. The schools and colleges have mushroomed, and the number of graduates has increased manifold. There are laboratories, academies, and Universities all over the country, and 'brain power' is exported. Don't these facts indicate educational progress? Yes, they do, but this is the kind of progress that the authors of Five Year Plans revel in.

The educational progress of a nation is measured in its increasing capacities to observe, reason and respond to issues. As the intellectual capabilities of its population and problem-solving capacities of its institutions increase, so does a society progress. On these scores, Pakistan has been de-educated. On the social psychological plane, Pakistan's intelligentsia has regressed since independence. The ideological proclivities and political expediencies of successive regimes have taken their toll. Even the level

of social tolerance, free discussion and critical thinking of British days have been stamped out.

The lively press and the exciting public debates carried through mammoth meetings of rival political parties have given way to the repetitive clichés about faith, unity and sacrifice by the Press Trust and Television Corporation.

The public debate has been quashed, and with it the thinking processes have atrophied. Education has come to be equated with jobs and credentials. Learning and knowledge as the tools of decision-making have lost ground. Seldom is a public issue discussed in terms of facts, figures, or even percentages. Instead, assumptions, folk beliefs, hearsay and analogies are the bases for public discussions and decisions. The intelligentsia has little use for objectivity and critical thinking.

Books and magazines have increasingly become marginal in Pakistani thinking. Reading as an avocation and activity is on the decline. Fashionable homes stocked with the latest products of the West are largely bereft of books.

Ask a Joint Secretary in Islamabad about the last book he read, and most likely it will turn out to be a textbook used for an examination. The clinic of a professor of Medicine in Lahore is lined with bulging bookshelves which have not been touched in years, as the of dust suggest. And knowledgeable persons may also notice that the books are essentially old text, perhaps read years ago for earning degrees.

PERSONIFICATION

Typically a Pakistani's approach to understanding a phenomenon is to look for 'persons' as its causes. Often the question is who caused it, not how and why it happened. This is particularly true for social situations. Behind every event is supposed to be somebody's hand. If students in Karachi protest against police high-handedness, then they must have been incited

by disgruntled politicians. If the youth have taken to drugs, they must have been misled by foreigners or crime syndicates.

Preconceived ideas, images and slogans inform the perceptions of Pakistani intelligentsia. These clichés and concepts become the instruments of observation. The 'facts' are perceived through the taints of ideologies, presuppositions and precepts. The empirical reality largely remains unacknowledged, and the preconceived notions are raised to the level of facts through reiteration. This is the phenomenon of packaged perceptions. The Pakistani intelligentsia has yet to be ushered into the age of inductive reasoning.

Pakistanis are proud of their humane way of life, and are convinced of the evils of the materialistic west. Yet they fail to notice how materialistic their life has turned out to be, with little opportunity. Millions of Pakistanis have gone abroad to work, at the peril of their families and communities.

The development ethos has promoted another source of packaged perceptions. The U.N. and the aid agencies with the active collaboration of national policy-makers, define problems, formulate solutions and coin precepts by which issues are comprehended. Phrases such as the Basic Needs Approach, the Integrated Rural Development, the Growth Pole, the National Settlement Policies, Technology Transfer, have become the 'opium' of policy-makers, administrators and the media. These clichés guide the analysis of local situations and define the scope of Five Year Plans. They have become a major barrier in the understanding of national issues and formulation of appropriate policies. Of course, they benefit the intelligentsia by providing them with jobs, and giving them ready-made answers to national questions.

THEMES

These themes underlie the Pakistani intelligentsia's intellectual apparatus. There are other elements also, but these stand out. They condition national outlooks, and provide categories for observing and understanding. From this brief exploration of the frame of mind, it can readily be seen why the Pakistani intelligentsia has evolved in a mold of double-think and anti-intellectualism.

The Pakistani mind-set has become a major obstacle to national progress. Undoubtedly this mind-set has been shaped by recent socio-economic experience events and policies. The social inequalities, the scramble for unearned riches, the loss of political and intellectual freedoms, are the forces that have shaped this mind.

The self-serving educational policies of successive regimes and, since Ayub's era, the continual desire of ruling circles to produce an 'obedient' populace, have nurtured this frame of mind. The emphasis on rote learning and conformity, suppression of critical thinking, along with the attempts to use students as political tools, have brought about the present state. Recent attempts to Islamize education, which was already saturated with religious themes and ideas (read any Urdu book for primary classes and it will be obvious that the religious themes had already reached a saturation point before the present round of Islamization) have ritualized learning and further curbed critical thinking.

If the Pakistani nation is to prosper and progress, specific measures will have to be taken to reform the mind set. Without attending to the intellectual health of the nation, the progress of the nation has to be built up anew. Pakistan needs an intellectual revolution as much as it requires a social revolution.

PAKISTAN

MOTIONS IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RAISE VARIOUS ISSUES

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 6 Oct 85 pp 1, 8

[Excerpt] Islamabad, Oct 5--Zain Noorani, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs today said the PIA has the proud distinction of being one of the major airlines in the world which commands respect and confidence of air traveling internationally and has excellent record in terms of regularity target.

Speaking on two identical adjournment motions by Usman Khan Noorani (Karachi) and Sheikh Rashid Ahmed (Rawalpindi) on delays and cancellation of flights during August last, Mr Noorani said PIA achieved on time regularity of 82.4 percent during August last which was equal to the target fixed for the previous year and only one percent lower than the revised target for the year 1985-86. The movers did not press their motion.

Speaker Syed Fakhar Imam ruled out of order an adjournment motion by Jam Mir Yousaf (Lasbela) seeking to discuss public concern over growing presence of foreign fishing trawlers in Baluchistan and Sind coasts for fishing purposes. The Speaker observed that the motion did not relate to any specific incident.

The House disposed of four other adjournment motions and one privilege motion which were not pressed after the Minister concerned explained the position.

Qazi Abdul Majid Abid, Minister for Agriculture opposing the motion by Jam Mir Yousaf on activities of foreign fishing trawlers in Mekran coast said these trawlers were fishing in deep sea beyond the territorial waters of Pakistan with the permission of the Government. They were also providing technical know-how in deep sea fishing to the people of coastal areas of Baluchistan province.

The Minister said no new agreement or new contract has been signed with any foreign party to allow fishing rights in the Arabian sea on the Pakistan coast.

Sheikh Rashid Ahmed did not press his adjournment motion in which he sought to discuss the Indian Government refusal to allow the former American President Mr Richard Nixon's plane to fly over its territory when he was on his way to Pakistan.

Opposing the motion on technical grounds, Zain Noorani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, said the incident took place outside Pakistan for which Pakistan Government was not involved. It also related to a person who was citizen of third country. It is for the country to whom he belonged to take up the issue or may Mr Nixon himself took it in good grace.

Mr Noorani, however, agreed with the assertion of Sheikh Rashid that while Pakistan on its part is going out of its way to create an atmosphere of peace and good neighbourly relations with India, it was not getting the same response from across the border.

Parliamentary Secretary for Establishment Division Rana Naeem Mahmood reiterated that the government servants were granted extension in only rare and extraordinary cases. He was responding to a privilege motion sought to move by Mumtaz Ahmed Tarar (Mandi Bahuddin).

The mover pointed out that the Minister of Information and Broadcasting gave extension of service to three speech writers, namely Anwar Khalil, Masood Qureshi and A.B. Azim. This, he said, is contrary to the policy of the government which was underlined by the Minister for Finance Dr Mahbubul Haq while replying to question in the house the other day.

He said the Minister had ensured the House that the Prime Minister would not allow extension of service in future in order to accommodate the young people in service.

Opposing the motion, the Parliamentary Secretary said the three officials mentioned in the privilege motion have been reappointed on contract basis for the period of two years. The three officials do not belong to service group. Moreover, he said, the officials were reappointed before the statement of the Finance Minister. The mover did not press his motion after the statement of the Parliamentary Secretary.

Mumtaz Ahmed Tarar sought for adjournment of the House to discuss the treatment meted out to one prisoner, Asif Butt, advocate, in Central Jail Multan. He said the accused who is undergoing life imprisonment has been put in chains and deprived of medical facilities.

Shah Mohammad Pasha Khoro, Minister of State for Interior opposed the motion, saying that the prisoner is availing medical facilities and was not kept in solitary confinement. He said the accused was put in chains for violating the jail rules.

Mr Tarar did not press his motion. He, however, asked the Government to ensure that all the prisoners, especially political prisoners, receive due facilities in the jails and are not given inhuman treatment.

CSO: 4600/51

PAKISTAN

NDP REITERATES DEMAND FOR NEW CONSTITUTION

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 6 Oct 85 p 6

[Text]

LAHORE, Oct. 5: The National Working Committee of the defunct Pakistan National Democratic Party today accepted the resignation of Sherbaz Mazari from the basic membership of the party and again demanded elections for a new Constituent Assembly to frame a new constitution for the country.

Decisions to this effect were announced by Rao Mehroze Akhtar Khan, acting President of the NDP, at a Press conference on the conclusion of a 2-day meeting of the National Working Committee of the party. Besides Mehroze Akhtar, those who attended the meeting included Mohammad Afzal Khan from NWFP, Haji Ghulam Sarwar Yasin Zai, Baluchistan, Haji Sher Khan from Karachi and Ehsan Wyne from Punjab.

They said that according to their party's constitution, the President or the Central Working Committee were empowered to accept resignation of any party member.

Regarding the NDP's stand on the 1973 Constitution, Afzal Khan said that almost all party leaders in the MRD had time and again voiced their opinion that with the enforcement of massive amendments the Constitution of 1973 was no more in existence and in that context the first point of the MRD's 4-point programme demanding the restoration of the said Constitution had lost its relevance. He insisted that the NDP stand was not in any way in conflict with

that of the MRD programme which envisaged the lifting of Martial Law and holding of fresh elections under the rules prevailing on July 4, 1977. For these objectives, he said, the NDP would continue participating in the struggle of the MRD with all the vigour.

Explaining his party's viewpoint in rejecting the proposals framed by the autonomy committee of the MRD, Afzal Khan said the NDP favoured leaving only four subjects, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Currency and Communications with the Centre. The MRD Committee added two more subjects, Finance and Foreign Trade to the list which had not been endorsed by their Central Committee. He said similar views were held by various other parties in the MRD including TIP, JUI and even the PML. In our view, he said, such controversial issues should, therefore, be left open and attention should be focused on the unanimously-agreed principles which in terms of priority were the lifting of Martial Law and the revival of political process in the country. He further explained that since the MRD could not assume the character of an election alliance, it was not necessary to have consensus on all issues. Replying to another question, he said, we stand for Federation and do not subscribe to the idea of Confederation. But the Federation, he said, should have only four subjects leaving the re-

maining to its federating units. In his view this was the only course left open to safeguard the Federation of Pakistan.

The resolutions adopted by the National Working Committee of the NDP, were extremely critical of the prevailing conditions in the country. In a resolution on the political situation, the committee emphasised that the present regime had failed to resolve the grave problems faced by the nation and demanded that the present government should quit. The only course seen as viable by the committee was the holding of fresh elections to the constituent assembly to frame a new constitution for the country.

The National Working Committee also took strong exception of the present Afghan policy pursued by the government and expressed grave concern over the recent visit by former U.S. President, Richard Nixon, to Pakistan and his comments on the Afghanistan issue. The Committee through a resolution also condemned the recent attack on PLO headquarters in Tunis by Israel and demanded of the Pakistan Government to condemn the U.S. for supporting Israeli aggression.

The National Working Committee of the NDP endorsed a resolution in toto as adopted by the Punjab Working Committee supporting the demand for creating a separate province of Bahawalpur.

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY DISCUSSES REPORTED MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 7 Oct 85 p 4

[Text]

REPORTS of the inhuman treatment meted out to prisoners during their detention have often figured in the national Press. But the facts that have now come to light about one Asif Butt, an advocate, serving life sentence in the Multan Central Jail, are highly perturbing. He is said to have been put in chains and denied medical facilities. Responding to an adjournment motion in the National Assembly the other day, the Minister of State for Interior, Mr. Shah Mohammad Khorro, admitted that the prisoner was being kept in chains 'for violating jail rules' but did not disclose what particular rules had been infringed to warrant such harsh and humiliating treatment.

Asif Butt, an educated person and an advocate as well, is not the only detainee to have been treated with such harshness. There are others too, particularly political prisoners, who have been detained for years and continue to be subjected to highly exceptional treatment. A case in point is that of Rasul Bux Paleejo, a political leader in his own right, who has been ailing for long and should by now have been granted reprieve. Asif Butt may have been guilty of a more serious offence to have merited a life term in prison, but he is nonetheless a human being, and human beings are not kept in chains unless they are raving mad and appear likely to kill other inmates in prison or take their own life. Jails should be looked upon as reformatories, not as institutions to inflict corporal punishment or deliberate mental torture on their unfortunate inmates.

CSO: 4600/51

PAKISTAN

MAIL CENSORSHIP BRINGS COMPLAINTS OF DELAYS IN DELIVERY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Oct 85 p 6

[Text]

KARACHI, Sept 30: A large number of people have complained about inordinate delay in the delivery and receipt of foreign and inland mail following Government's decision to subject all mailed material to scrutiny by Special Branch and Intelligence Bureau, well-informed sources revealed.

The complaints include politicians, journalists, writers, businessmen and even some legislators who have alleged that since Aug 31 last when the Government imposed censorship on mail they have either received no letter or the frequency of the mail has been drastically reduced.

A source close to the General Post Office revealed that hundreds of letters and other material received from abroad are lying at the GPO awaiting checking and 'disposal' by the officials of Special Branch and Intelligence Bureau.

It may be recalled that the Sind Government issued a handout NO. 1677 on Aug 31 which stated:

"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the Post Office Act, 1898, the Federal Government has with immediate effect, for a period of six months, directed that all foreign or inland mail, other than diplomatic bags, capable of undermining the ideology of Pakistan or inciting a section of the people to bring about changes in the existing political, social or economic order by violence and all foreign and inland mail comprising obscene

and objectionable articles, shall, in the course of transmission by post or at the place of posting or delivery, be subjected to interception by the Special Branch and the Intelligence Bureau and shall be detained and delivered to the Superintendent of Police of Special Branch concerned for scrutiny and disposal."

The handout did not explain what was meant by 'disposal' and whether all mail detained and scrutinised would be destroyed or returned to the addressees if found innocent and not objectionable.

It is interesting to note that while the handout was issued by the Provincial Government, it makes it clear that the decision has been taken by the Federal Government and that the latter has "directed" this action. The question remains unanswered that if the order was from the Federal Government the handout should have been issued from Islamabad by the Press.

Another source told 'The Muslim' that the scrutiny of foreign and inland mail was being conducted on the basis of the "black list" prepared by the Special Branch, and Intelligence Bureau and some other agencies. But in practice most of the mail being received from abroad addressed even to ordinary citizens and inclusive of letters and aerograms is being detained, checked and 'disposed'.

It was previously assumed that only parcels, pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, and cyclo-styled or photostat material would be detained for scrutiny. But now even private letters of citizens are also being scanned.

PAKISTAN

SIND SAID HIT BY SPATE OF ROBBERIES

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Oct 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Kamran Khan]

[Text]

KARACHI, Oct 7: While Sind police are still looking for dacoits who committed more than a dozen dacoities in the first week of the current month, six persons armed with automatic weapons struck at a private company in the industrial area of Karachi this afternoon and looted an amount Rs.1,20,000 which was meant for the salaries of the employees. The dacoits who were six in number looted the amount at the office of Hashmi Can Company at gun point in the SITE area of Karachi. They had come in a Toyota car and later escaped after firing in the air.

The latest incident was reported just after 48 hours of an armed dacoity at a jewellery shop in the North Nazimabad in which dacoits, armed with sten guns, decamped with jewellery worth Rs 2 lakh.

On Friday armed persons had crept into the bungalow of a civil contractor in North Nazimabad and at gun point had looted cash jewellery and electronic gadgets worth about Rs.3 lakhs. Two similar cases have also been reported from the same area earlier this week in which armed persons had looted valuables of about Rs 3 lakh from two bungalows.

The wave of robberies is not restricted to the city of Karachi only as in Hyderabad a 'Blue Line' passenger bus was waylaid near Sind University at Jamshoro half an

hour after it left Hyderabad for Karachi. The passengers had to surrender all of their belongings to three youth who were armed with automatic weapons. After collecting the valuables worth about Rs.2 lakh, these youths escaped towards the Sind University campus.

In tehsil Kandoyaro of the province, police are looking for dacoits who are demanding ransom of Rs. 5 lakh for the release of two influential landlords named Mohammad Parel and Ghulam Bhagat. The kidnapped landlords had been kept at an unknown hideout. Reports said that relatives of landlords were negotiating with the dacoits to arrange an early and safe release.

During the current week at least 10 dacoits - all armed with rifles and pistols - had looted a trolley full of dowry in Kot Deji tehsil. The trolley was looted while a marriage party was returning after the wedding ceremony. According to the report lodged with police the trolley contained valuables worth about Rs. 2 lakh. Police had no clue to the dacoits till today.

On Oct 2, robbers stopped traffic on main highway leading Larkana near Qambar tehsil, and looted the passengers of at least three buses and fled away.

A senior Sind police official commenting on the recent wave of robberies described them as 'serious' and claimed that efforts were afoot to track down the culprits.

Meanwhile Mr. Ghulam Hussain Unar, MNA from Larkana has demanded a probe into the police claims that all notorious dacoits of Sind have been killed. He said that dacoits are still active throughout the province while police have failed to bring them to books.

PAKISTAN

TEHRIK-I-ISTIQLAL PARTY CONVENTION PREVENTED

GF271504 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 19 Oct 85 p 1

[Bureau report]

[Text] Lahore, 18 Oct--The authorities arrested over a hundred workers of Tehrik-i-Istiqlal who were going to hold a convention here today.

Strict security measures were taken by the police to foil the convention. The entire area was cordoned off. The ground where the convention was to be held was flooded by the security personnel. The chairs and shamianas [tents] were taken away by the police.

The convention was to be addressed by Air Marshal Asghar Khan but on arrival at the airport, he was informed that he could not go to the convention.

The police started arresting people at 8 a.m., and continued it till 4.30 p.m. According to Tehrik sources over 120 leaders, workers and students were arrested.

When Aitzaz Ahsan along with Malik Hamid Sarfaraz reached the Mall Road, at 10 a.m. they were bounded upon by police commandoes in plain clothes. At this stage there was a scuffle between the police personnel and leaders of the Tehrik. Soon afterward an official with police uniform reached the scene. The Tehrik leader protested against the attitude of the plain clothesmen and demanded that cases should be registered against them.

Prominent among those arrested were Umar Asghar Khan, Rana Mohammad Arshad, Munir Ahmad Khan, Suleman Khokhar, Makhdoom Ruknudin and Nawab Hussain Taj. Asghan Khan, who was scheduled to address the convention at 3.30 p.m., was not allowed to leave his residence.

In the afternoon Asif Vardag, secretary-general of the party, addressed a press conference and gave a full account of the incident.

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CSO: 4600/54

PAKISTAN

MRD OFFICIAL DESCRIBES PROBLEMS IN SIND JAILS

GF252013 Karachi DAWN in English 21 Oct 85 p 2

[Excerpt] Lahore, 20 Oct--Over 250 people, convicted for indulging in political activities, are still in Sind jails, even after having served their sentences, while about 150 others are serving their terms.

This was claimed here today by the general secretary of the MRD Hyderabad Branch, Mr Shakeel Pathan. He is also the Central General Secretary of the Sind Prisoners Release and Relief Committee and vice-president of the Sind Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi.

Addressing a press conference, Mr Shakeel gave details of physical torture cases. According to him the convicts include writers, publishers, students, lawyers, labour leaders and political workers. They are scattered in 12 different jails throughout the province while some of them have been kept in prisons of other provinces.

Jails, where these prisoners are kept include the Special Prison, Nara, Special Prison, Landhi, Central Prisons at Khairpur, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Karachi, District Prisons at Jacobabad and Larkana, the judicial lock-up at Badin and sub-jails of Thatta and Bathoro.

He contested the government claim that there were only five political prisoners under protective detention in Sind. Mr Pathan cited reports by the Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, in this regard.

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CSO: 4600/54

PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

ISRAELI RAID DENOUNCED--Islamabad, Oct 2--The government and the people of Pakistan are outraged and shocked by the dastardly attack by Israeli aircraft on the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Tunis, said a spokesman of the Foreign Office here today. They strongly condemn this latest act of aggression committed by Israel against the Arab people. This provocative action, which has resulted in the loss of innocent lives and is in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Tunisia, has established once again the utter disregard which Israel displays for the universally accepted principles of international law and civilised conduct. The reprehensible air raid not only poses a serious threat to the stability in the region but also vitiates the prospects of peace in the Middle East. Pakistan reaffirms its unwavering support for the just and indomitable cause of the Palestinian and the Arab people. Pakistan urges the international community and all peace-loving peoples to denounce this aggression which has caused loss of precious and innocent lives as well as violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a member state of the United Nations. Israel must be restrained from pursuing its dangerous policies which jeopardise world peace and stability, he added. President Ziaul Haq has also sent the messages of sympathy and support to President Habib Bourguiba of Tunis and Chairman PLO Yasser Arafat.--APP [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Oct 85 p 1]

INDIAN AMBASSADOR CALLS ON NOORANI--Islamabad, Oct 2--The Indian Ambassador Shilendra Kumar Singh called on the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Zain Noorani, here this afternoon. The Minister of State, while welcoming the Ambassador, expressed the hope that his tenure in Pakistan would be a happy one and that the two countries would come nearer to each other. The Minister of State stressed that the major problem in the way of Pak-India friendship was the atmosphere of distrust and that it was the duty of each one of us to try to remove this feeling. The Ambassador reciprocating the Minister of State's feelings expressed the hope that the mutual goodwill on both the sides would be made about peace and good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. Mr Noorani once again stressed that Pakistan was committed to a peace offensive under the instruction from President Ziaul Haq but this could be achieved only when public representatives and important government functionaries on both sides used the restrained words in their statements and utterances.--APP [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Oct 85 p 3]

PAKISTAN-CANADIAN OIL VENTURE--Islamabad, 22 Oct--A four-member delegation of Petro Canada International Assistance Corporation led by its vice-president, John Southerland, called on the minister of state for petroleum and natural resources, Dr Mohammad Asad Khan, here this afternoon. During the meeting, matters relating to future offshore oil exploration in Pakistan including drilling of one more offshore well were discussed. The possibilities of carrying out seismic survey to delineate new drillable offshore projects also came under discussion. The progress of first offshore oil well in Pakistan (Pak-Can) which was inaugurated by the prime minister on 11 October last was also reviewed. The future exploration strategies for offshore including seismic survey for mapping the additional drillable structures and the future cooperation between Pakistan and Petro-Canada in offshore oil exploration were also discussed. [Excerpt] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 23 Oct 85 p 3 GF]

QAYYUM ELECTED AJK PRESIDENT--Muzaffarabad, Sept 30--Sardar Mohammad Abdul Qayyum Khan has been elected president of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The AJK Chief Election Commissioner, Mr Justice (Retd) Mohammad Gul declared him successful at a Press conference immediately after the polling. The polling started at 11 a.m. and continued up to 1.30 p.m. Secretary Election Commission, Ghulam Haider Khan acted as Returning Officer. Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan got 29 votes. Members of the opposition did not take part in the voting. Greeting: The Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo has felicitated Sardar Abdul Qayyum on his election to the office of President of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The newly elected President will take oath of his office tomorrow at 11 a.m. at a ceremony in front of the Assembly building.--APP [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Oct 85 p 1]

PLEA FOR NEW DAM SITE--Karachi, Oct 1--Mr P.K. Shahani, former adviser on agriculture, Government of Sind, has called upon the authorities to appoint a high level commission to examine all possible sites for constructing a dam and arriving at a just solution. In a statement, he supported the NWFP Chief Minister for criticising the selection of Kalabagh as site for a dam. He said "Frontier Chief Minister Arbab Mohammad Jehangir has rightly condemned the selection of power oriented Kalabagh as the site for a dam and suggested Basha, upstream of Tarbela. Though this is one of the favourable sites having low silt content, higher storage and greater life span, there is a still better site at Skardu which satisfied all the multi-purpose requirements of water, power and flood control, besides helping in a more orderly release pattern of Tarbela. Skardu is practically silt-free as the area is out of the mountain range and the river run-off is free from glaciers and snow-fed mountain catchment area. "It is therefore in the fitness of things that a high-level commission be appointed to examine all possible dam sites and scrutinise various feasibilities, so as to arrive at a considered consensus in the national interest based upon a thorough evaluation of the cost-benefit in regard to least displacement. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 2 Oct 85 p 6]

KASHMIRIS DEMONSTRATE AT UN--At the United Nations yesterday, a number of Kashmiris staged about an hour-long demonstration to press for their right to self-determination. This was their second demonstration. They held one on Thursday [24 October]. Yesterday's was a bigger rally, and state's Sikhs had also participated. They were organized by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The conference chief, Sultan Mahmud Chowdhury, who led the demonstration, said the struggle for the liberation of Kashmir would go on. They were committed to their cause because it was just. He said if all the issues like Kashmir were not resolved, smaller and weaker nations would start losing the confidence in the United Nations. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in English 1005 GMT 26 Oct 85 BK]